

# THE MONIST

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## PLATO AND MODERN EDUCATION

CONTEMPORARY education reflects the passing of the old order and the birththroes of the new. It focuses in a narrow field the changes which are taking place in all departments of our common life, the decay of established institutions and the tentative beginnings of new modes of thought and feeling, and new forms of organized activity. Thus we are witnessing the introduction of new methods of discipline and teaching. Higher education is becoming available for the poor as well as for the rich. We are beginning to take thought for all young children and all adolescents. The teachers are for the moment better paid. But on the other hand we are not quite sure that education is worth having, unless we can have it cheap, and those who believe in its value differ greatly in their views about the nature of that value and the ways in which it can be realized. When our ears are not deafened by the war-cries of conflicting parties, we hear a still voice asking three insistent questions. What kind of life should education help our boys and girls to live? What form of social order should it help us to establish? What place, if any, has religion in the education we wish to see? To these questions we have not yet as a nation found an answer. But until we are substantially agreed as to the answers to be given, we have no recognized standard by which to test our present methods, and no sure guide and inspiration for the future. The questions are old questions, but they require new answers, to be gained only by our own thought

and effort. While, however, we cannot take our answers ready-made from any authority or system, it may stimulate our thinking to recall the answers given by perhaps the greatest among the writers on education. Plato was faced by the same questions as those which puzzle us today. And if the advent of Christianity and the advance of knowledge and of society have shown us many things he could not see, yet in splendor of thought and insight he stands unapproachable above us. Moreover, the difference between his standpoint and our own makes his answers to our questions all the more suggestive.

To begin with, Plato approaches the subject of education by a path different from that followed by most modern writers. Holding as he does that education is a means and not an end, he treats it, not as an isolated process, but as part of a larger whole. Thus, neither of the two books which expound his educational views in detail is ostensibly devoted to the subject. The *Republic* is concerned with the conditions of right living, and it deals with education as the chief means by which those conditions can be fulfilled. The *Laws* sets forth the principles upon which the city-state should base its common life and institutions, and education is considered because it is one great instrument by which the state can secure its own well-being and the well-being of its citizens. In both cases, the center of interest is the social or supra-social end to be attained, and in the discussion of educational questions this end is kept constantly before us. Modern writers, on the other hand, tend to concentrate upon the process of education and to assume, rather than expound, the purpose it should serve. Thus, for instance, Locke's *Thoughts on Education* opens with the simple statement: "A sound mind in a sound body is a short but full description of a happy state in this world." Rousseau begins his *Emile* with a panegyric on natural as opposed to artificial education. The first chapter of Her-

bert Spencer's *Education*, it is true, raises the question, "What knowledge is most worth?" but the discussion is superficial and is only loosely connected with the educational doctrines of the remainder of the book. This difference between Plato and modern writers is not due solely to the obvious fact that it is no longer possible to include a system of philosophy and a detailed treatment of education within the covers of a single book. The same writer might give us two treatises, or one work in several volumes. The difference is really one of outlook. We are mainly interested in the details of the picture, and are more or less content to take for granted that if the details are right the whole picture will be true. Plato thought first of the meaning of the whole, to which all details were subordinate. Our attitude has great advantages. It has, for instance, increased the efficiency of our methods. But it has also resulted in the uncertainty of aim, which is one of the chief weaknesses of modern education. It has tended to divert attention from such fundamental questions as those named above, and to loosen the links which bind education to the deepest interests of our life. Thus, for example, the schools have been led to magnify their office, and to think of the knowledge and training they impart as valuable in themselves. The history of classical teaching and our whole system of elementary education provide only too many illustrations of this tendency.

The difference between Plato's way of approaching education and that fashionable in our own time is seen in the relative prominence given to psychology in educational theory. We all agree with him in holding that while psychology can tell us much about the process of education, it cannot define the aims by which the process should be inspired. For a knowledge of these aims we must go to such sciences as those of ethics and of politics in Aristotle's sense. But as a matter of fact our books on education

give us a great deal of psychology and very little ethics. Plato on the other hand talks more about ethics than he does about psychology, and his treatment of both is only a part of a general theory of human life. Here again we have something to learn from him, and the wisest teachers in our Training Colleges are beginning to insist that psychology without philosophy is like a locomotive without its rails.

In attempting a bare and partial outline of Plato's theory of education, we shall take his *Republic* as our guide, omitting much that does not bear directly on our special purpose. As all readers of the *Republic* know, the book contains two distinct discussions of the aims and methods of education necessary for the welfare of Plato's city-state. The second treats of education as the means of realizing the highest possible form of human life. It will be convenient to take these two discussions separately.

In the first four books of the *Republic* the subject of education comes up for consideration in the course of a more general argument. What, Plato asks, is the kind of life that fulfills the proper aim of living? The question is introduced by Socrates asking the aged Cephalus, what kind of life he has found to bring him peace at the last. This way of putting the question implies, first, that the test of a life rightly lived is happiness or permanent satisfaction; and, secondly, that such a life will possess a special quality of rightness, distinguishing it from other lives. The point to be considered is what we ought to understand by this peculiar quality of rightness. The answer to which a discussion of popular and Sophistic answers leads us may be roughly outlined as follows: Every living thing, such as a horse or an eye, has its characteristic end or function, and a characteristic virtue or excellence by which it fulfills this end. The end or function of the human soul is to live, and its virtue or excellence is the quality of rightness of

living, or justice, as δικαιοσύνη is usually translated.<sup>1</sup> Justice is thus no mere matter of convention, but rooted in the nature of the soul. It follows that the just man must necessarily be happy in the truest sense, and the unjust man miserable.

These results, however, do not carry us very far. They do not show us in what his quality of justice actually consists. Plato therefore goes on to consider what justice is like in actual fact. He assumes that it is manifested in men's dealings with each other, and looks for it in the common life of the city-state. If this common life fulfills its proper end, it will do so because it has justice, which is the proper excellence of our common as well as of our individual life. Plato analyzes the principles upon which the state's common life is based in order to discover the principle of justice which is thus the source of the state's well-being. He finds that the reason why men live a common life is that they have wants which they cannot satisfy by themselves, whereas each man can help to satisfy the wants of others.<sup>2</sup> He then asks what qualities will enable a man to play his proper part in thus ministering to the common good. He takes the city's defenders, or "guardians," as an example, and shows that they must possess "spirit" or courage, and at the same time be gentle and "philosophic," that is lovers of wisdom and gentle to their friends, because they are attracted by what is akin to themselves.<sup>3</sup> He is led to distinguish three elements in the human soul, the desires which apart from the higher elements are mere appetites, "spirit," and the philosophic element or reason. The last two elements are later seen to be the general tend-

<sup>1</sup> I, 335, 353. We may compare William Wallace: "We are, as it were, endowed with a problem, enriched with a task—the task to live." *Lecture and Essays*, p. 91. Wallace's book is a valuable commentary on much of Plato's thought.

<sup>2</sup> II, 369f.

<sup>3</sup> II, 375.

encies to self-assertion, and to union with that which answers to our higher selves.\*

After this brief analysis of human nature, Plato at once raises the question of how the "guardians" are to be reared and educated. The sudden transition is due to Plato's taking it for granted that education is the necessary means for ensuring that his citizens will possess the qualities he desires. Justice is, indeed, rooted in the nature of the soul, but it does not grow without the gardener's care. Right living is always the result of deliberate common effort, and education is the process by which the state, as represented by its wisest members, moulds the characters of its less developed citizens.

Following out this general conception of education, Plato tells us that the training given to the "guardians" ought to evoke in them courage, the special excellence of the "spirit" element in their souls, wisdom, the excellence of the "philosophic" element, and temperance or self-control. This last excellence involves the obedience of the lower elements to the higher, and especially the curbing of the appetites. How far this type of education should be given to the craftsmen and traders Plato does not definitely say. He hints, however, that it should be given to all citizens, and in the *Laws* he lays down a system of universal compulsory education up to sixteen years of age. Allowing, therefore, for his lack of sympathy with those whose nature was framed by God of brass and iron,\* we may take the education prescribed for the "guardians" as embodying the principles upon which Plato held that all education should be based.

If we compare Plato's conception of education with that which has taken shape in our own primary and secondary schools, one obvious difference is that our education is

\* It is interesting to compare and contrast the introversion and extraversion of recent psychology.

\* III, 415.

largely intellectual, whereas Plato's was in the main a training in moral character. Our traditional system of elementary education, in particular, lays great stress on knowledge, while Plato held that for young children knowledge was of comparatively small importance. Of course, we all agree in theory that the chief end of education is not knowledge but moral character in the widest sense. We assume that learning will make us good as well as wise. We rightly lay stress upon the value of the discipline which school life gives. But when all is said, our practice to some extent belies our theory. Our primary schools are still as a rule places to which children are sent in order that they may "learn." Inspectors do not often ask whether a school's boys are courageous or its girls self-controlled. The efforts now being made in England to improve our secondary schools aim almost entirely at better intellectual work. The Board of Education has established Advance Courses. It has not devoted itself to spreading our own counterpart of Plato's education, namely that typified by our English public schools. Plato's scheme no doubt assigns too small a place to knowledge, perhaps because he associated knowledge too exclusively with the higher education described later in his book. But in any case the aim of his education could not be chiefly intellectual. If, as he teaches, education is a training in the art of living, or of fulfilling the function of human life, it must treat the young as full human beings, for whom knowledge apart from feeling and action is of little worth. None of us probably would dispute this doctrine, but we are apt in ordinary life to narrow the more comprehensive aim. We are tempted to think of education as giving the store of information, and perhaps the social habits, expected of an "educated" man. Or we think of it as a preparation for success in some calling or profession. In either case, the narrowness of our aim prevents us from seeing how one-sided

is the intellectual school tradition which dates from the Renaissance. The result is one of our national inconsistencies. In most departments of our common life we tend to underestimate the value of intellectual knowledge. In education we exaggerate its importance. This inconsistency is one reason why so many of us do not really believe in education, which we associate with the acquisition of useless information. At the same time some of us are on Plato's side, and we can trace the influence of ideals not unlike his in many schools.

But while, according to Plato, all men alike are called to realize the meaning or end of human life, they will not all do so in the same way. We can fulfill the end of our being only as individual persons, who are members of, for instance, definite families and callings. Thus, the soldier lives a right human life by being a good soldier. The universal human excellences of courage, wisdom, temperance, and justice must be exhibited in his life, but they will be exhibited in a special form. It follows that the general aim of education is the same for all, but that this aim will take different concrete shapes according to each man's nature and mode of life. Plato thinks of these individual differences as differences in social function, and his scheme of education is therefore in a sense vocational, because only by being vocational can it be truly liberal or human. The "guardians" must be trained as guardians, since this is the only way of training them as men. This conception is familiar to us and inspires much of our best technical instruction, but our economic and social conditions make it difficult for us to do justice to both the liberal and the vocational sides of education. Thus on the one hand we are keenly alive to the economic value of some forms of technical instruction, and are therefore tempted to teach subjects like bookkeeping from a narrowly technical point of view. In the same way some of our technical and com-

mercial schools tend to regard industrial efficiency as their ultimate aim. On the other hand, our right desire to give all our boys and girls a truly liberal education, sometimes leads us to think that we can do so only by giving them all an education of the same kind.

In one respect we are giving effect to Plato's principles more fully than he did himself. He throughout assumes that education does not implant in the mind something extraneous which it did not before possess, such as mere information, or habits of conduct imposed by an alien authority. Education, he teaches, helps the soul to realize its true nature. It gives the soul the right air to breath, or turns its eyes towards the light. This belief in the soul's inherent capacity for good is implied in what we may roughly call the reformed methods of discipline and teaching, which are being widely adopted in our schools.<sup>6</sup> These methods lay stress upon the child's own interests, and rely upon guidance and inspiration rather than on restraint. We must not, however, like some enthusiasts, forget the other side of Plato's doctrine, namely that in the soul there is a lower as well as a higher element, and that education must therefore always be an arduous process involving the taming or subjugation of the wild beast within us.

The instruments by which the education of the "guardians" is to be given were found by Plato ready to his hand. They are the accepted instruments of Greek education, music and gymnastics. Incidentally, Plato also mentions the elements of science.<sup>7</sup> But he uses these instruments in a new way, at the same time making them more powerful. For him music and gymnastics are the means by which the influences of the city's common life are brought to bear upon the young, whose souls are thus opened to what is good and true and beautiful in the world around them, interpreted and in part created by the skill

<sup>6</sup> See, for instance, Edmond Holmes: *In Defence of What Might Be.*  
<sup>7</sup> E. g., VII, 537.

and knowledge and insight which have built up the city's political and religious life and produced its art and literature. And since the influences of the common life are manifold, music and gymnastics become very comprehensive terms. Under gymnastics he includes diet and organized games and dancing, as well as military exercises and gymnastics in the narrow sense.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, because gymnastics is an instrument of education in the sense explained, it must not only strengthen the body but thereby invigorate the soul.<sup>9</sup> Just as we value games for their moral as well as for their physical effects, so Plato held that the main purpose of gymnastics was to develop the element of "spirit" in the soul, fostering in it courage and endurance. For similar reasons Plato, both in the *Republic* and the *Laws*, emphasizes the importance of military exercises. We might expect him to do so when describing the education of the "guardians," but in the *Laws* there is no such limitation. He does not, however, value military training because he delights in war. "In war there never was, nor is, nor ever will be, either amusement or instruction to any extent worth considering."<sup>10</sup> But he regards the defence of the city as one important form of social service, and the city's military organization as one department of its common life. Military exercises are therefore a method of bringing boys and girls under the influence of that life, and so are truly educational.

Plato's conception of the process of education finds still clearer expression in his discussion of the teaching of "music" to the young. By "music" he means not only music as we use the term, but also literature and art and religious doctrines and observances. By "music" the spiritual influences of the boys' and girls' environment are made available for their souls' nourishment and training.

<sup>8</sup> III, 404. *Laws*, VII, 794.

<sup>9</sup> II, 410.

<sup>10</sup> *Laws*, VII, 803.

They thus come to "dwell in a land of health, amid fair sights and sounds, and receive the good in everything; and beauty, the effluence of fair works, shall flow into the eye and ear, like a health-giving breeze from a purer region, and insensibly draw the soul from the earliest years into likeness and sympathy with the beauty of reason."<sup>11</sup>

The process of education is thus partly one of conscious learning, but even more one of unconsciously absorbing the influences of a health-giving environment. The philosophic element in the young soul reaches out to all that is fair and good in its surroundings, to which it is drawn by a sense of spiritual kinship. The character of the environment is therefore of great importance, and Plato describes in detail the type of religion and art and literature and music which the city should provide for its young citizens. As is well known, he approves or rejects different forms of art and literature and religious teaching according as they are likely to have a good or bad effect upon the young. This criterion is not, however, so arbitrary as it seems. For the function of art and literature, according to his doctrine, is to mirror or imitate the nature of ultimate reality and goodness. Such imitation of the real is necessarily imperfect, but it may be in principle faithful or unfaithful to the reality it mirrors. The measure of its faithfulness is its power to evoke in men the qualities which perfect reality itself possesses. Thus if a poem tends to arouse our baser passions, that poem is to be condemned not only for its effect but also as intrinsically bad. If it inspires a noble attitude of mind, this is a proof that it achieves its proper end.

This theory of art is obviously open to criticism from several points of view, and when Plato works his doctrine out in detail, discussing for instance the effect of rhythmic movement and of different kinds of music upon the soul, he raises questions about which a good deal might be said.

<sup>11</sup> III, 401. Jowett's translation.

But even where we disagree, we find much that is suggestive in his teaching, and ideas akin to his are inspiring some of the most interesting movements in contemporary education. Here, however, we can only briefly notice two principles which Plato took for granted and made part of the foundation of his system of education.

In the first place, Plato assumes that education is the most important among the duties of the state. For by educating its younger members the state most directly fulfills its special function, that of enabling its citizens to lead good lives. This principle underlies the arguments on education both in the *Republic* and the *Laws*, but its truth is less obvious to us than it was to Plato. For Plato, the state's activities covered the whole of its citizen's common life. It therefore had the right and duty to supervise their religion and art and literature, as well as their education. And the state has these rights and duties because, as Plato held, it is a spiritual organism of which the function is right living. The state lives in its members' common life. We, on the other hand, tend to think of the state as concerned with the conditions of right living, rather than as itself living a full life.<sup>12</sup> We therefore assign it a much narrower field. But we need not accept Plato's theory of the state in its entirety in order to see that he calls attention to a very important aspect of the state's activity. We have been taught by experience that it is impossible to limit the state's influence to the sphere of legal administration. For all state action has its source in its members' thoughts and wills, and in turn affects their minds and characters. The state therefore cannot escape some measure of responsibility for the moral results of its acts, and for the sake of its own efficiency it is bound to secure, within the limits of its powers, that its members' minds

<sup>12</sup> For a discussion of these and similar questions see E. Barker: *Greek Political Theory. Plato and His Predecessors*, especially p. 383ff. and the same writer's *Political Thought from Spencer to Today*.

are rightly guided. We recognized this fact when we established compulsory education. We recognized it also in less desirable ways during the war. But our recognition is apt to be half-hearted, and we may well learn from Plato to face the position boldly. We must demand that the educational influence of any action taken by the state should be carefully considered, and we shall see that all action tends to be disastrous if it is not inspired by an ideal of right living as lofty as that which guided Plato when planning his *Republic*.

Secondly, Plato holds that we are educated by "imitating" or growing more like the persons and things around us. Our generation is beginning to recognize the truth and importance of this principle, though our interpretation of it is not quite the same as Plato's. But in spite of the teaching of psychology we do not yet honor it in our practice, and Plato's thorough-going application of it helps us to realize how great a difference our observance of it would make. What would Plato have said of the educational effect produced by the ugliness of most modern towns, or by the tendencies of much of our literature and art? Would he have approved of our typical school buildings, or of the conditions under which most school work is carried on? It is to be feared that many of our educational administrators would have been expelled from Plato's state.

The long discussion of the education to be given to the "guardians" forms part, as we have seen, of the description of the city-state in which justice is to be discovered. After concluding it, Plato goes on to show that this education, and the corresponding organization of the common life, will make that life efficient for its purpose, and will promote the virtues or excellences of wisdom, courage, temperance, and truth. But, he asks, what about the justice which we set out to find? He answers that justice is the principle presupposed in the whole inquiry. It is sim-

ply the principle that every man should do his own business and nothing else, that "a man should practise one thing only, the thing to which his nature is best adapted."<sup>13</sup> It is the observance of this principle, both by individuals and by social classes, which makes an organized common life possible at all, and the more strictly the principle is observed, the more efficient will the common life become. We have therefore discovered the characteristic excellence of the city-state, which we call by the name of justice. But justice in the state is justice in the individual soul writ large, and in the light of the results attained, Plato now answers the question from which the whole dialogue started. The characteristic excellence of the soul, or justice in the individual man, consists in each of the soul's constituent elements playing its proper part in the soul's life as a whole.<sup>14</sup> These elements we have found to be three, appetite, "spirit," and reason, which Plato compares to the higher, lower, and middle notes of the scale.<sup>15</sup> It is the harmonious co-operation of these three that constitutes justice or right living, because such harmony is the soul's characteristic excellence by which it is enabled to achieve its proper end. Justice thus defined is something more than temperance. It is the active principle of effective work, not the comparatively passive equilibrium attained by subordinating the lower to the higher. In Plato's view all virtues or excellences are "powers," endowing us with the ability to "do our own business," and this is emphatically true of justice. Plato's justice has, indeed, been described as "the power of individual concentration on duty."<sup>16</sup>

It follows that if education is to evoke justice in the soul, it must inspire to strenuous and rational endeavor. It must be an education of the will, that is of the whole self as

<sup>13</sup> IV, 443.

<sup>14</sup> IV, 434.

<sup>15</sup> IV, 443.

<sup>16</sup> R. L. Nettleship: *Lectures on Plato's Republic*, p. 151.

active. Such an education would tend, in Milton's words, to "gain our boys and girls to an incredible diligence and courage: infusing into their young breasts such an ingenuous and noble ardor, as would not fail to make many of them renowned and matchless men." Both in the individual and in society it might well be revolutionary in its effects. Modern psychology is helping us to give a concrete meaning to this dynamic conception of education. It tells us of the "actual moment" in the act of willing, of the disastrous consequences of the mental conflict and repression from which we are apt to suffer, and of the mental harmony and vigor which right education may enable us to attain. One of the main tasks of education in the future will be to give effect in practice to our appreciation of its power to unlock and harmonize the energies of our minds.

We may now pass to Plato's second discussion of education in the later books of the *Republic*. He there treats in rather less detail of the highest type of education, the type which is to be given to the rulers of the state. Just as in the earlier books, the subject of education is raised in the course of a wider argument. This argument starts from the question, whether the city-state which has been described can possibly exist in actual fact.<sup>17</sup> The answer is that the city will remain an unattainable ideal until philosophers are kings and kings philosophers. This statement is a paradoxical way of putting one of Plato's fundamental doctrines. The only ultimate realities are spiritual realities, of which the things of sense are but imperfect copies, owing such reality as they possess to their reflection of the ultimately real. These ultimate realities are unchanging and eternal, and form an harmonious whole centering in the Idea or principle of Good. That Idea, far from being a vague abstraction, or the creation of our minds, is the very essence of reality and value. It is "the

<sup>17</sup> V, 471.

chief and final satisfaction for which our souls are always looking."<sup>18</sup> It is the source and illumination of the world of space and time, as the sun is of the world of nature, and it is the culmination of all truth and love. Though "beyond existence and above knowledge," it can yet be truly known and loved in part by men who turn away from the things of sense, or view them in the light of the realities they embody, and whose souls are filled with passionate love for that which alone is perfect. It follows that the ideal state which has been described can never become fully actual. For "by the nature of things the actual grasps truth in a less degree than does thought expressed in words."<sup>19</sup> That philosophers should be kings and kings philosophers is a dream which will never be completely realized. But the ideal state will take shape on earth in proportion as some actual state derives its strength and being from the ultimate reality of which it is a copy. The correspondence of such a state with its spiritual antitype, Plato holds, must be ensured by a special body of men who live in the light and strength of the ultimate Good, and who, knowing what the Good really is, can rightly order the common life. It is therefore of the first importance for the actual state that such men should be found. But their value will not be measured simply by their service to the state. They share the supreme value of the ultimate realities in which they live. On the level we have now reached, the state itself is seen to be only a copy of a heavenly city, and is therefore only of derivative importance. We can even do without it, though in that case we suffer grievous loss. It may be that the philosopher will not find in the land of his birth a city in which he can realize his aims, and will not be a statesman in an actual city "unless he have a divine call

<sup>18</sup> E. Caird: *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, vol. I, p. 161. Caird gives an illuminating discussion of many points in Plato's doctrine.

<sup>19</sup> V, 473.

thereto." But he can nevertheless be a statesman in his own city, which is his soul. For the city we have founded in thought is "perhaps laid up in heaven as an example for him who desires to behold it, and beholding to found it in himself."<sup>20</sup> We are thus carried from the level of society to that of philosophy and religion. The right living, or justice, discovered in the constitution of the city-state is seen to be the reflection of a profounder justice which is the law of the universe itself. This ultimate justice is embodied in the life of those who while yet on earth are citizens of heaven. They "do their business" not merely as members of the social world, but as dwellers in the world of absolute perfection. Such is the final answer to the question as to the nature of justice with which the whole dialogue began.

When Plato has shown how important it is for the city to have philosophers for its rulers, he immediately raises the question of how such philosophers can be secured. He replies that they will be forthcoming only if men born with noble souls receive a fitting education. In the seventh book he sketches such a course of education. Its primary purpose is to free the souls of the chosen few from the leaden weights of sensual pleasure, and to turn their eyes from the darkness of the world of sense to the light of spiritual realities. In describing it, Plato gives us in an ideal form an outline scheme of higher education.

This scheme seems at first sight to be fundamentally different from that propounded in the earlier books. There stress was laid upon the influence of environment. The boys and girls danced and drilled, saw beautiful things, heard martial music, were told religious myths, and learned inspiring poems, and thus unwittingly grew brave and self-controlled and practically efficient. They were carefully guarded by a paternal government from contact with any

<sup>20</sup> IX, 592. The translation is that given by Adam in his edition of the *Republic*.

kind of evil. Here, on the other hand, the aim of the training is to develop in the future rulers the power of independent thought, to open to them the secrets of the universe, and to help them as they increase in knowledge to be filled with the intellectual love of God. The course is also far more severe. Those who follow it must "travel the longer road." They must renounce the common pleasures and ambitions of mankind, and when they have been constant to the end, they become, as it were, strangers and pilgrims among men. When, however, we look more closely, we see that the two forms of education are complementary rather than opposed. Both are based on the conviction that, in order to live aright, a man must become an effective member of a larger world, and that by reaching out to what is good and true and beautiful in that world, he can make his own soul fair and true. Thus, will he be enabled to do the work to which he has been called. Both types of education foster the same excellences of character, illumined in both cases by what we should call religious faith. The two courses are different stages in one process. In the earlier stage the world from which the soul draws its nourishment is the social world, and the life for which it is prepared is a life of social service. In the later stage the world widens into the universe of ultimate reality, and the life becomes that of the servants and lovers of God Himself.

We cannot follow in detail the course of study which Plato prescribes for his young rulers. It begins with arithmetic and geometry, plane and solid, passes on to astronomy and harmonics, and culminates in the study of the highest subject, dialectic. The sciences are learned, not for their practical utility, nor for the knowledge of phenomena they give, but for the sake of their influence on the soul. In the first place they provide a training in the art of thinking, and in the second place they open the soul's

eyes to see the general principles or laws which are the true being of the phenomenal world. Thus geometry is not learned in order that the student may know how to pitch a camp or draw up an army, but because it gives a knowledge of unchanging truth and so "compels the soul to turn her gaze towards the place where is perfection and true being."<sup>21</sup> Like Mr. Bertrand Russell in our own day, Plato treats mathematics as the study of the basic principles of thinking. Thus, for example, arithmetic deals with fundamental problems such as that of the real relation of the one to the many, or of the greater to the less. For Plato, as for Russell, "all pure mathematics is a priori,"<sup>22</sup> "compelling the soul," as Plato says, "to reason about abstract number, and rebelling against the introduction of visible or tangible objects into the argument."<sup>23</sup> The educational value which Plato attributed to the study of mathematics and physical science on the lines he lays down may be illustrated by a quotation from another modern writer. "The principles, ideals, and picturings of Mathematics and Physics," says Friedrich von Hügel,<sup>24</sup> (with their insistence upon ruthless law, utter interchangeableness of all individual instances, and flawless determinism) have a very certain place and function in the full spiritual life of the soul. For they provide that preliminary Pantheism, that transition through fate and utter dehumanization, which will allow the soul to affirm, ultimately and as ultimate, a Libertarianism and Personalism free from all sentimentality and slovenliness, and immune against the attacks of ultimate Pantheism, which can now be vanquished as only the caricature of the poorer half of a far richer whole."

The study of the sciences, not in isolation from each other but as parts of an ordered whole of knowledge, pre-

<sup>21</sup> VII, 526.

<sup>22</sup> Russell: *Problems of Philosophy*, p. 119.

<sup>23</sup> VII, 525.

<sup>24</sup> *Eternal Life*, p. 388.

pares the young ruler for his highest and most difficult task, the study of dialectic. Plato's dialectic was a special discipline with its own subject-matter and method, but we may take it as roughly equivalent to philosophical research, including under philosophy metaphysics, logic, ethics and theology. The purpose which is indirectly accomplished by the study of science, is consciously and directly achieved by dialectic. The soul is drawn upward towards perfect truth, is inflamed by the love of ultimate Good, and so becomes the spectator of all time and all existence.

If we compare Plato's scheme of higher education with the system in vogue in our own universities, we see that it is at once narrower and wider. It is narrower in so far as it is intended only for a special class of men, destined to perform one type of social service. To be a philosopher-king was in Plato's eyes the only calling fit for the elect souls of gold. He therefore prescribes the same curriculum for all, varying no doubt in detail, but leading by the same path to the same general end. Our universities, on the contrary, are tending more and more to prepare their students for many callings, and the courses they provide are continually growing more highly specialized. This difference is due partly to the larger range of modern knowledge and to the greater complexity of modern life. But it is due also to our conviction that here are many roads to the highest type of knowledge, and that university education ought not to be the privilege of exceptional men.

On the other hand, Plato's scheme was wider than our own in that it included a far broader field of knowledge and a longer course of study. Ten years were to be given to science, and five to dialectic. We try in three or four years to introduce our students to some important branch of knowledge, and to give them a scholarly or scientific attitude of mind. For Plato the change to be effected was much more fundamental. It was a conversion or revolu-

tion of the soul, a "transvaluation of all values," an initiation into a new and higher life. The change was moral as well as intellectual. Plato's philosophers were to be saints and heroes as well as lovers of all knowledge.

Most readers must feel that the second part of the *Republic* may describe a pattern laid up in heaven, but that this pattern can never in its details be copied upon earth. At any rate Plato's system of higher education is impracticable as it stands. But its value for us today lies less in its details than in the principles it embodies. The first and foremost of these principles is that education can never be merely social in its aims and outlook. Its purpose is not to make good citizens and nothing more. It can only make good citizens by training men and women to live in the strength of a faith in ultimate truth and goodness. For social life is based upon realities and values beyond itself. As Dr. Bernard Bosanquet puts it: Social life presupposes a guide and criterion beyond its current activities. No training in group-life will dispense with a direction of the social mind to the positive values which are not diminished by sharing, to beauty, that is, to truth, and to religion. "Aristotle" (and we may add Plato) "was surely right when he made religion the ultimate aim and quintessence of civic life, and it is only devotion to these supreme values that can guide desire aright, and keep patriotism sweet and clean."<sup>25</sup> We may reject Plato's principle as thus interpreted, but if we accept it we must take it seriously. The great task before us would then seem to be the recovery in a new form of that faith in the supreme importance of spiritual values, of which Plato was one of the noblest prophets. This task would appeal to us as particularly urgent in the field of education. We should agree with Prof. Muirhead when he tells us that "the main problem of the immediate future is to reinspire our educational sys-

<sup>25</sup> *Philosophical Theory of the State*, 3rd. ed., p. LXII.

tem with the religious idea, the idea that the task to which the teacher is called is nothing less than the opening of the soul to all the influences, spiritual, social, aesthetic, cosmic, that call to it from the unseen, and thus to fit it for its true life.”<sup>26</sup>

A second principle implied in Plato's scheme of higher education is that such education ought not merely to make the students masters of one subject, or even to equip them for research in some special field. It ought to give them “synoptic” minds, enabling them to view their special interests in relation to the whole of life and knowledge. It should make them in a true sense philosophers, possessing something of that freedom and impartiality of mind, “which in contemplation is the unalloyed desire for truth . . . in action, is justice, and in emotion is that universal love which can be given to all, and not only to those who are judged useful or admirable.”<sup>27</sup> The main weakness of much of the work in our modern universities is its failure to be philosophical in this sense. It is far more difficult for us than it was for Plato to comprehend the whole of knowledge in one philosophic view, but that is no reason why we should not strive to share his spirit. Our universities will focus and inspire the nation's spiritual life in proportion as they take Plato's ideal for their own, however much they may change its form.

If we think of Plato's two-fold system of education as a whole, we see that his description of it suffers from the lack of any idea of evolution, and also from his want of sympathy with less gifted natures. Had Plato lived today, we may be bold to imagine that he would have drawn less rigid lines between his social classes and his two stages of education. But standing on his shoulders and on those of later teachers, we can catch a glimpse of an education which would be true to his essential principles while apply-

<sup>26</sup> *Moral Instruction and Training in Schools*, ed. M. E. Sadler, vol. I, p. 68.

<sup>27</sup> B. Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

ing them in a less exclusive way. Such a system of education would provide a broadly human training for every boy and girl, varying according to the needs of each, but guided always by Plato's aim of turning the soul's eyes towards what is good and beautiful and true. Its methods would be Plato's methods used in combination with each other. It would surround the growing soul with the life-giving influences of literature and science, art and music, and beautiful objects of every kind. It would train healthy bodies as the friends and servants of healthy minds. But it would also, as the soul could bear it, change the unconscious response to environment into conscious converse through will and reason with the spiritual realities half hidden and half revealed in the world of daily life. It would lay stress on concrete forms of social service, for it is only by doing his proper work that a man can live aright, but it would insist also upon the religious basis of all life and duty, and find man's highest good in the knowledge and love of God.

H. BOMPAS SMITH.

UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER, ENGLAND.

## FICHTE ON EDUCATION

IT SEEMS appropriate at the present time to try to estimate the value of Johann Gottlieb Fichte's *Addresses to the German Nation*,<sup>1</sup> delivered in Berlin during the winter of 1807-1808, and which were published in April of the latter year. Fichte saw in education the only true foundation of national prosperity, and he devoted a large part of the fourteen addresses to the task of formulating and applying the principles of a system of education that would achieve the desired result. In this article an attempt is made to lay bare these principles by an analysis of the addresses and to subject them to critical examination.

Fichte starts from the fact that Germany has sunk into a state of abject and humiliating subjection to France and Napoleon. The German race is now conditioned in its development and in its aims by the alien power that governs its fate; its activity is restricted and fettered, and the downfall of the nation is threatened by fusion with foreign peoples. It is useless for Germans to blame one another for their position; it is the whole spirit of the age that has brought such misery upon them. No one can help them out of that position but themselves: they must find the remedy and apply it.

<sup>1</sup> *Editorial Note:* The need for a careful English translation of these Addresses has long been felt by scholars. Professors G. H. Turnbull and R. F. Jones have been engaged on this work for some time past; and their translation will be published shortly by The Open Court Publishing Company.

The only effective remedy is a complete regeneration, the creation of a totally new order of things, the formation of an entirely new spirit for the age. That alone can avert the downfall of the nation and preserve its existence; that alone can raise it from its state of abject dependence and restore to it an individuality that is self-supporting and quite incapable of any dependence upon others. Such regeneration can result only from the education of the nation to new life.

In the past education has been futile, partly because it has not even touched, far less trained, the roots of impulse and action in life. The new education must be such that its influence will penetrate to those roots; it will then be the art of educating man, not some part of man. Moreover, education has failed because it has been given only to a small minority and not to the whole people, on whom in very truth the commonwealth rests. If the intention is to mould the nation into a really corporate body, the new system must be applied to all without exception; it must be national education.

Now the fundamental law of man's mental nature is that he must engage directly in mental activity; such self-activity gives him the greatest possible pleasure. Further, there is in the child a natural inclination for clearness and order. A proper course of instruction will, therefore, stimulate and satisfy these fundamental tendencies and so fill the child with joy and pleasure. While he is in this state of satisfaction he is stimulated again by the new obscurities that appear, and is satisfied anew. In this way, there is kindled in the pupil pure love of learning, which grows and renders possible the easy development of his faculty of knowledge. The systematic course of instruction that will stimulate and develop this love without our design or assistance is that invented and practised by Pestalozzi, just as Pestalozzi's school is always ready to train capable teach-

ers and educators. The power of sensation should first be developed properly and regularly, and the pupil then led to direct perception; in other words, the free activity of the pupil's mind, his thought, must be stimulated. Knowledge will, of course, result from this; but it will result only incidentally and as an inevitable consequence, and will not be definitely aimed at.

The development of the pupil's bodily powers must go hand in hand with the development of his mental powers. Learning and working will thus be combined. The manual work which is to be undertaken by the children consists of agriculture, gardening, cattle rearing, and the trades that are necessary in their little community. Participation in this work is to be regulated according to strength and age, tools needed for it are to be invented and used. The children are to be taught to understand the principles of what they do, because such understanding will ennoble their mechanical work and make it intellectual.

Love of the good, i. e., pleasure in the right and good for its own sake, is also innate in man; every child wishes to be upright and good and does not want merely to be healthy like a young animal. This pure pleasure in the good can be developed to such an extent that it becomes impossible for man to leave undone what he knows to be good and to do instead what he knows to be evil. During his early years, however, the child cannot distinguish between good and evil; how then is this innate love of the good to survive these years of ignorance until an ordered system of ideas of right and wrong is formed, to which this motive of love can be connected? Wise nature has removed the difficulty without any assistance from us. It is the child's simple faith in the higher perfection of adults that makes it possible for us to plant in him, before he can distinguish good and evil, the good which he inwardly wishes. This faith shows itself in the instinct of respect, which in the child

begins as unconditional respect for adults and becomes the desire to be respected by them and to measure by means of their actual respect how far he should respect himself. On the existence of this characteristic in childhood and youth is based the possibility of all instruction and of the education of growing youths to perfect men.

The adult has in himself his standard of self-esteem and wishes to be respected by others only in so far as they have first of all made themselves worthy of his respect. With him that instinct of respect assumes the form of demanding that he shall be able to respect others, and that he shall himself produce something worthy of respect. The aim of the moral part of education is just to produce adult manhood in this sense. The foundation of all moral education is that one should know there is such an instinct in the child and presuppose it firmly established; then, that one should recognize it when it appears and gradually develop it by suitable stimulation and by presenting to it material for its satisfaction. The very first principle is to direct it to the only object that is suitable, viz., to moral matters. Now the root of all morality is self-control, the subordination of the selfish instincts to the idea of the community. There are, however, two different ways of subordinating the personal self to the community. There is that subordination which absolutely must exist and from which no one can be exempted, viz., subordination to the law of the constitution which is drawn up merely for the regulation of the community. He who does not transgress this law is not blamed—that is all; he does not however receive approbation. On the other hand, he who transgresses is censured and even punished. Then there is that subordination of the individual to the community which cannot be demanded but which can only be given voluntarily, viz., the raising and advancing of the well-being of the community by self-sacrifice. In order to impress correctly upon the pupils

from youth upwards the mutual relationship of mere legality and this higher virtue, it will be appropriate to allow him only, against whom for a certain period there has been no complaint in regard to legality, to make these voluntary sacrifices as the reward, so to speak, of legality, but to refuse this permission to him who is not yet quite sure of himself in regard to regularity and order. This kind of sacrifice should receive active approbation and real recognition of its merits; not in public in the form of praise, which might corrupt the heart, make it vain and turn it from its independence, but in secret and with the pupil alone. Each child should choose a teacher as adviser in matters of conscience, who will give this approval in secret; through the agency of such advisers education will inevitably be of systematic aid to each individual in his rise to ever greater power of self-control.

It is in this process of moral education that the mental training which was described earlier plays its main part; for the mental activity of the pupil is developed with the intention that by it he may voluntarily create an image of the moral order of life, that he may lay hold of this image with the love that is also already developed in him, and be spurred on by this love to realize it actually in and by his life. Thus steadiness and independence will gradually arise, until the child himself knows what is contained in the moral world and no longer needs the testimony of others concerning himself, but can sit properly in judgment on himself, i. e., until he is an adult. The result is the formation of a stable and infallible good-will, and it is only when this aim is attained that education is really ended. This moral training is, therefore, the true and final purpose of the new education. It is civic education; for an essential element of the stable and certain spirit will be real love of fatherland. It is also religious education; for it will lead the pupil to the knowledge that nothing exists

but the spiritual life that lives in thought, and that this spiritual life is the divine life manifesting itself in living thought; that is, it will lead to true religion, to the religion of the indwelling of our life in God.

Such an education is the art of training the whole man completely and fully for manhood. It develops equally the essential component parts of man, understanding and will, and aims at clearness in the former and at purity in the latter. It must therefore be national and for both sexes. The miserable wish that education should be finished as soon as possible, and the child again set to work, must not be breathed any longer, but given up right at the beginning of the consideration of this matter. This new education will not be expensive; but even if it were, the pupil must unconditionally and at any cost remain at school until his education is finished. Half an education is not a bit better than none at all; it leaves matters as they were; and if anyone desires this, he had better dispense also with the half and declare plainly at the very beginning that he does not want mankind to be helped.

It is essential, too, that from the very beginning the pupils should live together among themselves, forming a separate and self-contained community, with its organization precisely defined, based on the nature of things and demanded throughout by reason. This complete separation of the children from the parents is necessary because the hardship, the daily anxiety about making ends meet and the petty meanness and avarice which occur in the home inevitably infect children, drag them down and prevent them from making a free flight into the world of thought. Besides, life in a community of their own will enable them to create that image of the social order of mankind as it ought to be simply in accordance with the law of reason, which is so essential a part of civic education. This little community is to be self-supporting; if any help

from outside has to be given, it should be in kind, and the pupils should not know of it; or, if they do, they are to receive help as a loan. Further, everyone should know that he is indebted absolutely to the community. In these ways the honorable independence of the State and the family, and the relationship of their individual members to them, will be disclosed to him. Finally all the children must help in the little community. This will make them independent when they grow up, because they will be able to maintain themselves; it will help them towards moral independence, and will train them in the proper management of their resources.

The education of the scholar rests upon the universal national education. Permission to become a scholar is to be granted only to the boy who shows an excellent gift for learning and a conspicuous inclination for the world of ideas; on the other hand, it must not be refused any boy who shows these qualities. The vocation of the scholar is to advance the culture of the human race with deliberate art and in accordance with a clear conception. This means that his education must accustom him to solitary reflection and exercise him in mental self-activity without guidance from others. He is to be exempted, therefore, from the manual work which the other pupils undertake, and will devote the hours thus gained to the study of whatever his future profession specifically demands. He will, however, attend with the others the instruction supplied by the national education and is on no account to be exempted from the physical exercises that are prescribed.

By means of this system of education real love of fatherland will be established in the hearts of all. Such love of fatherland is the conception of one's people as an eternal people and as the security for one's own eternity. The noble-minded man's belief in the eternal continuance of his influence even on this earth is founded on the hope of the

eternal continuance of the people from which he has developed. This belief, his struggle to endow his work on earth with permanence, and his conception of his own life being made eternal through the eternal continuance of his people —these form the bond which unites first his own nation, and then through this nation the whole human race in a most intimate fashion with himself and which brings all their needs within his widened sympathy until the end of time. This is his love for his people, respecting, trusting and rejoicing in it, and feeling honored by descent from it. The promise of a life here on earth—that alone it is which can inspire men even unto death for the fatherland; it is neither the strong right arm nor the efficient weapon that wins victories, but only the power of the soul.

People and fatherland in this sense, as a support and guarantee of eternity on earth and as that which can be eternal here below, far transcend the State in the ordinary sense of the word, as the social order comprehended by mere intellectual conception and established and maintained under the guidance of this conception. The aim of the State is positive law, internal peace, and a condition of affairs in which everyone may by diligence earn his daily bread and satisfy the needs of his material existence. All this, however, is only a means, a condition and a framework for what love of fatherland really wants, viz., that the eternal and the divine may blossom in the world and never cease to become more and more pure, perfect and excellent. In the maintenance of the traditional constitution, the laws and civil prosperity there is absolutely no real true life and no original decision. But when these things are in danger, and it is a question of making decisions in new and unprecedented cases, then there is need of a life that lives of itself; then there is need of the devouring flame of a higher patriotism, which embraces the nation as the vesture of the eternal, for which the noble-

minded man joyfully sacrifices himself, and for which the ignoble man, who only exists for the sake of the other, must likewise sacrifice himself.

That is why this love of fatherland must govern the State and be the supreme, final and absolute authority. Its first exercise of this authority will be to limit the State's choice of means to secure its immediate object, internal peace. To attain this object the natural freedom of the individual must, of course, be limited in many ways; and if the only consideration and intention in regard to individuals were to secure internal peace, it would be well to limit that liberty as much as possible, to bring all their activities under a uniform rule and to keep them under unceasing supervision. It is only the higher view of the human race and of peoples that extends this narrow calculation. Freedom, including freedom in the activities of external life, is the soil in which higher culture germinates. A legislation which keeps this higher culture in view will allow to freedom as wide a field as possible, even at the risk of securing a smaller degree of uniform peace and quietness, and of making the work of government a little harder and more troublesome.

Hence arises the great difference between the genuine German art of the State and the foreign. The latter aims at making the whole of life in society into a large and ingeniously constructed clockwork pressure machine, in which every single part will be continuously compelled by the whole to serve the whole. But how then will the ultimate compelling power itself be compelled to compel, and compelled without exception to see the right and to will it? Very different is the genuine German art of the State. It seeks from the very beginning, and as the very first and only element, a firm and certain spirit; this is for it the mainspring that will regulate and keep continuously in motion the life of society. The German art of the State

understands that it can create this spirit only by educating the young who are still unspoilt, and by educating not only the prince but the whole nation. In the opinion of this art of the State the future citizen himself must first be educated up to the point of being susceptible to that higher education.

The State cannot attain its true aim merely by coercive institutions and without any religion and morality in its citizens. In the past the State has had to do a great deal, and yet has never been able to do enough, for law and police institutions. Convict prisons and reformatories have caused it expense. Finally, the more that was spent on poorhouses the more they required; indeed, under the prevailing circumstances they seemed to be institutions for making people poor. If the State makes the new education universal, the number of convict prisons and reformatories will vanish entirely. Early discipline is a guarantee against the need in later years of reformation and penitential discipline, which are very doubtful measures; while in a nation so trained there are no poor at all.

If the State undertakes to meet the cost of this education, it will soon have no other big expenditure to make. No special army will be needed, for it will have an army such as no age has yet seen. Besides, the State will get working classes able and inclined to help themselves, and its resources will prosper greatly. If parents resist this public education compulsion must be used. The State, as the supreme administrator of human affairs and the guardian of those who are its wards, is responsible only to God and to its own conscience. It has a perfect right, therefore, even to compel its wards for their welfare, just as it has the right to compel them to do military service.

Wherever a separate language is found, there a separate nation exists which has the right to take independent charge of its affairs and to govern itself. The Germans alone among Teutonic races have retained their original

and, therefore, living language. They are thus an original people, and a people that has the right to call itself simply *the people*. Among this people originality has burst forth into the light of day in modern times, at any rate up to now, and the power of creating new things has shown itself.

The function of the German people is, therefore, to take seriously and bring into real life what other countries have only superficially and hastily sketched out. We can see this clearly in the history of the reformation of the Church. True religion, in the form of Christianity, was the germ of the modern world; and the task of the modern world was to make this religion permeate the culture of antiquity and thereby to spiritualize and hallow it. The first step was to rid this religion of the respect for form which robbed it of freedom, and to introduce into it the free thinking of antiquity. Foreign countries supplied the stimulus to this step; the German people took the step. The second step, which is really the continuation and completion of the first, viz., to discover in our own selves this religion, and with it all wisdom—this step too was prepared for by foreign countries and taken by the German people. The next step forward that we have to make in the plan of eternity is to educate the nation to perfect manhood; the solution of this problem will solve the problem of the perfect State. This too is a problem for the German people to solve.

The salvation of Europe is not to be found in the balance of power, for such a conception is utterly worthless; it is to be found solely in the unity of the Germans among themselves. Nor does the German value the freedom of the seas, whether what is intended by this phrase be real freedom or merely the power to exclude everyone else from the seas. **He does not need free seas.** The abundant supplies of his land, together with his own diligence, afford him all that is needed in the life of civilized man; and as for the only true advantage that world trade brings in its train,

viz., increased scientific knowledge of the earth and its inhabitants, his own scientific spirit will not let him lack a means of obtaining this. Next to the unity of the Germans among themselves, their internal autonomy and commercial independence as a closed commercial State form the means for their salvation and, through them, for the salvation of Europe.

A large part of modern humanity is descended from the Germans, and the remainder has received from them its religion and all its civilization. If the German people go under, all humanity goes under with it, without hope of any future restoration.

The object of the above analysis has been to indicate the fundamental principles on which Fichte bases his plans for education reform and to attempt to set them down in a clear, concise and orderly manner. No attempt has been made to follow the order of the Addresses, chiefly because clearness, conciseness and order are not characteristic of the original text. Some parts are quite obscure and present great difficulties to the translator and to the general reader, while there are a few passages which seem to defy almost all efforts at translation and interpretation. Indeed, the reader cannot help wondering at times whether Fichte's hearers did really understand a good deal of what he said to them, and whether it was not his presence, delivery and force of character, rather than what he said, which influenced contemporary public opinion so profoundly as to draw from Stein the comment that the Addresses "had a great effect upon the feelings of the cultivated class."<sup>2</sup> It is certain that only a great effort of concentration could have enabled the listeners to understand the Addresses as they were delivered. Often too the reader tires of Fichte's verbosity and becomes impatient of the long involved sentences and of the elaborately constructed paragraphs.

<sup>2</sup> Seeley: *Life of Stein*, Vol. II, p. 28.

There is also a good deal of repetition; and while this is perhaps inevitable in a series of addresses delivered to an audience that was probably not always composed of the same persons, it adds considerably to the difficulty of tracing the main principles and of interpreting the trend of Fichte's thought. Today, as at the time of their delivery, the closest attention must be given to the Addresses if they are to be understood; even then there are times when one doubts whether one has really grasped the meaning which Fichte intended to convey.

Some of the ideas and opinions expressed in the Addresses are obviously false and cannot be accepted, while others are gross exaggerations and require considerable modification. Little comment need be made on Fichte's conception of the German language as the sole living language, or on his notion of the part which Germany has played, and must still play, in the process of the salvation of the world. His whole-hearted enthusiasm for things German makes him at times inclined to regard almost everything that is genuinely German as necessarily good and everything that is foreign as necessarily bad. It is obvious what evil results would accrue from the logical development of such a conception. He greatly exaggerates the part played by Luther and by Germany in the Reformation movement; and it may be that his views on some of the good results that will follow upon the adoption of his educational reforms are fantastic and overdrawn. The fact, however, remains that these false and exaggerated ideas are but small blemishes in the work; they are easily explained, if not justified, when we consider the desperate state of the times, the exalted aim of the lecturer, the peculiar difficulty of his task and his enthusiastic personality. In any case, they do not affect to any considerable extent our estimate of the tremendous influence of the Addresses

at the time and of their great importance for the understanding of subsequent periods.

It is beyond the scope of this article to try to estimate the historical and political importance of the Addresses, both for Germany and for the world, although it would be a most interesting and profitable study. One might, for instance, trace the development and practical consequences of Fichte's idea of the closed commercial State; or one might consider the influence of the principle of nationality, which he so emphatically champions, on the course of political development in Germany and in the rest of Europe during the nineteenth century. In these and in other directions it would be found that the Addresses are of the utmost importance and fully justify Seeley's reference to them as "the prophetic or canonical book which announces and explains a great transition in modern Europe, and the prophecies of which began to be fulfilled immediately after its publication."<sup>3</sup> Nor is it possible here to do justice to the importance of their influence on the development of education in Germany, although we know that it was very great. Stein was certainly influenced by the Addresses, especially by those which deal mainly with education;<sup>4</sup> he became an ardent advocate of educational reform on the lines advocated by Fichte, as the educational schemes of his ministry testify. That part of his political testament which concerns itself with education appears also to have been inspired by Fichte's influence.<sup>5</sup> More important still, however, is the fact that the Addresses seem to have influenced Wilhelm von Humboldt, whose ideas and plans concerning German education were carried into effect in 1809 and 1810; for we find him choosing Fichte to be Professor of Philosophy in the new University of Berlin in 1810. Humboldt's work laid the real foundation

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 41.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 37, 294.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29, cf. p. 292.

of modern German education, and it would be interesting to show how Fichte's ideas helped to mould that education in its origins and subsequent development.

It is rather, however, because of their importance today that attention has been called to the educational principles laid down in the Addresses. These principles, just because they are principles, are of value now as they were in 1808, and are applicable not to one country alone but to any nation. The addresses are essentially modern in outlook and in content, and we are only now beginning to put into practice many of the principles and ideas which are expressed in them. In these days, therefore, when education is the object of so much discussion and criticism, such views as are here set forth by Fichte merit close scrutiny and careful consideration.

He states the case for a national system of education with clearness, emphasis and accuracy. Education is to be democratic in nature and universal and compulsory in application. He will have nothing to do with a system that is incomplete, which leaves off when the pupil is but half-educated. He sees clearly that education is the very life-blood of the State, that without it the State cannot attain its true aim, and that the future of the nation absolutely depends upon it. He emphasizes, therefore, the necessity of looking at education from the point of view of its value for the nation. It is only now that we are beginning to realize this; hitherto we have been in the habit of regarding education mainly, if not exclusively, from the personal point of view, considering it as a matter of importance possibly to the individual and as aiming at individual development. Such a conception of education is hopelessly one-sided and inadequate. The individual is not only an individual; he is at the same time a member of a community and as such must be educated to take his place in it; otherwise the future of that community is doomed. The

application of this idea of nationality to educational matters is revolutionary in its effects; it completely alters our conception of the aim and process of education, gives a different status altogether to the school, the child and the teacher, and profoundly modifies the whole school curriculum.

A system of education which considered only the claims of the community would, however, be just as one-sided and as inadequate as the purely personal conception which we have just considered. Fichte tries, with considerable success, to do justice to the claims both of the community and of the individual in a scheme of education. He will not have merely civic education, aiming at the production of the good and useful citizen, but he will have full and complete training for manhood; the whole man is to be "inwardly perfected and completed in every part, and outwardly equipped with perfect fitness for all his purposes in time and eternity."

Fichte's ideas on moral education and on the place it should occupy in the whole system are well worth considering, even though we would not agree with him that love of the good is innate. Education is to be the deliberate and sure art of producing in the pupil a stable and infallible good will. All else, the development of his body, the training of his mind and the knowledge that will result therefrom, is subordinated to this. He will have the educator go right down to the roots and springs of action in life, i. e., to the instincts and impulses, and try to mould these as they gradually develop. He emphasizes the prominent part played by the instinct of respect in the process of moral education and traces its development; this is worthy of note because we are only beginning to realize the great importance of respect and self-respect in the growth of what is now called the self-regarding sentiment, which is such a decisive factor in the making of character.

He rightly insists too on the need for bodily training and assigns it an important place in the whole plan. He will have the children do manual work of various kinds because he feels not only that this makes them independent when they grow up, in so far as they are able to maintain themselves, but also that it trains them in the proper management of their resources and is a condition of moral independence. He urges, too, what we are only now trying to achieve, that the child should understand the principles of this manual work in order that it may not be done purely mechanically.

The place assigned to mental training by Fichte is also noteworthy. No longer is so much knowledge to be the aim of education; knowledge and the mental activity which results in knowledge are but means to an end, they but subserve the purposes of moral education. This reminder is very necessary in these days when the tendency seems to be more and more towards a purely intellectual system of education. It is not that one wishes to decry intellectual training; on the contrary, this becomes more and more necessary, in the interests both of the nation and of the individual, as competition increases and as the organization of society becomes more complex and more highly specialized. Yet there is the constant danger of forgetting that the corner-stone of individual and of national life is moral character, and that all else is necessarily subordinate thereto.

Fichte's demand that children shall be separated from the adult world and live in a community of their own undoubtedly sounds at first fantastic and ridiculous. There is, however, a good deal to be said for his point of view. Of what use are the efforts of teachers and educators on behalf of the child if their work is daily undone by contact with home surroundings? The force of this argument is becoming universally recognized; and it may be that where

now under certain conditions we isolate children from home influences that are positively bad we shall some day come to remove all children from home influences that are not positively good. That such children can be educated with very good results in a community of their own where they work and play and learn some kind of manual occupation is already being proved.

Finally, it may be that Fichte exaggerates when he promises that the adoption of his ideas in education will greatly reduce the number of convict prisons and reformatories, and will do away altogether with the necessity for a standing army and for alms-houses, all of which impose such heavy financial burdens on the State. Yet one cannot help thinking with him that if the State could get working classes able and inclined to help themselves, and could by early discipline and training fashion the will and character of the individual, we should be much nearer the realization of the ideal State than we are today.

G. H. TURNBULL.

SHEFFIELD UNIVERSITY, ENGLAND.

## THE PSYCHIC NATURE

### PART IV. OTHER PROPERTIES

PATTERNS in the nerve frame are formed in agreement with experience, either of ancestors or of the individual himself. As experience is derived from stimulation of the five senses by concrete objects, it follows that awareness of those neural-patterns will take on some kind of concrete form, although it may be nebulous in some instances. The ancients, seeking causes for the phenomena occurring before them, formed the pattern of a Zeus, sitting on Mount Olympus, sending his personal agents throughout the universe to create and regulate its various manifestations.

It is no different in this day and generation in regard to the unknown. Seeking causes for the mysterious workings of his inner nature, man has formed patterns of a concrete ego, soul, or spirit, as a controlling entity, with various entities as its servants to produce the manifestations of the psychic nature.

As investigations into the mysteries of the coarser manifestations of nature discovered the laws controlling them, thus demolishing the patterns of gods and goddesses, so at the present time the investigations of the scientific psychologists are discovering the laws that control the manifestations of the nervous system, and mythological patterns are being modified by indisputable facts.

In any period of transition from fancy to fact, existing patterns can not be wholly or immediately disrupted. The old patterns, the so-called conceptions, will be retained until a new generation has been inoculated with the new facts.

A person with fixed patterns becomes immune to infection with new factors; the first impulse is to deny any truth that runs contrary to the established patterns, or, if that be impossible by reason of weight of evidence, to twist that truth into some sort of agreement with what is held. History proves this beyond dispute. It took ages to demolish the pattern of gods, and the pattern of the creation of man has not yet been demolished by the indisputable facts of evolution. It may take many generations to create in the general consciousness an awareness of patterns from which fanciful factors have been eliminated. That individual who is open to the influence of new facts is a rarity among men. He who would enter the paths of wisdom, then, will follow the dictum of Marcus Aurelius:

“Make for thyself a definition or description of the thing which is presented to thee, so as to see distinctly what kind of a thing it is, in its substance, in its nudity, in its complete entirety, and tell thyself its proper name, and the names of the things of which it has been compounded and into which it will be resolved. For nothing is so productive of elevation of mind as to be able to examine methodically and truly every object which is presented to thee in life, and always to look at things so as to see at the same time what kind of universe this is, and what kind of use everything performs in it, and what value everything has with reference to the whole, and what with reference to man, who is a citizen of the highest city, of which all other cities are like families; what each thing is, and of what it is composed, and how long it is the nature of this thing to endure.”

Progressive advancement comes through the discovery of such facts and the hope of the future lies in the scientific discovery and proving of facts.

That which makes a vivid impression upon the senses; that which finds synchronizing factors in our hereditary natures; that which is often repeated; that which fits in with our dominant characteristics; these are the things which determine the form and strength of our patterns, and which control our actions in life.

Applying all of this to our subject, and in the light of the facts developed in the preceding parts of this thesis, let us examine other phases of the psychic nature.

**WILL OR VOLITION:** From the facts previously referred to it can not be maintained that volition is an independent entity in the organism; it is not a Vulcan, producing thunder at the command of Zeus. There can be no such entity as WILL to control either our consciousness or our actions. It is sometimes said that there are two kinds of WILL, the voluntary and involuntary, but if the phenomenon that is ascribed to WILL is but the dominance, the prepotence, of the pattern that is controlling the organism at any particular time, such a separation will be seen to be fallacious. When the primal passions or well-established routine forms the pattern there will be no conflicting factors sufficiently strong to prevent immediate effect, and this result is the so-called involuntary WILL. When other factors are powerful enough to impede or prevent the formation of a clear and dominant pattern, there will be hesitation, which, when resolved by a final composition of an effective pattern, results in the so-called voluntary WILL; but it is evident that the only difference between the two results lies in the manner through which the pattern becomes dominant and controlling.

It is a matter of common experience, that when we are well acquainted with the fixed character of any person, we

can foretell how he will act under any specific provocative stimulation, in other words, can accurately predict the character of his dominant pattern. In our everyday intercourse with those whom we know, we respect their idiosyncrasies, we know what patterns will be formed from the stimulation we impose upon them. With strangers we are ever in doubt, we are circumspect until frequent observance of them has given us an inkling of the factors that are in their make-up, then we are assured of the patterns that will form and control the other's reactions, and govern ourselves accordingly. If WILL were some kind of entity subject to law of its own fashioning, such anticipations would be impossible. Even with those we best know we do not always make allowances for ALL the factors that enter into the making of their patterns, frequently we get an unexpected response and we say, "You must have got out of the wrong side of the bed this morning." "You must have eaten something that disagreed with you." "What's gone wrong at your house?" and so forth; showing that we expect others to act in accordance with their normal formation of patterns.

What a person will WILL depends upon the factors in his chromosomes. If those factors are coarse and brutal, his reactions will be likewise; if the primal factors have been modified by training in previous generations, or if the coarser factors of earlier times are inhibited by acquirement of new associations in the life of the individual, then he will react in a finer, more refined manner.

A person may have some of his factors respond to an artistic production and feel an urge to produce something similar, but unless his composition contains all the factors requisite to such production, all his efforts will prove unavailing. The claim of certain schools that a person may become what he WILLS to become, by simply exercising the POWER OF WILL, is a mischievous fallacy, for while, in

some exceptional cases, latent characteristics are stirred into activity with successful results, it does not always so happen; what is commonly lost to sight is the tremendous waste of effort that follows the acceptance of this dictum where there can not be the slightest chance of success. In proof of this, note the failure to persist on the part of the great majority of those who are beguiled by this fallacy. There is, however, a sure indication of latent factors that assure of success; it lies in the joy with which any appetent effort is pursued.

MEMORY, KNOWLEDGE, CULTURE: These are not, as Napoleon pictured them, chests of drawers, which one can open at WILL and find in a particular compartment that which one wants. It is a truism that we never really forget anything, and with our new psychological facts we can see the reason for this. Every experience causes a pattern to be formed in the nervous system, which patterns tend to re-form when the same stimulation is repeated; more than this, the re-formation may occur when only one factor of the totalized pattern is stirred into activity. Who has not had a whiff of an odor, a flash in the eye, a sound in the ear, a stimulation from a touch, arouse long dormant patterns that recreate past experiences. The only reason we do not recall all of our experiences is because the patterns, formed in the first instance, are too weak to bring a reflection, that is, an awareness, of them into the consciousness, in their subsequent resurrections, but they still exist in the sub-conscious field whenever stimulated.

Cultivation comes through a repetition of the same experiences until the patterns resulting from them attain a certain set, or tendency to persist. Some patterns have been so constantly formed by habits as to become like automatic machines. Take walking, for example; slow and difficult are the first attempts to form the complicated, many factored pattern, or patterns, but when well established.

there is a direct connection between the nerve currents and their appropriate muscles that does not call for any discharge from the pattern nuclei and, hence, there is no awareness of such effects and we walk unconsciously. So with every other established pattern. With what tedious repetitions infants pass through in acquiring perfected patterns of seeing, hearing, feeling, smelling and tasting, to say nothing of the still greater effort required to coördinate all the factors necessary to perfect action of any kind. Then there are the patterns that have been evolved in the growth of the race; it is far from fantastical to image the slow process of events that created the pattern which controls the heart in its beats; or that which governs the unfelt activities of the alimentary canal; which must have taken ages to perfect.

One who is adept in any art, whether manual or intellectual, must recollect that in his first beginning there was intense activity in the nerve nuclei, of which he was painfully aware, but as he progressed toward perfection he became less and less aware of such activity; this loss of awareness resulting from a more perfect correlation between the nerve currents and the muscles, demanding less driving power in the central focuses. One absolutely perfect in any art might do the best when oblivious to all other stimulations, in other words, when asleep. An illuminating instance of this occurred when an official stenographer to the House of Commons in England was engaged in taking notes at a Committee hearing. Falling asleep, he was awakened by being called upon to read a question and answer that had just occurred; to hide his embarrassment he commenced to turn back the pages of his note book when, to his great surprise, he found that while his consciousness had been a blank his hand had gone on making the record in better and more perfect form than usual. He quickly found and read the required transcription.

KNOWLEDGE, in common acceptance, can be nothing other than an awareness of patterns that have been formed or established by stimulations from objects in the outer universe; it is setting in order the jumble of impressions that are borne in upon the senses; it is to acquire patterns in which every part is consistent with every other part. Let one part or factor be disproved by the facts of experience and the entire pattern must be reorganized. Dreams and fancies are patterns that spring up unhindered by conventions or the contact of the senses with outer conditions; they are patterns that form spontaneously, repercussions of patterns formed in the wakeful state, with admixture of factors which the conscious reactions keep out.

Knowledge comes from four sources: (1) through the senses; (2) through association of the different factors in the nervous system; (3) through comparison of patterns as they form and re-form, that is, through their agreements and disagreements; (4) through repeated experiences that serve to fix the patterns, creating that stable condition which we name conviction.

Knowledge is hindered by: (1) Ambiguous language; (2) acceptance of stimulations while lacking the fact integrals that would modify or antagonize them; (3) the unreliability of the senses in conveying to the nervous system all the factors in the objects that affect their end organs; (4) misinforming literature; (5) too ready acceptance of patterns from those reported wise, or inspired; (6) predelictions caused by the tendency of inherited patterns to persist.

Knowledge is limited to the patterns which the organism is capable of forming, that is, upon the wealth of factors which the chromosomes of a person contain. One can not become an artist, an orator, a writer, or a scientist without the necessary factors. Undoubtedly there exists in the universe many things that our senses can not respond

to, because of the lack of sufficient sensitiveness; there are vibrations too low or too high in amplitude to be registered in our nervous system, and beside this, there is a lack of fluidity in patterns that prevents the admixture of the more tenuous stimulations that are reflected by the end organs. In this particular there are tremendous differences between persons.

The knowledge that many possess is a chaos, a jumble of unrelated factors in the patterns of the higher order that make them of little service to their possessor. It is only by reducing well ascertained facts to order, and the associating with them all of their relative factors, that accurate patterns can be formed. Here is where the misnamed "memory" is an evil; it is a dependence upon single patterns formed by rote, disassociated from all other factors by the very exclusiveness of the means taken to form them.

The tests made upon the conscripted men during the late war proves that Bacon was right when he wrote:

"As young men, when knit and shape perfectly, do seldom grow to a further statue; so knowledge, while it is in aphorisms and observation, it is in growth; but when it is comprehended in exact methods, it may perchance be further polished and illustrated, and accommodated for use and practice; but it increases no more in bulk or substance."

Which is the same as to say with the new psychology that patterns once fixed are immune to further amplification.

In this, we find an explanation of "FIXED IDEAS" about which philosophers have quarreled so bitterly in the past.

**ATTENTION, CONCENTRATION:** In these we find phenomena upon which the believers in an entity called WILL lay great stress in defending their position, but a more logical explanation is at hand.

Take a Leyden jar and discharge its energy and a recharge is necessary before another discharge is possible.

As set forth in a previous section of this treatise there is an analogous condition in the focussing nuclei of the nervous system. When a focussing point has been discharged of all its energy, all awareness of it ceases until it is reinvigorated from the blood stream. Now, if the pattern under consideration happens to consist of focussing points that by reason of contiguity, relationship, or for any other cause, becomes exhausted, there will remain no factor to compel attention. Such a condition is exceptional in a well-trained person, but common enough in the untrained, in whom attention is a flitting element. In the well-trained the energy of the various factors in any pattern is not of the same potency, nor is it drawn upon in the same degree, hence, while one factor may become exhausted and cease to create an awareness, the others that accompany it may be strong enough to hold attention to their activity. In such cases the pattern loses a part of its make-up, there is a consciousness of a falling off in the vigor or completeness of the awareness. Everyone has had the experience of suddenly finding that what had been clear in his mind a moment before is now indistinct and muddled, there is a lessening of interest or attentiveness.

Let a pattern discharge unwonted energy and we can no more help attending to it than we can help living, but in all such cases the energy is soon dissipated and we sink back into an oblivion of its most powerful factors, even if entire unconsciousness does not intervene, as is frequently the case. Concentration, then, depends upon the vigor of the nerve fibres in the nuclei from which the energy is discharged, or in the multiplicity of those centers that can maintain the activity of which we are aware.

**EMOTIONS:** Psychological investigations have not as yet developed a clear definition of the cause of emotions. That it is inextricably mixed up with the secretions is well established. It is known that the sympathetic system, represented by the glands, functions separately from the main

sensory system, but that it receives stimulation from that system. It is common experience to have certain patterns in the sensory system bring a flush to the face; others to produce the palidness of fear; while others bring a flood of tears to the eyes. Interruptions in the flow of the gastric fluid, alterations in the beating of the heart, peristalsis, defecation, urination, etc., are also due to stimulation of the secretion neurons, caused by activity in the sensory system. A vivid illustration of this is found in the tumescence of the sex organs by suggestion.

"Apparently one of the most important effects that emotional stimuli exert is the release of adrenin. The adrenin in turn liberates sugar from the stored supply in the liver, often in amounts greater than the body can consume. . . . It is unquestionably a very delicate indicator and revealor of emotional changes. . . . In addition to its sugar conversion effect upon the liver, adrenin acts in conjunction with the sympathetic nerves and produces vaso-constriction and hence an increased blood pressure. . . . There seems to be general agreement that the free adrenin in the blood acts directly upon the muscle in such a way as to neutralize fatigue products. 'What rest will do only after an hour or more, adrenin will do in five minutes or less.' (Cannon.) This result is in addition to adrenin's function in producing a greater food supply to the muscle and increasing the amount of blood circulating through the muscle." (Watson's Psychology, pp. 219-221.)

As I write this, there appears in the daily press an account of the rousing to life of a still-born babe by injecting the adrenin principle into its heart.

These facts go far to prove that emotions are as much the result of electro-activity of the sympathetic neurons as those induced by stimulation of the end organs of the sensory system by exterior objects. It is not definitely known that any excess of secretions have a reflex action

upon the patterns that are formed, but it would seem to be a logical conclusion, as witness the phrases, "billious temperament," "dyspeptic," "melancholia," "lovesick," etc. It appears to be a fact that the secretions do reinforce or inhibit sensory patterns, whether they initiate them or not.

In discussing this subject with a well-informed friend, he made the suggestion that the bases for emotions may be a hang-over from earlier forms of matter, such as the gill-slit, and three kidneys in the embryo, or the appendix and muscles originally formed to move the ear in adults, of which many have been sloughed off. The sympathetic system was necessary in the earlier forms to enable them to live and reproduce their kind, it is less necessary in mankind, when living in civilized state, which leads to the expectancy of diminished influence of emotions in the future progress of man. The beginning of this may be seen in the lack of emotional response in a man of prolific and well-ordered patterns, compared with emotional response in those less well cultivated.

It is unfortunate that our language does not differentiate between the different forms of emotion according to the source of stimulation. Consider the varied sorts of stimulation that result in effects that are variously termed (in Spinoza's enumeration), desire, pleasure, pain, wonder, contempt, love, hate, inclination, aversion, devotion, derision, hope, fear, confidence, despair, joy, grief, disappointment, pity, approval, indignation, overesteem, disparagement, envy, goodwill, mercy, self-contentment, humility, repentance, pride, dejection, honour, shame, regret, emulation, thankfulness, benevolence, anger, revenge, cruelty, fear, daring, cowardice, consternation, civility, deference, ambition, luxury, drunkenness, avarice, and lust. The very enumeration of all these words gives an indication of the lack of definiteness in patterns aroused by the word emo-

tions, yet they all simmer down to harmonious or disharmonious reactions between outer and inner stimulations.

When a stimulation produces a pattern that agrees with the factors we have inherited or acquired, the resulting harmony gives a pleasurable feeling, i. e., absence of conflict; when the stimulation tends to form patterns that are antagonistic to our normal reactions, a conflict results that produces unpleasant or painful feelings, and in either case the results are conditioned by the nature of the stimulation.

In normal conditions the secretions pursue their regular course, but when the stimulation is powerful or excessively antagonistic to our usual patterns, the secretions increase their effect and intensify the reactions; sometimes to the turning of pleasure into pain or pain into indifference, thus arises, as we say, a tenuous line between joy and sorrow, love and hate, sense and nonsense, wisdom and folly.

Watson says: "An emotion is a hereditary pattern involving changes in bodily mechanism as a whole, but particularly in the visceral and glandular system."

Ladd sums up the whole question of feeling as follows:

"One knows by immediate perception very little of the size, shape, temperature, and motion of one's intercostal and visceral extensions and surfaces. . . . But from all these organs, through the nerve plexuses and nerve-tracts of the great sympathetic system, an indescribable *mélange* of nerve commotion is ceaselessly ascending through the cerebro-spinal tracts to the brain. What this *mélange* is at any particular time depends upon what kind of intercostal and visceral organs one has inherited, or acquired by good or bad habits, or had forced upon him by happy or unfortunate circumstances, or got by the action of the last hour or of yesterday. When this *mélange* corresponds with that to which we are habitually accustomed, we feel 'like ourselves'; when it corresponds to any one

of several characteristic types, we feel in one of our several 'moods'; when it is largely unaccustomed, we feel 'queer' and 'not a bit like ourselves'."

#### PART V. CONCLUSIONS

What must we conclude when we banish from our conceptions all forms of an individual super-entity, whether denominated a soul, spirit, or ego, when we find that all the phenomena hitherto ascribed to such an entity are but the result of simple activities in the nervous processes? Does it reduce man to a mechanical toy, to a self-acting mechanism, uncontrolled by anything outside of itself? Far from it. Man is the outcome of ages of experience. He has been evolved from pre-existing matter, and contains nothing that cannot be found elsewhere in the universe. To form a pattern explaining why this is so, and to what end he was evolved, we must pause to examine the forces and the motives that created the universe.

It is as useless to speculate about the first cause as it is to attempt to pierce the infinite future. In either case, we come up against a blank wall beyond which we can neither see, hear, smell, taste, or feel, yet it is axiomatic that "something never came from nothing" and for every known effect we must seek a cause. If we find certain manifestations of the nervous system of man that are superior to the chemical composition of material things, it follows that beyond the wall of our knowledge there is something that caused them.

When we are stimulated by something that contains a supermaterial element, one that we call spiritual, we are

compelled to the conclusion that it has a cause, and in lieu of exact knowledge we invent an internal spirit to account for it.

It is at this point that our materialistic friends slip up. Baffled by the wall limit to their knowledge they deny that there can be anything beyond the wall that is superior to that which is in evidence this side of it. They say, that as Force and Matter are the limit of human acquirement, they must be sufficient in themselves, when fully disclosed, to explain all phenomena; they refuse to form a pattern of anything existing outside the contents of these two elements. In place of restricting these elements to the position of means they raise them to the position of ends in themselves; in other words, they see no necessity for postulating a super-essence; they maintain that the discovery of all the elements contained in Force and Matter will make untenable a pattern of any superior entity.

As it is not possible to form patterns without causal stimulation, so it is impossible to form from the manifestations of Force and Matter, a pattern of something that those manifestations do not disclose; we can not associate idealism with chemico-nervous force. Any attempt to form patterns from other than manifested actualities creates fantasies, which are futile and unproductive; worse than that for they prevent a fluidity in the nervous processes out of which new patterns can be formed. If, on the other hand, we frankly form a pattern of the wall, and diligently look for manifestations that are caused by a something beyond it, we will add new factors to our patterns, increasing our knowledge and pushing back the wall to that extent. It was in this way that the wall, which was very close to the men of ancient days, was pushed back, as scientific investigations of manifestations disclosed their causes in the material universe and demolished fantastic explanations. The efforts of present-day scientific psychol-

ogists are extending our knowledge of the causes of manifestations of the finer elements of sensitiveness.

Such pushing back of the wall is inevitable, because it is the irresistible nature of man to seek a cause for every effect. Take the fact, nowhere disputed, that manifestations of life, during its known existence upon this planet, have become more varied, have reached a higher plane, and transcend purely material bounds, and we are forced to form some kind of a pattern to account for this growth. The real essence of life is unknown, as that of electricity is unknown, but as in the electrical field we deduce some of the qualities inhering in its essence, so in the case of life we are beginning to deduce some of its qualities from its manifestations.

The fact of manifestation is indisputable, it is universal law. No form of matter exists that does not manifest its inner nature. Whence comes this urge to manifest? This is beyond our present scientific attainments to answer, hence its cause lies beyond the wall, but we are driven to conclude that it is one of the qualities of whatever is behind that wall. Make this single assumption and there immediately spring into being other patterns to satisfy the inevitable questions, **WHY?** To **WHAT END?**

Our materialistic friends say that this quality is inherent in Force and Matter, which are infinite, but this is begging the question. Infinity is but a particular arrangement of letters of the alphabet, devoid of meaning as no pattern can be formed from it, while the demand is for a real cause. When I come to this wall, I reflect upon the successive improvements in material forms from the gaseous to the solids, from the vegetable to the animal, from the irritability in the ameboids to the flowering of the nervous system in man, I form the pattern that this evolutionary development was required to provide forms that could manifest, and that experience with each successive form paved the

way for an improvement in the next. That there must be something using these material forms as instruments or means through which to function, and that one of the qualities of this something was the urge to manifest.

If this something behind the wall has the urge to manifest, it must be because there are qualities seeking disclosure, and when we see manifestations of order, beauty, goodness, and love, can we deny that they are supermaterial qualities? Then when we see that opposite, and all evil manifestations are followed by loss, suffering, or death, we have further evidence of the nature of that something, which I prefer to call the ESSENCE of the universe.

Man, then, was painfully evolved through experience, to be the highest form of instrument through which could come manifestations of the qualities of the Supreme Essence, and in the degree of his perfectness does he interpret or misinterpret the superior impulses?

## PART VI. MEANING AND GOAL OF LIFE

With the adoption of the assumptions made in the preceding part, all mystery is banished; there remains no border land between rightness and wrongness; everything that brings no punishment in its train, either to present or future instruments, is in accord with the qualities of the Supreme Essence, and is right, while everything that is disharmonious to those qualities is wrong. Evils are due to imperfections in the instrument, not in the quality of the impulse.

The meaning of life, then, is the creation and maintaining of instruments, and the goal is the evolution of more, and ever more perfect instruments. In other words, human beings were evolved as improved instruments, and their obligation is to be worthy of use by the over-brooding Essence.

Such a conception dignifies life in the body. Firmly incorporated into the patterns now being formed by the rising generation, it would cause them to slough off many of the imperfections in patterns that bring evils upon their parents. A person having the fixed and dominant pattern that he lived for the purpose of manifesting the qualities of the Supreme Essence, or God, as Jesus seemed to have, could not act otherwise than in accordance with it, and a new advance would be made in that progress which is the end and aim of the creation of all things.

It must not be overlooked that so far as the Supreme Essence is concerned, it is not the individual, but the general advance that is important; that while the manifestations of any individual are part and parcel of the influences that increase or hinder progress, yet the individual form is of no account in the total scheme of things. Nature is prolific in forms, it snuffs them out without distinction as to kind, and creates other forms to take their places. But nothing that the individual has contributed by his manifestations is ever lost to that experience which determines whether it be good or evil.

The only real happiness lies in satisfaction with our manifestations, and when those manifestations are in harmony with the qualities of the Essence the ecstasy of feeling knows no bounds, there is happiness that passeth understanding.

F. LINCOLN HUTCHINS.

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND.

## THE FAILURE OF BERGSONISM

MRS. KARIN STEPHEN has chosen an excellently suggestive title for her new volume: *The Misuse of Mind*. Those who are familiar with her contributions to the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* will require no assurance as to the ability displayed, while to others it may be commended as a work of the highest interest. In substance, it is a defence of Bergson which exhibits—owing to the standpoint taken by the author—exceptional merits. The pros and cons of Bergsonism have already been discussed at such length that it is now an extremely difficult matter to infuse really fresh interest into the controversy. Yet, this is exactly what Mrs. Stephen has succeeded in doing; and her success is due to her concentration on those principles which underlie Bergson's entire philosophy—on principles therefore which constitute the crux of modern speculation, inasmuch as they concern the root problems of reality and of knowledge.

Mrs. Stephen, then, has not merely undertaken an exposition of Bergson's philosophy as such, but has dealt with something still more fundamental—with that attitude which must be assumed from the very outset if a just appreciation of his position is to be acquired. It is here, rather than in any formal principles, that the central difficulty lies. "This is the reason why some of the most brilliant thinkers have been able to make nothing of Bergson; the less the reader knows of current metaphysical notions the

easier it may be to adopt the mental attitude required."<sup>1</sup> We must return, that is to say, to the innocence of a philosophic Eden wherein man, untempted by the serpent,<sup>2</sup> has not yet eaten of the apple of abstraction. In itself, of course, there is nothing new in all this. Bergson has himself insisted upon it in his own dignified and serious way, while James, ever alert for spiritual adventure, positively welcomed the necessity for a "certain inner catastrophe" and "the execution of a psychological change of front."<sup>3</sup> The philosopher, let us put it, must slough his skin; not that he is to be blamed for this, any more than is the snake; for even the philosopher—again like the snake?—must live, and it is just the demands of practical affairs that have condemned him to his fundamentally false attitude to experience and to reality.

Thus, we must begin at the very beginning; and although this is an excellent procedure on due occasion, it appears to me that this reversal of what we may agree—for argument's sake—to call the "intellectual" method of approach is (in the first place) quite unnecessary, and (secondly) is only insisted upon because this method in itself is completely misapprehended. I am tempted to employ the *tu quoque*, and to reply that Bergson himself has failed to perceive that "intellect" is capable of much more than he is prepared to admit. Certainly, if thought never achieved more than he attributes to it, his condemnation would be thoroughly justified. But he persists in conceding to intellect that paltry modicum of its native power which is—or at least appears to be—active in the concerns of daily life and the earlier stages of scientific enquiry. In this way, therefore, intellect—thought—reason—is traced along only half its course; and the due completion of all its efforts being thus ignored, it is thereupon judged to be ultimately

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 13, 15.

<sup>2</sup> R. V. metaphysician.

<sup>3</sup> *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 266.

inadequate. Hence, the root fallacy of Bergson's system. He has failed to see that the sole method of truly knowing reality is to carry forward the method of intellect to its farthest limits; and thus its essentially synthetic activity, whereby it apprehends more and more fully that reality with which from the outset it is confronted, is altogether lost sight of.

The outstanding merit of the present volume, then, is that in taking us back to the beginning it raises the meaning of some of our most fundamental terms and the purpose of our spiritual activities. "The business of philosophy, according to Bergson, is not to explain reality but to know it"; and this seems to imply an antithesis between knowing and explaining of such a nature that knowledge can never be attained by means of explanation—"a different kind of mental effort is required" in each case, and "the better we explain the less, in the end, we know." The problem thus becomes that of the method of truly knowing reality; and in the first place, there exists "something which we know directly," by which is meant "what we see, or touch or feel . . . the foundation of knowledge." To this "something" Mrs. Stephen applies the term "the facts"<sup>4</sup>—a somewhat unusual course, which need, however, cause no confusion if its special meaning is adhered to.

Thus it is obvious, so far, that "direct knowledge" is, or at least includes, sense-perception; on p. 22 it appears to be identical with "actual experiencing"; and there follows the familiar contention that the intellect quickly departs from this "direct experience," adopts "the intellectual method of abstraction," and thus forms "an obstacle to direct knowledge of the facts."<sup>5</sup> I think it will assist us to attain a clearer view of all the issues if I here anticipate my criticism of Mrs. Stephen's presentation of Berg-

<sup>4</sup> Pp. 18-20. Cf. note 47 below.

<sup>5</sup> P. 21. Cf. further p. 76.

son's position, and say that while it is certainly true that abstraction is an indispensable "intellectual" method, it is altogether incorrect to hold that this is the *sole* such method and erroneous therefore to conclude that intellectual method is essentially, and apart from the ignorance and error which affect all methods alike to some degree, an insuperable barrier to complete (or "direct") knowledge. On the contrary, I should maintain that, with the ~~possible~~ exceptions of mystical and religious experience, the "intellectual" is the only method which is capable of attaining such knowledge in any range or volume that is worth consideration.

This supposedly defective "method of abstraction" then means that "the usual work of the intellect consists in analysis and classification" (p. 15)—a principle that is, once again, undeniably true. Nevertheless it is fundamentally inadequate, for it omits to add that these operations are more and more frequently—as our knowledge<sup>6</sup> expands—succeeded by the higher activities of synthesis and systematization; if indeed we may not go still further and add Bergson's own term "intuition"—but intuition, of course, with a difference. And it appears to me to be a very remarkable feature of this prolonged controversy that these patent characteristics of intellective activity are always adduced by Bergsonians as if the "intellectuals" themselves were totally unaware of their significance and lack of finality, and persisted therefore in employing them in total ignorance—reprehensible or merely pitiable as our temperaments suggest—that any more exalted course was open to them. But the true state of the case is directly contrary to this. For while the "intellectuals" have always

<sup>6</sup> There is a serious difficulty here which should be borne in mind throughout the discussion. It is obvious that Mrs. Stephen uses the term "knowledge" in a much narrower sense than my own; but there seems to be no suitable alternative. Our diverse meanings therefore must be gathered from the context; and much the same holds true of "facts." The entire issue, indeed, may be said to turn on the nature of "knowledge"; for Bergson, any knowledge other than "direct" is "knowledge, of a kind" (p. 17). Cf. also p. 105.

emphasized the necessity of analysis and classification,<sup>7</sup> and have submitted them to detailed examination, still they have never forgotten their merely partial character, and have never omitted to repudiate their claims to yield any final and complete revelation of reality. It is surely impossible to state this more plainly than Hegel has done. "The object of philosophy," he asserts—and we may compare this with Mrs. Stephen's already cited "business of philosophy"—"is the Idea. Everything actual, in so far as it is true, is the Idea; a thing *distinct from abstract analytic determinations.*"<sup>8</sup> His entire work rests on a vigorous condemnation of abstraction, and of the "fundamental delusion in all scientific empiricism." The lowest stage of Logical doctrine is its "Abstract side, or that of understanding"; and Hegel's use of "understanding" must be compared with Bergson's use of "intellect"; which means that it is consistently depreciatory; "the most abstract" again is "the poorest."<sup>9</sup> It is sufficient, I think, to place a passage from Mrs. Stephen side by side with another from Hegel. "You were only able to class what was stumbled upon as a dog after you had recognized a certain number of properties as being those *shared by dogs*—texture, size, smell";<sup>10</sup> it is thus that we begin to explain and—therefore—to leave knowledge behind; and according to Bergson and his supporters "a reversal of the usual work of the intellect"<sup>11</sup> is necessary—"a psychological change of front," hitherto unsuspected or at least unacknowledged. Let us turn, however, to Hegel: "We speak of the notions of color, plant, animal. They are supposed to be arrived at by neglecting the particular features and retaining those

<sup>7</sup> Cf. "Philosophy never can get on without the understanding. Its foremost requirement is that every thought shall be grasped in its full precision." Hegel, *Logic* (Wallace), sec. 80.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, sects. 6, 213, 45. "Idea" must be interpreted in a fundamentally objective sense, not subjectively. Italics mine.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, sects. 38, 79, 85.

<sup>10</sup> P. 16.

<sup>11</sup> *Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 34.

*common to all.* This is the aspect of the notion familiar to understanding; *hollow and empty notions*, mere phantoms and shadows.”<sup>12</sup> There is, literally, not the slightest difference between these two positions, one ultra-modern, the other almost classical; and the “inner catastrophe” of James must have been experienced, well over a century ago, by the German intellectual.

The parallelism must indeed be carried much farther than this. For we begin, as we have just seen, with “something which we know directly . . . the foundation of knowledge . . . actual experiencing.” But this, once more, is undiluted Hegelianism. “Philosophy should understand that its content is no other than *actuality*, that core of truth which . . . first we become aware of in Experience”;<sup>13</sup> it is true that we find on page 28 that “for all philosophies the actual facts which require to be explained are the same”; the point is that for Hegel, as for Bergson, these facts are the essential and basal “actuality”—a term which is always employed by Hegel as of the highest significance; and he proceeds immediately to that distinction between appearance and reality which forms the commencement of Mrs. Stephen’s chapter on “Fact.”

Thus, the starting point, and also the repudiation of abstraction as anything more than a partial and preliminary organon, are alike common, and equally essential, to both Bergson and Hegel. To ignore this is simply to misapprehend “intellectualism”; but to admit it, on the other hand, is to abandon the alleged necessity for the reversal of its procedure, since this is, obviously, identical—thus far—with Bergson’s own contentions. So much then for abstraction; but exactly the same is true as regards analysis. “Empiricism labors under a delusion, if it supposes

<sup>12</sup> *Logic*, sec. 163. Cf. sec. 6; “abstractions, dreams though they are.” My italics.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, sec. 6. Cf. Dr. Bosanquet, *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 3, on perception and reality.

that while analyzing objects, it leaves them as they were. As a consequence, *the living thing is killed*; life can exist only in the concrete";<sup>14</sup> and to this Hegel adds only that analysis is none the less indispensable. If again we appeal to a modern intellectualist logician's treatment of classification, we find precisely the same attitude. Throughout Mrs. Stephen's first chapter (on Explanation) analysis and classification are as inseparable as the Siamese twins—in them, we are told repeatedly, lies "the usual work of the intellect"; an assertion, however, which is directly refuted by a single further quotation: "following the straight line of what judgment really means, not only do we never deal with class as such but . . . we leave the preconception of class behind us for good . . . the predicate has nothing more to do with class significance."<sup>15</sup> But throughout Mrs. Stephen's consideration of commonsense, and scientific classification and abstraction, which extends from pages 34 to 46, there is no reference whatever to this "intellectual" repudiation of "hollow and empty notions," nor of its allied transcendence of classification. The passages I have just quoted—passages which are of course not exceptional, but fully characteristic of "intellectual" Logic—might never have been written; either they are unknown, therefore, or they have been ignored.

These extracts are amply sufficient, in my opinion, to prove that the Bergsonian indictment of intellect is altogether superfluous, simply because it has been repeatedly anticipated by many of the thinkers at whom it is directed; and thus Mrs. Stephen's volume only furnishes additional support to Lord Haldane's recent assertion that "no philosophical doctrine has been more misrepresented or given to the world in a more distorted form than has been Hegelianism in current literature."<sup>16</sup>

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, sec. 38. My italics.

<sup>15</sup> Dr. Bosanquet, *Logic*, Vol. II, p. 256. Cf. also *The Principle of Individuality*, p. 141, note 3.

<sup>16</sup> *The Reign of Relativity*, p. 344.

This, however, is but part of the problem; and the least important part. We have seen that those characteristics, which Bergson regards as defective, are exhibited by intellectualism, certainly as essential, but equally as preliminary and partial. It is agreed on both sides therefore that they cannot, as such, yield full knowledge; the difference is that while Bergson affirms that they lead us away from knowledge, his opponents hold that they carry us at least over a portion of the road; both parties must agree further, therefore, that something more is requisite in order to attain complete knowledge. In other words, both agree that the final aim is knowledge of reality. "The business of philosophy is to know" reality, according to one; similarly for the other "the object of philosophy is the Idea—everything actual";<sup>17</sup> the divergence then arising as to the method, or the completion of the method, by which this is to be achieved.

It is here that there comes to view the second fundamental defect of Bergson's position. Not only has he charged intellect with employing defective devices long after their faultiness has been amply insisted upon by many intellectuals themselves; he has further assumed that these constitute the sole and final methods which they are able to employ. But this second accusation is as groundless as his first. Intellectualism could never have emphasized—as we see that it has done—the radical insufficiency of abstraction if it had not been fully aware that some more adequate means was at its disposal; and thus its course must be traced through three principal stages. Primitive experience, in the first place, is concerned with actuality; but this is destroyed by analysis—"the living thing is killed";<sup>18</sup> and the third and final step then consists in resynthesizing, reconstructing, rebuilding, actuality or reality.

<sup>17</sup> For both, further, Reality is not identical with what "appears." Cf. Hegel's *Logic*, sec. 6.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. notes 13, 14, *ante*.

"It is because the completed work of science still leaves us with a riddle"—words which might serve as an epitome of Bergson's criticism of intellect—"that we see that it is necessary to apply higher categories. Hegel described philosophy as simply *completed experience*",<sup>19</sup> as the revivifying, in other words, of "the living thing" which analysis has killed.

Thus we find the central issue of the whole problem presented here as the striving for "completeness"—the "completed work of science" contrasted with philosophy as "completed experience"; and again the parallelism of principle with Bergson's own position is obvious. Hegel, equally with Bergson, realized the total inadequacy of scientific abstraction;<sup>20</sup> and—again like Bergson—he endeavored to overcome this defectiveness by an appeal to the concretely real. It is this identity of the final aims of both thinkers that is, owing to some mysterious decree of Fate, persistently ignored; and while Hegel is universally condemned for deliberately plunging into the fog of "abstraction," Bergson is acclaimed as directly revealing the real. Can it be that difficulty has been confused with abstractness, and a vague mysticism with lucidity?

It is a further remarkable and significant fact that Bergson, in discussing the methods of scientific enquiry, altogether misses its true implications—implications, too, which obviously support the intellectualist position and disprove his own.

"Science" he has recently affirmed, "always tends to mathematics as to an ideal",<sup>21</sup> an assertion which may not only be accepted without question, but may still further be expanded to include *all* knowledge—in History or Art or Moral Theory; for throughout all these there operates—consciously or unconsciously, with acceptance or reluc-

<sup>19</sup> *Life of Edward Caird*, p. 168. Italics mine.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. further note 45 below.

<sup>21</sup> *Mind Energy*, p. 70.

tance—the tendency to express definite truths which are related to one another as precisely as possible; and this—in principle—is all that the mathematician attempts to do; the only difference being that he succeeds—and will always succeed—to a far greater degree than any other culture.<sup>22</sup> But with this we are not here concerned, except incidentally; our present problem lies in the real significance of Bergson's statement. His own interpretation of it, of course, is that science is to be condemned as a false guide, because it tends more and more towards those (supposedly) essential characteristics of mathematics—analysis and abstraction.<sup>23</sup> And yet it is daily becoming more and more obvious that modern mathematics, in gaining its rapid and striking extensions of power and range, is rapidly changing its character; or more truly, is exhibiting more and more clearly what its real character is. This is because its always implicit aim is now being explicitly achieved; when therefore we survey its content as a whole, we perceive that this is steadily gaining in concreteness, at the cost of its previous—but always indispensable—abstraction. Once this clue has been obtained, it is easy to see, I think, that it illuminates even the elementary branches of the subject. Every student, in working through *e. g.* a good geometry, is sensible that his subject matter, which begins with the most abstract and simple of spatial entities, becomes less and less abstract as he advances. He passes from points to surfaces, from these to solid figures, from static to dynamic, until his primitive geometry, now allied with algebra or trigonometry—themselves also growing in their special concreteness—becomes expressive and predictive of the real processes and changes of external nature; so that, as a leading physicist has recently expressed this truth, "integration leads to physically significant results only be-

<sup>22</sup> "The central function of the intellect, even of consciousness, is one from beginning to end." Dr. Bosanquet, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 29.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. note 27 below.

cause it corresponds step by step to some physical process."<sup>24</sup> As mathematics unceasingly develops, therefore, that abstraction, which necessarily characterizes all its earliest stages, and without which its growth could never have begun, becomes the basis of an ever fuller concreteness which has—in one direction—achieved a splendid consummation in the success of the Theory of Relativity taken in its entirety; a triumph of thought which amply proves, in Dr. A. N. Whitehead's words, "that the last thing to be discovered in any science is what the science is really about."<sup>25</sup> To describe the total content of that Theory, making demands as it does upon the results of a prolonged course of investigation, as "abstract," is surely a misuse of language. Relatively to the physical Universe as a whole, doubtless it is abstract. But it will be time enough to raise that charge against it when our knowledge of the Universe attains a level with the present content of Einstein's mathematical work.

It is well known, further, that there is a tendency to assimilate Logic with Mathematics; and so far as this is well-founded, it furnishes a fresh parallel to what I have just maintained in its bearing upon the latter. But here, again, except in details, there is nothing that is novel in principle; for the entire course of Hegel's *Logic* is an attempt—how far successful is of course matter for argument—to trace the evolution of logical thought to its highest stages in the Absolute Idea, as one aspect of Absolute Reality;<sup>26</sup> and even this result, which is at first sight the very antithesis of all that Bergson maintains, is actually suggested in another of his own recent utterances. "Modern science" he asserts in a passage immediately preceding that I have just commented upon, "is the offspring of

<sup>24</sup> Dr. N. R. Campbell, *Physics, The Elements*, p. 422.

<sup>25</sup> *Introduction to Mathematics*, p. 223.

<sup>26</sup> The term, "Absolute," is not a fetish. It simply means complete, final, whole. Cf. "absolute alcohol," "absolute zero."

Mathematics, begotten on the day when algebra had acquired sufficient force and pliability to be able to enfold reality"; and the question at once arises, if the analytic operations of intellect are essentially misleading—if, to use Mrs. Stephen's expression, "the better we explain, the less we know"—how is it at all possible that algebra and its sister sciences should ever "enfold reality"? We should have expected that the greater its "force and pliability," the farther it would take us away from Reality;<sup>27</sup> but on the contrary, Bergson's statement might well have been written as an express anticipation of the success of Einstein's "abstract" investigations.

It is impossible to deny therefore that the character of "intellect" has been fundamentally misunderstood and misrepresented by Bergson; and this not on matters of secondary detail, but as a basal principle: "a falsification due to preconceived ideas runs through *the whole* of our direct experience."<sup>28</sup> This radical misconception of what is, after all, "practically useful"—of what is (admittedly) the basis of all our scientific knowledge—cannot but suggest that the alternative method, which Bergson has appealed to precisely because of this misconception, may itself be of doubtful value. If e. g., I were to argue that the present railway route from New York to Chicago invariably deposited persons in Washington, and that therefore they would do better in future to travel *via* the Pole, then it would be perfectly logical to reply that the argument loses much of its force simply because, so far as Washington is concerned, it rests on a misconception of the facts. But it would still remain an open question whether or not the present route really arrived at Chicago, and whether or not a detour through the Arctic would be more advantageous. Similarly, even if it be admitted that there is much more to be

<sup>27</sup> "Ordinarily thought progresses from abstraction to abstraction steadily getting further from concrete facts" (p. 84).

<sup>28</sup> P. 21. My italics.

said on behalf of intellect, both negatively and positively, than Bergson appears to imagine, still there remains the question as to whether the method of intuition is not more successful in achieving the "business of philosophy" and attaining the "fullest possible direct knowledge of the fact" (p. 23). The consideration of this subject plainly involves, instead of a defence of "intellect" against the Bergsonian criticism, a direct enquiry into the merits and possibilities of "intuition" as he presents it.

Mrs. Stephen begins her exposition of "change" (p. 48) with what is, once again, nothing more than a criticism of the abstract universal. "We pretend that there is a color not itself either red or green . . . this abstract color neither red nor green . . . but only an abstraction" (p. 49); a subject which it is unnecessary to discuss further because intellectualist Logic has long since relegated abstract universals to their proper sphere in the realm of thought. But when the same attitude is taken up with regard to the "red and green which we say we see," difficulties arise. Why, in the first place, the excess of scepticism implied in "we say we see"? Is it really possible (theoretically) to doubt, as a general principle and ignoring error and illusion, our expressions of these simplest contents of sense-perception? For if it is so possible, then the primal basis of Bergson's whole position is at once destroyed. For that basis lies in "direct knowledge"—"something we know directly, *what we see or touch or feel*" (p. 18). Let us, however, admit the doubt and trace its consequences. "The red . . . is simply a fictitious stage in the process of changing (the changing process with which we are directly acquainted) . . . which does not itself occur as a distinct part in the actual fact" (p. 49).

The standpoint thus expressed by Mrs. Stephen concerns the root problems, not only of philosophy, but equally of psychology. The question now becomes: What is it that

we are directly acquainted with, or know directly, so far as this is expressed by "we see, touch, feel," *etc.*? We are not considering, that is to say—and the exclusion is fundamental—any content *prior* to actual sense-perception itself, such as *e. g.* the presentation-continuum<sup>29</sup> of Professor Ward; and this being the case, Mrs. Stephen's position becomes that we see *etc.*, not red or green—for these are fictitious<sup>30</sup>—but rather "the process of changing—change, as we know it directly."

Is this, then, a true account of experience in the form of sense-perception? Do we see and feel, not red or hot, *etc.*, but the "process of changing"—"change"?—in the sense, that is, that this process is not occasional, or parallel with hot and red, but is something still more fundamental by comparison with which hot, red, *etc.*, are "fictitious"? This, it seems to me, is the real problem that has to be faced; and when thus expressed, it excludes two other problems with which it may easily be confused. For we are concerned neither (1) with the perception of changes *in the same way* as we perceive green or cold, for it is indisputable that we do so perceive them; nor (2) with the reality of change itself, for that is equally undeniable; the question is rather, Do we see green, or do we merely *say* we see green, when what we *really* see (= "know directly") is always "the changing process"?

Surely, the only possible answer is that we see green, or feel cold, in exactly the same manner, and under precisely the same conditions, as we see or feel changes;<sup>31</sup> and that further, it would be totally impossible thus to perceive (*i. e.*, to "know directly") any changes whatever unless we also perceived, and perceived *in the same way*, red and cold;

<sup>29</sup> At the same time Ward's use of "continuum" is significant, in so far as it indicates something essentially continuous—analogous therefore to the "continuous becoming" which Bergson presents as being totally neglected in current theory. Cf. Bradley, *Logic*, p. 96, on "continuity" and "fictions."

<sup>30</sup> That is, the *contents* themselves are fictitious, not merely the *adjectives* red, *etc.* It is admitted that all our *terms* have an element of abstraction.

<sup>31</sup> I use the plural to exclude abstract change.

simply because—as has been pointed out repeatedly—the persistent consciousness of “changing process” and nought else<sup>32</sup> would be equivalent to unconsciousness. It is altogether insufficient to admit that “fixed stages”—i. e., the “fictitious” red and hard—“are needed if we are to describe change and explain it in terms of general laws” (p. 50); they are needed for something which is still more fundamental—for the very original and basal *consciousness* of change itself. “Consciousness, or at least intelligence, must begin with both Distinction and Identification.”<sup>33</sup>

The truth of this contention can be established, obviously, only by an appeal to the direct experience of every individual percipient; and if any one then declares that he sees the “changing process” as more fundamental than he sees red, or feels hard, there is nothing more to be said; he has successfully undergone that “psychological change of front” which James prescribed. There still remains open, however, the indirect test of the nature of animal perception—an experience, obviously, which is purely perceptive in the sense of being practically free from deliberate analysis, abstraction and classification. Do the higher animals, then, living in such a world of pure sense-perception, see yellow and feel cold, or do they see and feel the “continuous process of changing”? There is, it seems to me, only one answer possible; nor can it be evaded by setting up any distinction between animal sense-perception, and human; for, as sense-perception, they are (in principle) identical, except that the animal’s is the better developed. All the evidence supports the inference that animal activities are based on perceptual experience similar to our own; and this being so, “the aim in both cases is the same, . . . controlling facts directly known.” Animals therefore must indulge in “the intellectual method of

<sup>32</sup> “According to Bergson, we know nothing else directly at all” (p. 60); “the only actual reality is the changing fact itself” (p. 76).

<sup>33</sup> Dr. Bosanquet, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 28.

abstraction" so far as "things and qualities and events" are concerned.<sup>34</sup> Bergson, however, regards animals as impelled by instinct; and this contradictory result of the logical extension of his argument always seems to me to tell very forcibly against his whole position.

If this is the true state of the case, then it must follow that the consciousness of Change—the perception of continuous changing process—as the universal and basal characteristic of Reality is but a later development—is the result of reflection and of thought in exactly the same way—though possibly with greater justification—that our consciousness of Energy or Matter is the product of such reflection; and Bergson's philosophy then becomes nothing more than the advocacy of the fundamental objective reality of such Change, or duration, or creative evolution; while his arguments that distinctively philosophical knowledge can be attained solely by means of intuition or "a reversal of the usual work of the intellect" are deprived of all foundation.

I have just argued that the persistent consciousness of changing process and of nought besides<sup>35</sup> could not possibly give rise to consciousness, in any actual sense of the term, at all; and it is only stating this in other words to say that the "resemblance and difference" which Mrs. Stephen ascribes to the formal "state of consciousness" (p. 57) could not conceivably be "directly known" unless some unchanging and specific contents persisted before the mind (or within experience), between which the process of comparison could be carried out. It is a well-known principle of Logic that resemblance rests on a basis of difference, and *vice versa*; each implies the other; but the consciousness (or "direct knowledge") of neither could arise unless there were definite contents between which comparison could be instituted. This postulation of a basal "resem-

<sup>34</sup> Pp. 50, 51.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. note 32 *ante*.

blance and difference" is, indeed, on Mrs. Stephen's own showing, self-contradictory; for these are, or at least directly imply, relations. But relations are rigorously excluded from "facts," because they are all products of intellectual abstraction; it is, therefore, absolutely impossible thus to introduce them into that content of consciousness which is the object of "direct knowledge."

Equally disastrous is the interpretation of the "logical" as the "spatial," and the consequent elimination of all distinction from "fact."<sup>36</sup> Once again there is exhibited that complete misapprehension of the intellectualistic standpoint which has been so prominent already. The "two logical characteristics," we find, are "mutual distinction of terms and externality of relations," and these belong—admittedly—"to the abstractions employed in explanations" (p. 55). But since all abstractions (as I have shown) are regarded as totally inadequate by Hegelian Logic, it follows that no ground exists for charging it with externality. Those distinctions (in other words) which it is the task of Logic to discover and to relate, are never finally left external to one another, although they may possess an aspect of externality in their earliest stages. On the contrary, true logical distinction necessitates an essential internality, in the sense that all the distinctions imply each other, and possess meaning and value only because they are inseparable. Just as resemblance and difference rest on a common basis, so distinction implies connection or internality, and *vice versa*. To isolate any distinguished content—to render it "external"—is to destroy it; and "all logical process is the *reshaping of a world* of content."<sup>37</sup> Its activity begins in that content of "actuality" which is the "core of truth" of experience, and which constitutes, for Hegel as for Bergson, a

<sup>36</sup> "For Bergson spatial means logical. Whatever is logical is characterized by consisting of distinct, mutually exclusive terms in external relations." Pp. 54, 55.

<sup>37</sup> Dr. Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality*, p. 332. My italics.

"world"; from that world it can never escape, but, operating always within it, it reshapes it into the world of Reason, or the Absolute Idea, to which all "externality" is hostile and alien. "That not only abstractions but also the actual facts have the characteristics of consisting of mutually exclusive terms joined by external relations" (p. 56) is denied therefore as strenuously by the intellectualists as it is by Bergson, and yet we are told that intellectual thinking is altogether inappropriate and even mischievous as a method of speculation" (p. 61).

Nor is the principle of creativeness by any means as novel as Bergson and his supporters take it to be;<sup>40</sup> it has, indeed, long been a prominent tenet of those "intellectuals" who are supposed to be engaged in "the discussion of pseudo-problems" (p. 71). "Creation" (says one "intellectual"), "is incessant and perpetual; the world is ever in the making. Each birth is a creation." "Everywhere" (affirms a second), "the world is in the making. Its reality consists in the making"; and finally, "the normal and natural working of intelligence is creative and constructive. The law of intelligence is not the law of Identity."<sup>41</sup> Their devotion to "pseudo-problems, not real philosophy," would seem therefore to have been not altogether fruitless; and the "intellectual," stimulated anew by Bergson's endorsement of his "creation," may now rid himself of the haunting "suspicion that the whole thing is trivial, a dispute about words of no real importance" (p. 71).

In considering thus far the intuitional standpoint and method as contrasted with the "intellectual," we have found

<sup>38</sup> Cf. p. 7, *ante*.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Mr. Bradley: "To us the universe is a living whole, which apart from violence and partial death refuses to divide itself into well defined objects and *clean cut distinctions*." Quoted by Professor Baillie, *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1919, p. 236. (My italics.)

<sup>40</sup> *The Misuse of Mind*, pp. 65-74.

<sup>41</sup> Wallace, *Lectures on Natural Theology*, pp. 142, 109. *Life of E. Caird*, pp. 353, 354. Dr. Bosanquet, *Logic*, Vol. II, p. 184—he is criticizing Bergson's charge of "repetition"; (*Misuse of Mind*, pp. 68, 69).

their agreement to extend much farther than is generally supposed by the critics of the latter. For both schools alike—again to quote Mrs. Stephen—"the changing fact which we know directly is described as a process of becoming which does not contain parts nor admit of repetitions" (p. 75). Both schools, further, agree in their repudiation of all abstractions and classifications as adequate to reveal reality. Bergson's system therefore—which in its polemical character is but the recrudescence of an old type of thought—presents in these points nothing that has not been abundantly insisted upon before. And when we trace its further course, we find that system overtaken by the nemesis of its too vehement condemnation of the methods of "intellect."

For in calling for "a reversal of the work of the intellect," and bidding us "install (ourselves) within change . . . place ourselves in intuition,"<sup>42</sup> Bergson deprives us of all possibility either of conserving what that experience yields for ourselves or of communicating it to our fellows. Language and thought are not merely inadequate—they are positively misleading and deceptive. "When we try to describe the facts in words . . . *all* descriptions in words . . . are bound to be a mass of contradictions"<sup>43</sup> . . . distinct terms have to be employed because there are no others, and this creates pseudo-problems."<sup>44</sup>

How, then, are we to proceed? We are compelled to fall back on what is nothing other than the final stage in the philosophy of intellectualism itself—on syntheses—alternating, of course, with "intuition." "This, according to Bergson, is the way in which philosophical knowledge should be built up, facts being translated into descriptions only that these descriptions may again be further synthesized" (p. 105). And here the only comment that

<sup>42</sup> *Creative Evolution*, pp. 324, 282.

<sup>43</sup> We may contrast the function of contradiction in Hegel's philosophy.

<sup>44</sup> *The Misuse of Mind*, pp. 57, 70. My italics.

is necessary is a final brief quotation from Hegel: "analysis has to raise the given material with its empirical concreteness"—*i. e.*, "the facts"—"into the form of general abstractions, which may then be set in the front of the synthetical method as definitions"; and, continues Hegel, that these analytic or scientific "methods, however indispensable and brilliantly successful in their own province, are unserviceable for philosophical cognition, is self-evident. Their style of cognition is that of understanding, proceeding under the canon of formal identity"<sup>45</sup>—*i. e.*, employing those "repetitions which have been imputed by Bergson to all intellectualist thought without any discrimination, but which we find here, once more, explicitly and finally rejected as unphilosophical. For Hegel, then, as for Bergson, "philosophical method is analytical as well as synthetical," but with the fundamental difference that this is "not a mere alternating employment of these two methods, but rather in such a way that it holds them merged in itself."<sup>46</sup>

And while the Bergsonian system, having completely ignored that synthetic principle which is so fundamental in "intellectualism," proclaims this wholly imaginary absence to be a fatal defect, and then advances it as its own unique discovery, it also fails to discern its deepest significance and to employ it to the best purpose. For the successive syntheses which it is presumed to yield—and how "a mass of contradictions" can be merged fruitfully in the later intuitions is a difficulty which I have not discussed—embrace "ever wider fields of knowledge (p. 105);"<sup>47</sup> the

<sup>45</sup> *Logic*, sec. 231.

<sup>46</sup> Sec. 238.

<sup>47</sup> Mrs. Stephen's earlier dictum that "the better we explain, the less in the end we know," here seems to have been abandoned completely. *Cf.* p. 4 *ante*.

expansion *i. e.*, is simply in volume or extent. But "intellectualism" perceives much more than this in the continuous advance of knowledge; for in pressing forward under the urge of that "one living Mind whose nature is to think," of which it is itself a finite mode, human Reason grasps a Reality not simply ever wider, but rather fuller, richer and profounder.<sup>48</sup>

J. E. TURNER.

LIVERPOOL, ENGLAND.

<sup>48</sup> Hegel, *Logic*, sec. 13.

## A CRITICISM OF THE PSYCHOANALYSTS' THEORY OF THE LIBIDO

APPARENTLY we have not yet reached that degree of development in the mental and social sciences which has been attained by the workers in the physical and biological sciences and which enables them to utilize their well-established principles and laws for the projection or prevision of phenomena and to invent systems of social organization and control in the same way and with the same facility with which those versed in the older sciences design elaborate machines, construct synthetic compounds or breed selectively new vegetable varieties. Such attempts in the social and mental sciences are not wanting and they have been attended with a fair degree of success. The devotees of the newer sciences have two difficulties to contend with which are not present to the same degree in the older and more concrete sciences. The mass of data which they have to handle is so great and their subject matter is so variable that they find it difficult to establish definite and dependable quantitative generalizations which can be used successfully for constructive or inventive purposes. Also the complexity of the resulting invention is itself so great that it has as yet proved an almost insuperable task to organize in the mind all of the details of a complex social invention constructed by the aid of the laws of the social and mental sciences. Consequently, most of the inventions in the field of abstract organization of the mental and social

life have so far arisen as discoveries rather than as the result of conscious prevision and scientific construction. Some process or technique or institution has grown up or has sprung into existence at a critical time and has been selected for survival because of its utility or because of some accidental social attachment to it. In this respect present-day psycho-social inventions are very similar to the earlier empirical physical inventions or discoveries, made before the physicist learned to make use of his mathematical formulae for the construction of machines largely *de novo*.

Psychoanalysis is no exception to this general principle. Like Christian Science it was discovered rather than invented, in the sense of being first constructed in abstract theory out of scientific formulae and then reduced to a technique of practice or a physical structure. Its development has, in fact, been in just the reverse order. Beginning as a practical technique it has gradually been subjected to a systematic, theoretical interpretation in an attempt to render it scientific.<sup>1</sup> The almost inevitable result of this line of development has been that the theory of psychoanalysis carries an immense deadweight of unsound speculation and metaphysical theory. Developed for the most part by practical men trained in the old metaphysical mental science rather than in the newer behavioristic and neurological psychology, in so far as they were trained psychologically at all, its sponsors brought more speculative ingenuity than sound scientific knowledge to the theoretical explanation of their technique or practice. This has been especially true of Freud who has so largely dominated the development of psychoanalytic theory. It is the purpose of this paper to discuss one of the more striking meta-

<sup>1</sup> For a brief account of the origin of the psychoanalytic technique and theory, see W. A. White, *Mechanisms of Character Formation*, ch. 1; Smith Ely Jelliffe, *The Technique of Psychoanalysis*, ch. 2; S. Freud, *History of the Psychoanalytic Movement*; A. Tridon, *Psychoanalysis, Its History, Theory and Practice*; P. C. Bjerre, *The History and Practice of Psychoanalysis*.

physical interpretations which have in this way arisen within the theory of psychoanalysis.<sup>2</sup>

The theory of the "libido" is undoubtedly one of the best known doctrines of psychoanalysis and is an active concept in the theories of all the psychoanalysts except one,<sup>3</sup> although Jung has suggested the use of the term *horme*<sup>4</sup> in its stead. The implication of the term libido is itself metaphysical in content since it presupposes a conscious attitude of desire, when as a matter of fact most of our impulses or conations come into consciousness but imperfectly, if at all. The use of the term with this implication represents a sort of intellectualization and rationalization which was the general rule among the philosophers of the nineteenth century and was particularly characteristic of those who had a leaning toward the Utilitarian or the hedonistic interpretation; and traces of such a correlation can be found in psychoanalytic theory, as when Freud speaks of "pleasure-striving" and the "libido" as synonymous<sup>5</sup>. It seems strange that psychoanalysis, which originated in close connection with hypnotic therapy and was at its inception closely related to the various schools dealing with the unconscious and the subconscious, should have adopted a terminology which implied an unwarranted intellectualization of causative factors and a close balancing of feeling motives.

Freud makes of the "libido" a sex term, thinking of it as equivalent to sex urge or desire. In this respect he takes issue with Jung,<sup>6</sup> who identifies "libido" with energy or

<sup>2</sup> For other papers by the writer on metaphysical concepts of the psychoanalysts, see "Instinct and the Psychoanalysts" in *The Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology* and "The Psychoanalysts' Theory of the Conflict-Neurosis," in *American Journal of Psychology*.

<sup>3</sup> Andre Tridon (*op. cit.*) substitutes the term *urge* for *libido*, apparently meaning much the same as is meant by Jung and his followers by the term "libido."

<sup>4</sup> See his "Psychological Understanding," *Jour. Abnormal Psychology*, Feb., 1915.

<sup>5</sup> Freud, *General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, 116.

<sup>6</sup> *The Psychology of the Unconscious*, 135, 139ff; *Analytical Psychology*, 231, 272.

impulse to action, desire. Freud says, "Obviously we should gain slight profit if, following the example of Jung, we were to emphasize the original unity of all the instincts, and were to call the energy expressed in all of them 'libido.' Since the sexual function cannot be eliminated from psychic life by any device, we are forced to speak of sexual and asexual libido. As in the past, we rightly retain the name libido for the instincts of sexual life."<sup>7</sup> Also, "Until now we worked with the impulse that we can distinguish the ego and the sexual instincts from one another by their manifestations. . . . We called the accumulation of energy which the ego directed towards the object of its sexual striving libido and all others, which proceeded from the instincts of self-preservation, interest."<sup>8</sup> Freud even goes to the extent of regarding nursing—the primitive form of food-getting and also an example of a self-preserved instinct at work—as an example of the striving of the sex libido, since nursing gives pleasure and all pleasure is, according to Freud, sexual.<sup>9</sup> This is, of course, an excellent example of reasoning in a circle, the conclusion being justified by the arbitrary assumption that all pleasure is sexual. This assumption is based upon the superficial analogy between the sex act and nursing, including the similarity of the mechanics of the two processes, the expressions of pleasure in the acts and the relaxation and contentment following the acts.<sup>10</sup> Such reasoning is, of course, childish and metaphysical. Its author does not offer any neurological or other scientific evidence in support of it, but assumes it on the basis of crude analogies.

Freud traces the evolution of the expression of the "libido" from nursing to onanism as follows: "The suck-

<sup>7</sup> *Op. cit.*, 357.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 358.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 116, 309.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 270-1. See also Freud, *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex*, 44. H. Ellis in his *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, also calls attention to this analogy.

ing at the mother's breast becomes the term of departure for all sexual life, the unattained ideal of later sex gratification, to which the imagination often reverts in times of need. The mother's breast is the first object for the sexual instinct; I can scarcely bring home to you how significant this object is for centering on the sexual object in later life, what profound influence it exerts upon the most remote domains of psychic life through evolution and substitution. The sucking, however, soon relinquishes it and fills its place by a part of his own body. The child sucks his thumb or his own tongue. Thereby he renders himself independent of the consent of the outer world in obtaining his sensual satisfactions, and moreover increases the excitement by including a second zone of his body . . ." <sup>11</sup> This, he says, gradually leads over to onanism itself. Here we have an exposition in brief of the current assumption of an inherent or neurological correlation between finger sucking and autoeroticism, when, as a matter of fact, the only similarity is a superficial analogy unless, indeed, we adopt the definition of autoeroticism used by Jelliffe. He makes it identical with any self-given pleasure.<sup>12</sup> This definition, however, does not serve to connect finger sucking with a sex act, such as masturbation, any where except in the imagination of the psychoanalytic theorist.

Another glaring example of metaphysical assumption is to be observed in the characterization of nursing as

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 271-2.

<sup>12</sup> Jelliffe says, "In the infantile period, the pleasure principle seeks the continuance of the satisfaction. The term, erotic satisfaction, is used by Freud to signify this in the general sense, by which is meant the gratification of the pleasure sense of the area involved (sic). Thus, there can be respiratory, lip, stomach, urethral, anal, skin, retinal, cochlear, vestibular, muscular, gustatory, and olfactory eroticism. To assume that only one area of the body is capable of receiving sense gratification, and hence that the word, auto-eroticism, has reference only to one area, *i. e.*, the genital area, is unutterably stupid, and yet this is the usual implication given to the word by critics. There is ample justification for applying the term, auto-erotic, to each receptor group already indicated, since it has been seen how the interest (*libido*) may be transferred from one area to another that becomes the center of striving." — *The Technique of Psychoanalysis*, 42. Compare Brill, *Fundamental Conceptions of Psychoanalysis*, 22-23, 29.

symbolic of "The unattained ideal of later sex gratification." Such a teleological statement is not justifiable, since at this age there can be no prevision of future sexual experiences. Neither is there any question of ideals or aims involved here. Also, to speak of the lips and hands as erogenous zones at this stage of development of the child is to substitute effect for cause. Among many primitive peoples, lovers do not kiss, either during courtship or during the consummation of the sex act. Girls and boys do not generally enjoy kissing, except for extrinsic reasons such as when playing games involving the performance, or when under the influence of external suggestion, until the conditional reflex has been established in connection with the expression of sex passion. Kissing apparently arises as a practice from the tendency of the young child to make its earliest contacts with the outside world by means of the lips, which in turn springs from the fact that its first definite localizations are with its lips, because it learns to localize the source of its food—the mother's breast or the nursing bottle—before it acquires correlated movements with its hands and other parts of its body. When the mother fondles her baby it offers the mouth as its most effective contact mechanism and she responds in a similar way. Thus kissing is established as a habit long before sex feeling is experienced. Kissing and fondling come to be associated with sex feelings and expression by induction and their physiological mechanisms become, by conditioning and association or induction, erogenous zones. By the law of conditional reflexes, kissing and fondling in themselves acquire in time the power of arousing sex desire and become secondary forms of sex expression. We must not, however, fall into the error of supposing that, because the mother (who has gone through the process of courtship and sex expression) may have sex feeling in kissing and fondling her child, the child has

the same experience or feeling, unless it be simultaneously stimulated in primary sex zones. And even then the feeling must be acquired as a conditional reflex.

As indicated above, Jung developed a somewhat different conception of the term "libido." At first a follower of Freud,<sup>13</sup> he was forced to expand the concept of the "libido" to include all phases of desire and energy expenditure.<sup>14</sup> He even compares the concept to that of physical energy,<sup>15</sup> and elsewhere he regards it as psychic energy.<sup>16</sup> The "libido" is at first nutritional in character. "The first manifestation of this energy in the suckling is the instinct of *nutrition*. From this stage the libido slowly develops through manifold varieties of the act of sucking into the sexual function."<sup>17</sup> "With the development of the body there are successively opened new spheres of application of the libido."<sup>18</sup> In other words, the libido evolves from the nutritional to the sexual, and "in the territory of sexuality, the libido wins that formation, the enormous importance of which has justified us in the use of the term *libido* in general."<sup>19</sup> He finds the clearest distinction between the two forms of the "libido" among those animals in whom the stage of nutrition is separated from the sexual stage by a "chrysalis stage."<sup>20</sup> This growth from the nutritional to

<sup>13</sup> *Psychology of the Unconscious*, XXVI, XXXIII, 139-140, ff.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 135, 151. He says (*Analytical Psychology*, 347-8), "In the classical use of the word, *libido* never had an exclusively sexual connotation as it has in medicine. The word *interest*, as Claparède once suggested to me, could be used in this special sense, if this expression had today a less extensive application. Bergson's concept, *élan vital*, would also serve if this expression were less biological and more psychological. Libido is intended to be an energizing expression for *psychological values*. The psychological value is something active and determining; hence, it can be regarded from the energetic standpoint without any pretense of exact measurement." Compare *Ibid.*, 231.

<sup>15</sup> "It can be said that the conception of libido as developed in the new work of Freud and of his school has functionally the same significance in the biological territory as has the conception of energy since the time of Robert Mayer in the physical realm."—*Psychology of the Unconscious*, 138.

<sup>16</sup> "As you know, by *libido* I understand very much what Antiquity meant by the Cosmogenic-Principle of *Eros*; in modern terminology simply 'psychic energy'."—*Analytical Psychology*, 272.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 231.

<sup>18</sup> *Psychology of the Unconscious*, 148-9.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 149.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

the sexual libido is not immediate and direct, but is by degrees and from stage to stage.<sup>21</sup> "Two periods are to be distinguished in this state of transition, so far as I can judge—*the epoch of the suckling and the epoch of the displaced rhythmic activity*. Suckling still belongs to the function of nutrition, but passes beyond it, however, in that it is no longer the function of nutrition, but rhythmic activity, with pleasure and satisfaction as the goal, without the taking of nourishment. Here the hand enters as an auxiliary organ. In the period of the displaced rhythmic activity the hand appears still more clearly as an auxiliary organ; the gaining of pleasure leaves the mouth zone and turns to other regions. The possibilities are now many. As a rule, other openings of the body become the objects of the libido interest; then the skin, and special portions of that. The activity expressed in these parts, which can appear as rubbing, boring, picking, and so on, follows a certain rhythm and serves to produce pleasure. After longer or shorter tarryings of the libido at these stations, it passes onward until it reaches the sexual zone, and there, for the first time, can be occasion for the beginning of onanistic attempts."<sup>22</sup>

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 160.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 160-1. I believe the above to be the most nearly correct interpretation of Jung's theory of the "libido." However, another interpretation, closer to the Freudian view, may be justified from the text. In this version, Jung attributes much more importance to the role of sex: "It can be a surprise only to those to whom the history of evolution is unknown to find how few things there really are in human life which cannot be reduced in the last analysis to the instinct of procreation. It includes very nearly everything, I think, which is beloved and dear to us."—(*Psychology of the Unconscious*, 145.) Also he appears to identify the "libido" with the sex "instinct," setting the "libido" over against hunger in the same way that he sets the "instinct" for the preservation of the species (sex "instinct") over against the "instinct" of self-preservation (*Ibid.*). He states that from the descriptive standpoint in psychology he recognizes a multiplicity of instincts, of which sex is one. He also recognizes certain affluxes of the "libido" to non-sexual instincts. This seems to imply that the non-sexual "instincts" or dispositions are derived from the "libido," which is sexual in character. He continues, "Quite otherwise is the genetic standpoint. It regards the multiplicity of instincts as issuing from a relative unity, the primal libido; it recognizes that definite amounts of the primal libido are split off, as it were, associated with the newly formed functions and finally merged in them."—*Ibid.*, 150.

Unlike Freud, he does not consider the act of sucking as a sexual act.<sup>23</sup> He explains the connection otherwise: "In its migration the libido takes more than a little of the function of nutrition with it into the sexual zone, which readily accounts for the numerous and innate correlations between the functions of nutrition and sexuality."<sup>24</sup> His reasoning on this point appears to be sound when he says, "The pleasure in sucking can certainly not be considered as sexual pleasure, but as pleasure in nutrition, for it is nowhere proved that pleasure is sexual in itself."<sup>25</sup> In fact, Jung is rather insistent upon the view that Freud has vastly overstated the importance of sex in the subconscious.<sup>26</sup> He does not deny that sex imagery and activities appear very frequently in dreams and in neuroses, but he explains this on the ground that sex, being so much repressed in our society, forms the chief constituent of the subconscious, or unconscious, as he calls it. When the censorship is applied to any unconventional, or otherwise unacceptable idea there is an overflow of the dammed-up "libido" into substitute channels of expression, that is, largely into the subconscious, and consequently becomes assimilated to the dominant content there. In this way the libido and its substitute expressions tend to take on a sex coloring when, as a matter of fact, the object of the repressed or displaced "libido" may be originally anything but sexual.<sup>27</sup> He specifically states that symbols may have more than one meaning and that they are not all sexual.<sup>28</sup> The content and meaning of the symbol are relative to the situation and causes giving rise to it. Patients often invent some story of the sexual origin of a neurosis, probably because of the

<sup>23</sup> *Analytical Psychology*, 231.

<sup>24</sup> *Psychology of the Unconscious*, 161.

<sup>25</sup> *Analytical Psychology*, 231. While the hypothesis of the identity of sexual feeling and pleasantness has not been proven, it has been adopted by a number of psychologists, especially continental psycho-metaphysicians, and it may be that Freud has been influenced by this erroneous view.

<sup>26</sup> See, for instance, *loc. cit.*, 216, 218-20, 231, 234, 277, 305, 308, 370, etc.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 220, 234, 370, 372.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 218-19.

regression of the libido when blocked and its consequent overflow into and assimilation of the sex content of the subconscious.<sup>29</sup>

The "libido," having evolved from the nutritional to the sexual aspect, now undergoes a process of differentiation and desexualization.<sup>30</sup> "The process of transformation of the primal libido into secondary impulses always took place in the form of affluxes of sexual libido, that is to say, sexuality became deflected from its original destination and a portion of it turned . . . into the phylogenetic impulse of the mechanisms of allurement and of protection of the young. This diversion of the sexual libido from the sexual territory into associated functions is still taking place," either by sublimation or by repression.<sup>31</sup> One of the main functions of religion, especially of the Christian religion, has been to offer a means to sublimation or an instrument of repression of the cruder and more primitive forms of the "libido," thus giving to the "libido" a spiritual rather than a mere physical expression.<sup>32</sup> Christianity "was accepted in order to escape at last from the brutality of antiquity. As soon as we discard it, licentiousness returns, as impressively exemplified by life in our large modern cities."<sup>33</sup> . . . The religious myth meets us here as one of the greatest and most significant human institutions which, despite misleading symbols, nevertheless gives man assurance and strength, so that he may not be overwhelmed by the monsters of the universe. The symbol, considered from the standpoint of actual truth, is misleading, indeed, but it is *psychologically true*, because it was and is the bridge to all the greatest achievements of humanity."<sup>34</sup> As valuable as has been this sublimation

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 227.

<sup>30</sup> *Psychology of the Unconscious*, 146, 149.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 150.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 258, 262-3, 453-5, 474, 479.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 258.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 262.

and desexualization of the "libido" through the religious symbol and ideal it has had the disadvantage of keeping us on an infantile plane and, therefore, ethically inferior. New and more efficient intellectual symbols must be "substituted for those that are antiquated and outworn, such as have lost their efficacy through the progress of intellectual analysis and understanding."<sup>35</sup> With this conscious recognition and understanding we can take possession of the "libido," "so that we no longer need the stage of religious symbolism for this end. It is thinkable that instead of doing good to our fellowmen, for 'the love of Christ,' we do it from the knowledge that humanity, even as ourselves, could not exist if, among the herd, the one could not sacrifice himself for the other. *This would be the course of moral autonomy, of perfect freedom, when man could without compulsion wish that which he must do, and this from knowledge, without delusion through belief in the religious symbols.*"<sup>36</sup>

It is in this way that the "libido" becomes socialized through knowledge and the pressures of the social environment. This nice bit of social philosophy setting forth the necessity of the irradiation of conduct by science instead of belief and tradition is by no means new, but it can never be too much insisted upon. It is doubtful, however, if its exposition is in any way rendered more effective by overshadowing it by the clumsy theory of the "libido" and infantile regression. Although Jung speaks of the differentiation and desexualization of the "libido," which is really a process of socialization by means of making our interests comprehend and function in the wider social environment, he does not, like some of the writers,<sup>37</sup> marshall a long list of special or partial derivative "libidos." Of the seven

<sup>35</sup> *Analytical Psychology.*

<sup>36</sup> *Psychology of the Unconscious*, 262.

<sup>37</sup> See particularly White, *Mechanisms of Character Formation*, and Jelliffe, *Technique of Psychoanalysis*.

examples he gives—hunger libido,<sup>38</sup> sexual libido,<sup>39</sup> mother libido,<sup>40</sup> maternal libido,<sup>41</sup> incestuous libido,<sup>42</sup> animal libido,<sup>43</sup> and religious libido<sup>44</sup>—there are really only three separate classes—nutritional, sexual and religious. According to Jung it is through the religious interest that man escaped from the sexual. To be wholly consistent with the development of his theory as set forth above he should also have included a rational or intellectual “libido,” although this might be regarded as a contradiction in terms, especially since the “libido” is essentially and originally instinctive.<sup>45</sup>

White approaches fairly closely the position of Jung. He says, “To my mind there ought to be no serious difficulty here.<sup>46</sup> In the physical sciences we have the concept of energy and also the concept of the transfer of one kind of energy into another, as heat into electricity, electricity into light, etc., so here if we think of the libido only as energy we will be on safe ground. Now the question is, to what use is the energy put? As we have seen that all libido trends may be classified into one of two groups, the nutritional and the sexual, the question becomes more specifically, is the libido being used for self-preservation (nutritional) or race perpetuation (sexual) ends?”<sup>47</sup> White also introduces a metaphysical and analogical assumption into his discussion of the “libido” when he says, “All love has as its fundamental object race perpetuation and is therefore sexual, it matters not how far removed its

<sup>38</sup> *Psychology of the Unconscious*, 160.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 160, 172, 460.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 289, 393, 467.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 289.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 453.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 469.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 477.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 150-1.

<sup>46</sup> The discussion here is as to whether the “libido” is interchangeable between sex and nutrition. Jung holds that it is. Freud appears to hold to the contrary. White seems to support Jung in this passage. See White, *Mechanisms of Character Formation*, 319-320.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 320-1. See also pp. 153, 159.

particular manifestation may seem to be from actual concrete sexual expression. We must, therefore, be prepared to find, and it has been so found that the attachment of the child to those about it is fundamentally a sex attachment, a fact which is at once brought out by the fact that, in general, the child is more strongly attached to the parent of the opposite sex.<sup>48</sup> Herein lies the basis of the problem of incest, a problem that has vexed all peoples throughout time and has been the occasion of some of the most important and powerful social institutions."<sup>49</sup> White is not one of those who accept a maternal or parental instinct,<sup>50</sup> hence he cannot be accused of contradicting himself on this score or of confusing the parental with the sex instinct, a procedure which Freud might readily justify. The error of the assumption that all love is fundamentally sexual in character is of a piece with the dogma that all pleasure is sexual, earlier mentioned as an element of the psychoanalytic metaphysics. Love is the affective attachment of one individual for another arising in response to an actual or anticipated beneficial association. It is given in response

<sup>48</sup> This is not necessarily true. When it is true the fact is probably due rather to the greater responsiveness of the parent of the opposite sex to the child, induced by the overflow of that parent's love for the spouse fixing itself upon the child of the same sex as a symbol of that parent, especially as a sex symbol. Thus the mother loves her young son because his maleness symbolizes the sex attractiveness of his father; and the same may be said of the father's greater affection for his little daughter. It is to be expected that the child would respond to the greater affection of the parent so influenced, but this does not justify the assertion that the child's response is sexual, even in the symbolical sense in which the parent's love may be so characterized. There may be an added incentive for the small son to love his mother more than the father because of the closer and more sympathetic contacts which he enjoys with her. In many cases, also, the young daughter prefers the mother for the same reasons. The writer once asked a girl of five which she liked better, her father or mother. The response favored her mother. "Why?" "Because mother cooks for me." This answer was doubtless in some degree a rationalization; or shall we say, rather a symbolical simplification? This tendency to prefer the parent with whom there are closest and most frequent contacts may be counteracted in greater or less degree by the attractiveness of novelty and the background of mystery regarding the activities of the other parent, especially the father.

<sup>49</sup> *Op. cit.*, 153.

<sup>50</sup> He does not mention such instincts in the treatise on psychoanalysis, which is here cited. However, he does accept these so-called instincts in two other later volumes: *Thoughts of a Psychiatrist on the War and After* and *The Mental Hygiene of Childhood*.

for some service or favor, or contact, material or spiritual, which arouses an affective or pleasurable response in the one who loves. Any service, such as the giving of food, assistance in a task, consolation, etc., when gratefully received and when offered by a personality with which we can establish sympathetic relationships, tends to inspire love of some sort. Sex favors are among those most appreciated by most people in certain age periods and their expression tends to establish a highly sympathetic relationship between the parties concerned. Hence sex love is one of the most intense types of love. But it is probably not more powerful than maternal love, which may be wholly devoid of directly or indirectly expressed sex elements, especially if the relationship between mother and child is particularly close and sympathetic and if the mother is called upon to render much service to the dependent child. The confusion in the minds of the psychonanalysts is a very commonplace one in logic.

White also uses the term libido in a rather general and distributive sense. While he asserts that "the libido has two main tendencies, the self-preservative or nutritional libido and the race-preservative or sexual libido,"<sup>51</sup> he also speaks of various special or partial "libidos." In connection with his discussion of Adler's theory of organ inferiority he says of a theory of the cure of errors of refraction without glasses,<sup>52</sup> "To translate this into terms of libido we should say that defective vision was a defective use of eye libido."<sup>53</sup> Likewise he raises the question of a similar interpretation of other diseases." Can a carcinoma of the stomach be understood in terms of nutritional libido? A rectal tabetic crisis in terms of anal erotic (libido)? A

<sup>51</sup> *Op. cit.*, 196. It may be worth while to note that he here speaks of the "libido" as originally a unit fact, apparently following the conception of Jung.

<sup>52</sup> See Bates, W. H., "The Cure of Defective Eyesight by Treatment Without Glasses or the Radical Cure of Errors of Refraction by Means of Central Fixation," in *N. Y. Med. Jour.*, May 8, 1915.

<sup>53</sup> *Op. cit.*, 255.

pulmonary tuberculosis in terms of respiratory libido? A tremor in terms of muscle libido? And so on throughout the whole category?"<sup>54</sup> It may be remarked that this interpretation makes room for at least as many "libidos" as there are separate pathological organic conditions. It must also be obvious that the assimilation of these various organic "libidos" to the more general nutritional and sex "libidos," including them under one or the other of these, can be nothing but a metaphysical device of classification, based not upon organic functional or structural kinship, but upon an anthropomorphic interpretation of similarity. Such similarity or identity exists only in the abstracting and synthetizing processes of the human mind which can perceive ends abstractly. It is the mind which imposes the conception of similarity or unity upon these various "libidos." Physiology and biology know nothing of it. Hence, to speak of it as a naturalistic fact, rather than as a logical hypothesis, is metaphysical rather than scientific. Furthermore, such a teleological and intellectualistic classification must face the embarrassing fact of the interchangeability of the constituent or secondary "libidos," which may at one time be classified under the nutritional and at another under the sex category, according as they are conceived by the interpreting mind as serving the one end or the other.

The following passages, bearing on the same subject, also illustrate well the intellectualistic, anthropomorphic and metaphysically teleological character of psychoanalytic theory with reference to the concept of the "libido." In speaking more at length of one of the special "libidos," White says, "In the striving for power the respiratory libido has, so to speak, been selfish, wrapped up in its own selfish ends, and has not been able to serve the individual as a whole. It is again the old story of self-preservation

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 266-7. See also p. 269.

versus race preservation or in this case the preservation of the community; that is, the community of partial libido trends which comprise the individual whose salvation depends upon each tendency being willing to sacrifice some of its self-seeking for the good of the group. The same way of thinking may be applied to other diseases—gastric carcinoma, nephritis, arterio-sclerosis, etc. Is cerebral arterio-sclerosis, for instance, a setting of the tissues which makes further development impossible, or is it a tissue response to stoppage of development, a crystallization of the ways of thinking?"<sup>55</sup> The last clause is highly suggestive of the language of Christian Science. Possibly both psychoanalysis and Christian Science have, at this point, something in common in the metaphysics of their theories, if not in their therapeutic technique.

It may be worth while to consider the views regarding the "libido" set forth by two minor writers<sup>56</sup> in order to secure a better perspective of the theory. Jelliffe follows Jung in defining libido in terms of interest,<sup>57</sup> energy,<sup>58</sup> or striving.<sup>59</sup> Although he recognizes, along with Jung and Freud, two original dominant tendencies, or "principles" in the organism—self-preservation and race preservation<sup>60</sup>—he does not, as they, consider the "libido" to be originally a unity. The child's activities or strivings are not at first integrated into an economic harmony. The very young child is a very loose federation of "libido" values and of these Jelliffe mentions five—respiratory, nutritive, skin structures, pelvic and the special senses,<sup>61</sup> and these might be further broken up into several subdivisions.<sup>62</sup>

"At birth the entire energy is concentrated on the respira-

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 268-9.

<sup>56</sup> It is generally conceded, I believe, that Freud, Jung and Adler are the leading exponents of the psychoanalytic doctrines.

<sup>57</sup> *Technique of Psychoanalysis*, 42.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 40, 44, 66.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 44, 66.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 46, 66.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 40 ff.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 62.

tory act. . . . Respiratory libido, therefore, constitutes the first libido striving of the child."<sup>63</sup> In addition to the "libido" values mentioned above, Jelliffe lists the following partial "libidos": gastro-intestinal, bladder, genital, urethral, muscle or muscular, tendon, joint, mucous membrane, eye, ear.<sup>64</sup> Obviously some of these overlap. These various "libidos" originate in the archaic stage and evolve through the autoerotic and narcissistic stages to the social.<sup>65</sup> In the initial or archaic phases "each libido area is egoistic, self-seeking to the exclusion of all others; the child stops breathing in the early attempts at feeding: all other forms of libido energy wait in abeyance until that one demanding the moment satisfaction is appeased."<sup>66</sup> This anarchistic competition of the "libidos" is overcome under pressure of environmental limitations to the satisfaction of the various "libidos" separately. Mutual concessions are made and each is disciplined into co-operation with the rest.<sup>67</sup> Socialization comes through repression, which "consists in the subordination of certain libido values at lower levels in order that a utilization of identically the same energy may take place at higher levels in the process termed sublimation"<sup>68</sup> . . . this process of repression is going on all the time below the levels of consciousness in the developing child. . . . By the age of five . . . the work of repression, so far as these primitive ego strivings are concerned, has resulted in creating a social animal."<sup>69</sup>

In this way unity of "libido" striving arises out of original disunity, the reverse of the process described by Jung, who speaks of "the multiplicity of instincts . . . issuing from a relative unity, the primal libido."<sup>70</sup> Jelliffe holds

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 40.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 40-48, 62, 133, 135.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 133, 135.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 41, 42.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 47-8.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, 42.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, 44, 67. See also Jung, *Psychology of the Unconscious*, 461.

<sup>70</sup> *Psychology of the Unconscious*, 150.

that this "repression of partial libido trends "brings about" an adaptation to the self-preservation combined libido."<sup>71</sup> Having thus accounted for the integration of the self-preserved interest or "principle" (one of the two "principles" controlling life),<sup>72</sup> the author is not quite so clear regarding the origin of the race-preserved interest or reproduction. He identifies the reproductive or sexual as contact with a member of either sex for the purpose of mutually productive creation.<sup>73</sup> This is of course a purely mystical and arbitrary definition of sexual, nor does it throw much light on the manner in which the reproductive becomes integrated out of the conflicting "libidos." The co-operative aspect may, however, lead us to suppose that it also is properly the result of the coerced organization of the "libidos" under the compulsion of the social environment. It would thus appear to be an even more socialized integration than the self-preserved "principle," since it involves co-operation between personalities while the latter involves only the co-operative functioning of the "libidos" within the personality. Thus reproduction in the psychoanalytic mystical or metaphysical sense presupposes the integration of the personality for self-preserved purposes. It might even be said to be the second or more social stage in the development of the personality, in which mere self-preservation of the person expands into social self-preservation or social creation and perpetuation. This interpretation would appear to be compatible with Jung's account of the evolution of the "libido" from the nutritive

<sup>71</sup> *Technique of Psychoanalysis*, 48.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 46, 66.

<sup>73</sup> "It is to this broad reproductive instinct, in all its conscious and unconscious manifestations, that Freud has applied the term sexual. In this present volume on the *Technique of Psychoanalysis*, *sexual* means any human contact actual or symbolic by means of any sensory area with the object of the same or of the opposite sex, which has *productive creation* for its *purpose*, be it concretely in the form of a child, or symbolically as an invention, artistic production, or other type of mutually creative product. It does not apply to those contacts which have purely nutritive or self-preserved instinct behind them. And it does not apply solely to genital contacts."—*Loc. cit.*, 52. See also p. 42.

to the sexual,"<sup>14</sup> although the theories of the initial "libidos" set forth by Jung and Jelliffe are not the same. This assumption of similarity would also seem to be borne out, in part at least, by the following passage: "If then concrete immortality is the goal of the libido striving, which is reached either directly and foremostly through the birth of children and secondarily through building up of social structures and all that goes to make life worth living, then it is extremely simple to comprehend that the symbol of power to bring this about should be expressed, for the adult, in terms of the primacy of the genital zones. Potency becomes the guiding ideal. The direct opposite of personal immortality is death. Desire as a constructive forward push of the libido is therefore symbolized as potency. Fear becomes the opposing symbol of impotency and is likened to death."<sup>15</sup> The conclusions here drawn do not appear as obvious to me as they do to the author, but nevertheless the statement may serve to indicate his conception of the nature and origin of the two phases of the integrated "libido."

Another American writer on psychoanalysis, A. A. Brill, utilizes essentially the same general concept of the "libido" as that set forth above, but he retains the Freudian terminology regarding sex. Brill is closer to Freud than to any of the rest of the older and more authoritative figures in psychonanalysis; he may be spoken of as the interpreter of Freudian theory in the United States. To him the "libido" is always sexual in content, but one soon discovers that all desire or affective attitude is, according to his usage, sexual.<sup>16</sup> According to Brill, there are two fundamental instincts:<sup>17</sup> hunger and love, and these are the original bases of the libido. But since civilization has mitigated or largely removed the hunger conflict or struggle for food

<sup>14</sup> Jung, *Psychology of the Unconscious*, 146-161.

<sup>15</sup> Jelliffe, *The Technique of Psychoanalysis*, 67.

<sup>16</sup> Brill, *Fundamental Conceptions of Psychoanalysis*, 22.

<sup>17</sup> *Op. cit.*, 32.

while it has repressed sex expression, we are concerned with the sex "libido" only, from a pathological standpoint.<sup>78</sup> Dreams,<sup>79</sup> lies,<sup>80</sup> fairy stories,<sup>81</sup> art<sup>82</sup> of any sort, vocations,<sup>83</sup> all represent more or less indirect methods of satisfying desire or the "libido," frequently or primarily through sublimation. He distinguishes three stages of the development of the "libido" or "love-life." In this also he follows Freud. The three phases of the sex life are (1) the auto-erotic, or egocentric attachments, (2) the narcissistic and (3) the object love.<sup>84</sup> This classification reminds one of Jelliffe's diagrams, illustrating the growth of the libido toward integration and socialization, except that Jelliffe includes an initial stage which he terms the archaic.<sup>85</sup> In Brill's classification the object love or "libido" is the one which is least egocentric and most socialized. The dream is always egocentric,<sup>86</sup> and modern art is distinctly auto-erotic,<sup>87</sup> having many characteristics in common with the artistic expression of the "libido" of insane people.<sup>88</sup> However, the growing understanding of vocation as a process of sublimation and normal outlet for the repressed "libido" is working constantly in the direction of socialization. The problem here is to find a vocational adjustment which exercises the "libido" in a complete or normal manner,<sup>89</sup> since vocation has come largely to exercise only part of the "libido" on account of the high degree of specialization of labor.<sup>90</sup>

Andre Tridon, although his work is of a popular character, deserves mention in this connection, because he drops the term libido and substitutes the term vital urge, which

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>85</sup> *Op. cit.*, 133, 135.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, 226.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, 213.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, 200.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, 312.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 296, 300.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 309.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, 314 ff.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, 314, 315.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, 329 ff.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, 189.

he draws from Bergson.<sup>91</sup> In fact, the psychoanalysts often refer with approval to the metaphysical vitalism of Bergson. Tridon mentions four of these vital urges, three of which are native and one apparently the result of experience or the product of adjustment on the basis of the other three. "Man must be fed and hence impelled by a certain urge to seek sufficient food. He must be impelled by some urge to perpetuate his species. He must avoid encounters with harmful stimuli. We may then speak of a nutrition urge, of a sex urge and of a safety urge."<sup>92</sup> The last appears to be the same as the fear "instinct" of other writers and scarcely fits into the conventional category of "libido" of the general run of writers on psychoanalysis, for the "libido" is to them practically synonymous with love or striving after some object, rather than to escape from it. The acquired element in the urges as they actually manifest themselves is large. "The three urges have been greatly developed by civilization and partake of its complexity. Desire for food awakened in man a desire to extend his domination over a certain territory from which he derived his food supply and to drive away from it other individuals when he could not extend his domination over them. The will to power was born. That will-to-power, gratified or ungratified, became a source of egotism. The ego, weak in the animals, became extraordinarily powerful in man."<sup>93</sup> Thus arises the fourth urge, the ego urge. "The ego urge permeates every relation of life, even the purely sexual relations."<sup>94</sup> It "constitutes the main difference between man and the animals."<sup>95</sup> It does not arise in the animals, because they are static and do not build up adjustment complexes with relation to their envi-

<sup>91</sup> *Psychoanalysis, Its History, Theory and Practice*, 23.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, 23, 26-7.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, 27.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

ronment. Man does and his ego is the result."<sup>98</sup> However, it is not the most important urge from the standpoint of survival. "The sex urge and the ego urge are far from being as necessary for the individual's survival as the self-protection and the nutrition urge."<sup>99</sup> It may be inferred that these latter are the more primitive. The urges are closely related to and interact with one another.<sup>100</sup> Apparently there is no attempt here to reduce the "libido" to a strictly sexual content.

Tansley, who has attempted to systematize into a scientific and critically constructive treatment the psychology of psychoanalysis, takes up his position more especially with the school of Jung. He says, in defining the "libido," "The term *libido* may conveniently be applied to the psychic energy inherent in the great natural complexes, or becoming attached to any individual complex, and discharging itself along the appropriate conative channels."<sup>101</sup> In this definition he makes it possible for the energy which constitutes the "libido" to be discharged through either inherited or acquired pathways or neural mechanisms. However, the discharge of energy or "libido" occurs most easily through inherited or instinctive channels. He says, "Human actions are certainly determined in the first place by the inherited mechanisms corresponding with the great primary instincts, and secondarily by mechanisms built up in the mind on the foundation of these instincts."<sup>102</sup> These

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, 24-28.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.

<sup>100</sup> "Sucking the mother's nipple which in the infant is primarily an activity meant to secure food, develops into a semi-sexual activity totally unrelated to nutrition and from which kissing originates. The physical pleasure a Don Juan derives from a new conquest increases his egotism and his sense of power; and reciprocally Don Juan's newly acquired sense of power and increased egotism, revealed by certain attitudes, postures, buoyancy, mental and physical, may increase his sexual pleasures by vouchsafing him new conquests, etc. A great egotist may be so filled with a sense of his importance that he will desire an increase in protection commensurate with the growth of his real or imaginary power, etc."—*Ibid.*, 28.

<sup>101</sup> A. G. Tansley, *The New Psychology and Its Relation to Life*, 63.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, 67. See also p. 77.

great primary instincts which dominate the outflow of the "libido" are the self or ego, the herd and the sex instincts.<sup>101</sup> Around these "great dominant instincts" are built great habit complexes which adapt the utilization of the "libido" to the needs of the organism in its adjustment to the environment.<sup>102</sup> Besides the complexes built around the "three great dominant instincts," which "are universal factors in the human mind," there are other secondary complexes which arise out of the variety of experience. These secondary complexes "are of the most various kinds and complexions according to temperament, culture, civilization, and special surroundings."<sup>103</sup> The chief outflow of "libido" or psychic energy is through the sex complex, built around the sex instinct, "whose energy charge is the largest and the most intense of any of the great universal complexes." But "the combative instinct, at least in fighting races, furnishes another example of a specially intense energy charge" and consequent ready channel for the discharge of "libido."<sup>104</sup> Altogether Tansley accepts twelve "simple instincts," which, presumably are organized within the "three great dominant instincts," as channels for the outflow or expression of the "libido."<sup>105</sup> In recognition of the fact that the "libido" may be discharged through a great variety of acquired or adapted channels, Tansley says, "In the normal civilized man, who is living comfortably above the margin of subsistence, there is a greater or less amount of free psychic energy available which can be turned into

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, 177 *passim*.

<sup>102</sup> The author's definition of a complex is as follows: "A complex . . . is a well-defined system of ideas and emotions, created in the mind by the play of experience upon the primary forces of the mind—the instincts," p. 178.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, 178.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, 63.

<sup>105</sup> See p. 180. In selecting these so-called instincts, he follows McDougall in detail (see McDougall, *Introduction to Social Psychology*, Ch. 3.) The twelve "simple instincts" adopted by Tansley are: flight, pugnacity, repulsion, curiosity, self-assertion, self-abasement, parental, reproduction (sex), feeding, gregariousness, acquisition, construction. For criticism of this usage of instinct see Bernard, "The Misuse of Instinct in the Social Sciences," *Psy. Rev.*, March, 1921, and "Instinct and the Psychoanalysts," cited above.

any suitable conative channel in which he is able to take an interest—his daily work, sport, a hobby, money-making, politics, religion, social activities of various kinds, and so on.”<sup>106</sup> In other words the channel of the outflow of psychic energy or “libido” is as broad as life itself and is limited by neither “the three great dominant instincts” nor the twelve “simple instincts.” It occurs wherever there is material for human activity or interest.

Thus Tansley’s interpretation of the “libido,” like that of Jung, seems to be much less artificial and narrow than the interpretation of Freud and the true Freudians.<sup>107</sup> His tendency is to regard the “libido” as merely psychic energy which may be discharged through any avenue of activity whatever. However, at times he seems almost to fall into the two-fold classification of the “libido” expression which was observed in the writings of Freud and White. Speaking of the evolution of the dominant complexes he says, “During the first year of post-natal life and for some time longer the psychic energy is principally devoted to satisfying hunger—the nutrition libido.”<sup>108</sup> The sex libido soon begins to develop alongside of the nutrition libido: “During the next few years of life, long before puberty, the sex complex begins to develop, at first in a very undifferentiated but still quite unmistakable form.”<sup>109</sup> The growth of the sex complex is modified and largely directed “by the development of the manifold relations of the growing child to its environment (particularly the relation to society) which form the foundations of other complexes and the channels for the increasing stock of psychic energy. Meanwhile the ego complex, at first expressed mainly in the nutrition libido, develops and differentiates, employing

<sup>106</sup> *Op. cit.*, 63. See also p. 85.

<sup>107</sup> He says, “The Freudian School hold that all the primitive psychic energy of a child is sex energy in a wide sense, but there is no more warrant for this belief than in the case of primitive man.” *Op. cit.*, 85. See also Adler, *The Neurotic Constitution*, 62.

<sup>108</sup> *Op. cit.*, 83.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, 84. The similarity of all this to Jung is evident.

more and more available energy."<sup>110</sup> These two dominating complexes appear, from his treatment, to be based upon primitive instincts which clash with the artificial and civilized environment. In this the environment is apparently the aggressor. "At the same time the environment establishes a chronic mental conflict between the purely egoistic impulses and sex, on the one hand, and herd instinct, which checks and thwarts these impulses, on the other."<sup>111</sup> Apparently environment is more or less identified with the herd complex, since the latter so obviously arises from the former. Sex urge and hunger (sex and nutritional "libido") arise from within, but the herd attitudes and viewpoint are developed within us as a result of the necessity of making adaptations to the psycho-social environment. This is not Tansley's expressed view of the origin of the herd complex, and he might logically assume it to be developed from the "gregarious instinct." But, nevertheless, this interpretation squares with the facts. It furthermore has the effect of making the herd complex depend primarily on education, which Tansley urges as a means of offsetting the too great strength of the sex and ego complexes. If we accept this view of the origin of the herd complex it barely saves the author from commitment to the twofold expression of the "libido" accepted by White by introducing another "libido," which Tansley does not name, but which we might perhaps by analogy term the "social libido," or "herd libido" or "herd-protective libido."

A further indication that Tansley, at least subconsciously if not by design, places the herd complex in a different category from the self and sex complexes is to be found in the fact that he discusses the "nutritional libido" and the sex complex together and follows with a discussion of methods of modifying and sublimating these strong inherent tendencies by means of education. He brings in his discussion

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, 84.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, 85.

of the herd complex subsequent to this discussion of sublimation and modification, as if it were really a part of the sublimation process.<sup>112</sup> Of this process he says, "Education, in the wide sense, is the most important factor in determining the actual particular complexes to which the psychic energy is attached. The healthy child has a large surplus of free energy which can be directed into almost any channel not too inconsistent with the hereditary make-up of its mind. In the years before puberty, as is well known, almost any direction can be impressed upon the developing mind by appropriate and sufficiently severe training. . . . Much of its inherent energy may be converted into forms not directly connected with physical sex, and of these art and religion are the most conspicuous, though there are many others. This is sublimation of psychic energy in the strict sense, diversion of energy recognizably belonging to a primitive complex to a 'higher,' i. e., a less primitive one."<sup>113</sup> He states a warning, however, with regard to the limit to which modification of the primitive channels of "libido" expression may take place: "Energy cannot, however, be wholly diverted from primitive instincts; the sex complex, for instance, though it can be considerably modified in the most various ways cannot be made unrecognizable."<sup>114</sup> Then, after speaking of the way in which the herd instinct operates to "check and thwart" the primitive egoistic and sex impulses, he adds: "The attempt to divert the whole available energy from the primitive outlets leads at the best to a one-sided development of mind and character and often to overt disaster in later life, for the primitive instincts, though they may be starved, cannot be destroyed. A certain amount of their inherent energy may be sublimated with safety and advantage, but the effect cannot be wisely pressed beyond the point at which desperate re-

<sup>112</sup> *Op. cit.*, 84-5.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, 84.

sistance is encountered. . . . The function of education, in its widest sense, is precisely to secure that the complexes formed, varying, of course, with the hereditary disposition, are such as to secure a fairly balanced allocation of the psychic energy available."<sup>115</sup> All this appears to support the view that the social or herd complex is predominantly an acquired thing, the result of environmental pressures, the values implanted through education in the larger sense. It also serves as evidence to strengthen the argument that the "libido" can have an acquired as well as an instinctive basis, even in one of its major forms.

We may conclude this discussion of the psychoanalysts' theory of the "libido" with a summary and criticism of their arguments and preconceptions. In the first place, the "libido" is not a thing of mystery but is merely a metaphysical and anthropomorphic term to cover the more impersonal one of energy, or psychic energy, as Jung and Tansley interpret it. Psychoanalysis is not immune from the general metaphysical tendency to personify the abstract processes which take place in nature and human nature. Tansley recognizes this when he says, "It is difficult, and sometimes impossible, in dealing with a conception like that of the libido, to avoid using it as if the libido were itself a living thing with independent activities of its own, rather than mere energy flowing along defined channels."<sup>116</sup> Jung seems to be least metaphysical in his employment of the term, regarding it as "the equivalent in the psychical sphere of the concept of *energy* in the physical sphere."<sup>117</sup> Tansley, however, limits the concept to "psychic energy attached to a complex and discharging through a conative channel, as distinct from the conception of psychic energy at large, which is not necessarily attached to a complex."<sup>118</sup> Either of these views is much less personal and metaphysical than

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, 85.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*, 64.

<sup>117</sup> This is Tansley's statement of Jung's position. *Ibid.*, 63.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, 63, note.

the views of Freud, White,<sup>119</sup> and their various followers. In order that all mystery and anthropomorphism should be removed from the concepts of psychoanalysis it would be much better to drop the term "libido," with its sex connotation, altogether and substitute for it the simple expressions desire, energy, reaction, response, process and the like, as occasion requires.

In the second place, the "libido" is not specialized to any one or more mechanisms of discharge or action patterns, inherited or acquired. It is the energy expression of the organism's metabolism and drains off through any channels which are open to it. It is natural that, other things being equal, those complexes which are built around the more active and deeply rooted instincts, especially around those of sex, should offer more opportunity for the draining off of this energy or "libido" than the complexes built around the weaker or surface instincts and habits. But any action pattern, inherited or acquired, may serve for the purposes of draining off the energy of the organism. Nature has provided for some of this expression, in adaptation to the survival needs of the organism, through the instincts. But in the human organism or nervous system these instinctive pathways are decidedly inadequate for the drainage of the large amount of energy available for action. As Tansley says, there is a great deal of surplus energy which must go off in other channels.<sup>120</sup> Freud is perhaps the most insistent in this identification of the "libido" with a single channel of expression.<sup>121</sup> But even Tansley holds to it in large degree. He says, "The most probable hypothesis is that the great instincts are each endowed with a certain quantity of energy, which prob-

<sup>119</sup> White says, "I am conscious of the objection to this term but it seems to be too well grounded in use to discard. Then, too, the important thing is the concept and not the name." *Op. cit.*, 73. In his *Outlines of Psychiatry* (pp. 10-12), he uses the term "libido" as essentially equivalent to interest.

<sup>120</sup> *Op. cit.*, 63, 84, 85.

<sup>121</sup> See *General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, 356-8; also his *Selected Papers on Hysteria and Other Psychoneuroses*, 191-3.

ably varies with the individual."<sup>122</sup> However, he recognizes that this relationship is not a fixed one, for he adds, "A surplus (of energy) is normally available for use through any channel which the circumstances of life favors, and . . . of the energy normally attached to any instinct, a certain portion, but not all, can, under stress, be diverted to another. We can pretty safely add that under the conditions of civilized life a large part of the energy of sex is so diverted. . . . But sex energy can be far more easily diverted into certain non-sexual channels than into others."<sup>123</sup> This assumption of a fixed quantitative correlation between inherited action patterns and energy discharge seems to me to be unwarranted. The control of the energy discharge of the organism is, at least in early life, extremely mobile and is markedly susceptible to the valuation imposed by the environmental organization. This fact is partly recognized in the theory of sublimation set forth by the psychoanalysts themselves; although the orthodox Freudians make much less allowance for the sublimation process than do the newer school to which Tansley may be said to belong.

In the third place, it may be pointed out that the food and other vegetative instincts, and complexes, such as those connected with respiration, digestion, assimilation, circulation and excretion, have been largely neglected by the psychoanalysts in their treatment of the "libido," or they have been lumped under the general and indefinite heading of the ego complex or instinct (nutritional or self-preservative "libido"). White and Adler have perhaps given more recognition to these organic functions than have the other psychoanalysts.<sup>124</sup> The cause of this neglect probably lies in the fact that in modern civilized society there are rela-

<sup>122</sup> *Op. cit.*, 232.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, 232-3.

<sup>124</sup> See especially White, *Mechanisms of Character Formation*, Ch. 11, and Adler, *The Neurotic Constitution*.

tively few inhibitions upon a normal satisfaction of these organic demands. While, on the other hand, our society regulates by means of many conventions the exercise of sex functions and it at the same time permits the commercialized and personal overstimulation of the sex impulses through amusements, literature, dress, and the like. Consequently the margin between sex desire and sex satisfaction is so much greater than it is between desire and satisfaction of the other organic functions that sex is much in our attention. Also the attempts to secure modified or substitute sex satisfactions which are not prohibited by convention or detected by authority are so numerous and frequent that we readily take cognizance of this field of organic action and the discharge of energy through it, although the actual discharge of energy may be less in volume here than elsewhere.

Finally, the psychoanalysts are in need of a shift of emphasis, in part at least, from the instinctive over to the habitual or acquired bases of the "libido" or action-energy discharge controls. As was pointed out earlier in this paper, their instincts are not instincts, but are abstractions. They are habit valuations and abstract mental correlations of activity processes which do not exist as such in overt reality. There is no such thing as a general ego or self-instinct, nor is there any unit organization of habit which corresponds to this general social valuation which corresponds to self-centered or egoistic action. But there are a multitude of activity processes, instinctive and acquired, which function with reference to the promotion of self-interest or satisfaction and, therefore, we may properly correlate them abstractly (but not concretely and objectively) because of the similarity of their values for the individual and society. The same may be said with equal, or even with greater, propriety regarding the herd "in-

stinct" or complex.<sup>125</sup> Both are abstract valuations rather than concrete action processes when viewed as units or wholes. In considerable degree the sex instinct of the psychoanalysts is subject to the same criticism. However, the sex complex, considered as an abstraction, has more concrete and objective reality, because dominant in it there are certain actual instincts which function in sex activity. It is because of the existence of these sex instincts in the sex complex, giving objective reality and vigor to it, that it is so generally recognized as the strongest of the complexes in most people. The other complexes are much more the result of habit adaptation. They are built up in social situations. In fact, it is quite evident that the ego and the herd complexes of the psychoanalysts are the two poles of the reciprocally developed consciousness of self and society of which Professor Cooley has made so much in his books.<sup>126</sup> These supposed instincts of the self and the herd are complexes constituting the dominant experiences of the individual as he is inducted into a realization of the race experience by means of a more or less constructive adaptation to the psycho-social environment.<sup>127</sup>

Therefore, since the "three great dominant instincts" of Tansley,<sup>128</sup> or the two of White or the one of Freud, which serve as "libido" patterns are but complexes, consisting mainly of acquired elements, it would be desirable for the psychoanalysts to recognize this fact and to build their theory accordingly. By doing so they could do much to elevate their theory of the "libido" from a metaphysical postulation to a scientific explanation. Only by studying the organization and permutations of the environment

<sup>125</sup> See author's article on "Instinct and the Psychoanalysts," in *Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology*.

<sup>126</sup> See his *Human Nature and the Social Order* and his *Social Organization*.

<sup>127</sup> For an outline discussion of the method by which this environment moulds the self and social consciousness of the individual see the author's paper on "Influence of the Environment as a Social Factor" in *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society*, 1921.

<sup>128</sup> *Op. cit.*, 177.

carefully, with a view to ascertaining its power of moulding the individual's consciousness, can a truly scientific theory of energy expenditure be arrived at. This fact does not deny that the instinctive patterns are effective or that the instincts influence the nature of the complexes superimposed upon them. But the fact remains that the psycho-social environment, in the stage of civilization at which we have arrived, has more to do with shaping the great complexes and determining resulting conflicts in the expression of the "libido" than have the native or instinctive tendencies. Hence, it is in a sociology and a social psychology, even more than a psychology and a biology, that the psychoanalysts must in the future search for their most important data.

L. L. BERNARD.

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA.

## RATIONALISM AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

### I

THIS ARTICLE is an attempt to state a case for what perhaps is a small, but I believe is a growing, section of the thoughtful public. The persons I have in view combine two very different sorts of experience and two very different sets of aspirations; and they sometimes feel that there is mutual incompatability between the sets, and that at one point or the other their experience must be infested with illusion.

In the first place, they are persons who, either from scientific training or from natural cast of mind, are strongly disinclined to give their adherence to any belief which does not rest on rational grounds. Their sense of evidence is very keen. Their notion of proof is exacting and fastidious. Their critical faculty is perpetually awake. They accept nothing on bare authority. And they feel it to be a moral duty to preserve their intellectual integrity, scrupulously and at any cost. Any abdication of reason offends their sense of honor. Moreover, they, like the rest of us, are fully conscious of the benefits that Science has brought to mankind. Reviewing the history of the peoples of Europe from the Dark Ages, they see the continual rise in the general standard of living, the elimination of the factors of disease, the decay of superstition, the improved facilities for knowing each other's mind through travel and the wide circulation of books and journals, the ever-

growing interest in, and voice in the direction of, public affairs, and the greater amount of leisure available each century to a greater number of persons for the cultivation of the things of the mind and spirit; and they know that all these things have largely been made possible by the investigation of the powers and processes of Nature by scientific methods. Nor do they doubt that further investigation along these lines will tend to further improvement of the same sort, save only in so far as Science is used to enhance the destructiveness of the engines of war.

In the second place, the class of persons I am considering have the highest possible veneration for Christian principle as they gather it from the life and teaching of Jesus of Nazareth himself. They feel, firstly, that Jesus' example and precepts are in eminent and touching accord with their own moral consciousness; secondly, that in their own private experience a dedication of their self to the spirit of Jesus has, so far as it was made, been productive of rich results in stable happiness, or that such results can be noticed in other people; and thirdly, that in the course of history, Christian organizations, in spite of many set-backs from without and much folly from within, have on the whole exerted a beneficent influence on human affairs, and have contributed greatly to the spread of those ideas of justice, equality, and mutual good-will which make a fitting human life possible. And not only this. Besides thus commending the ethical teaching of Jesus, they are aware of something more. They have found in experience that *a certain posture of the mind, and an attention to and reliance upon a certain class of events in consciousness*, add a unique element to their life—strengthening their moral purpose, clarifying their mental outlook, and pouring energy and good-will into their practical work.

I know that this last is vague language. I have purposely allowed it to be so. For the point is that the type

of mind we are considering notices this "class of events in consciousness" and its effects, without advancing to an unverifiable judgment as to its source. Thus, though the "posture of mind" referred to is recognizable as what would normally be called the religious attitude of mind, and the "class of events in consciousness" is recognizable as what would often be called the Spirit of God, these terms on the present view of the case would be regarded as unscientific and would not be resorted to by the persons in question.

Now by "religious experience" I propose to mean a state of consciousness wherein a sharp sense of humility and weakness in the presence of forces wholly or partly beyond our knowledge and control, is combined with a dependence upon and repose in a felt power which *prima facie* appears as wholly external to ourselves. This definition, inadequate as it will appear to many religious persons, does, I think, include the most important common elements in the various types of what is usually called religious experience. What I wish, then, to consider is whether the last degree of scientific caution is or is not compatible with religious experience in this sense and with a trust therein, and whether religious experience in this sense must or need not necessarily fall short of a complete satisfaction of what is called man's spiritual nature.

## II

Let us take the extreme case—that which presents the most and gravest difficulties. Then all the inside cases, which present fewer or less grave difficulties, will be, so

to speak, included, and may be passed by. Let us suppose a scientific or philosophic enquirer of the utmost caution. Such a one will not be troubled by such doctrines as those of the Incarnation, the Atonement, or the Trinity. He will feel himself remote from considering them as serious views of things at all. The main objects of his considered doubt are not these minor doctrines, but the major problems of God, free-will, and immortality. Let us suppose that he regards the existence of each of these three as unproved, which indeed in point of logical demonstration it almost certainly is. No purely rational argument for the existence of God as a personal supreme Being has shown itself to be finally acceptable. The three most respectable ones (Ontological, First Cause, and Design) received their death-blow in the first Critique of Kant; and Lotze, Mr. Russell, and others have since restated the Kantian attack even more cogently. As to "Free-will," no one will pretend that this age-long controversy has been settled by conclusive arguments either way. The scientifically-minded are generally disposed to think it probable that the actions of men are subject to laws just in the same way that an ever-increasing number of other phenomena in the observed universe can be shown (from the stand-point of science) to be. This tendency on their part is no doubt only a prejudice. For universal causal determination has certainly not been proved. And what the nature of causal determination may be, and whether it can ultimately be shown to exist at all, as well as how far it extends and whether we can ever know any event to be an example of it, remain questions for metaphysical inquiry. Still, there seems no valid reason for finally exempting human volitions from the domain of natural law, any more than we should exempt any other classes of events of which we cannot at present assign the causes. And psycho-analysis can fairly claim to have shown that

actions which appear to be perfect examples of pure caprice sometimes have their demonstrable causes in the unconscious mind. Accordingly the enquirer we have in view has no reason to accept the reality of free-will, and has a tendency to doubt it. There remains the question of immortality. Here again no one will venture to say that the matter has been proved. The appearances are certainly all against immortality. The only spirits we know, appear to us in bodies; and bodily death certainly appears to put an end to the life of the spirit. We have no unexceptionable evidence of the existence of disembodied spirits. Psychical research, even if it proved survival, would not thereby prove immortality. There are of course metaphysical arguments which attempt to demonstrate immortality—arguments generally bound up integrally with complete metaphysical systems, or depending upon proofs of the unreality of time combined with the reality of the self, and often involving pre-existence as well as immortality. But let us assume that our enquirer does not accept any of these, and that his position at most is that of Mr. Bradley's grudging admission "after all it is possible."

Now the beliefs in a personal God, in human freedom, and in human immortality, are often held to be vital to real religious experience. Are they so in reality? I do not think that they are. In the first place, we invariably include Buddhism among the great religions of the world. As far as I know, orthodox ancient Buddhism—the canon of the Pali Pitakas—rejects all these three beliefs. It is atheistic. It denies that there is a persistent self; and therefore, I conclude, as there is no self to will anything, there can be no free will. And as the persistent self is denied, Buddhist language about Transmigration, Rebirth, and Nibbana is necessarily shrouded in vagueness, and nothing that could properly be called immortality or even survival can justifiably be maintained. Yet few would deny

to Buddhism the title of a religion. And I think it would be easy to show from Buddhist writings and history that religious experience does occur among orthodox Buddhists.

In the second place, let us return to our enquirer, whose position is that of suspended judgment on all these three questions. He will not be one of those who lightly set aside all religious phenomena as the outcome of mere illusion or of deliberate self-deception. He will perceive that something which has for so long and so much occupied the hearts and minds of men is at least a psychological fact deserving very serious examination. He is also, as we premised at the outset, in full accord with the main drift of Christian ethics. Consequently, in a spirit of quietness and with an open mind, without intellectual pride but without prejudging any question, he attends, say, to what is written in the Gospels. Now the issue of repeated meditation of this sort, accompanied by sincerity of purpose and a withdrawal into quietness of spirit, is a certain deep sense of comfort. This surely is a fact well known. It is not in itself a very remarkable fact, though it is one which people are easily tempted to describe in emotional language. The sense of comfort is, no doubt, an emotion; but we, of course, here do not wish to do more than describe in the barest terms exactly what takes place. This sense of comfort, then, tends to become a very real and important and desirable thing. It is seen to be something which can be reached almost (though not quite) at will by putting the mind into a certain attitude. This attitude being partly one of expectancy, what is expected tends to be looked upon as a power making an irruption into consciousness from without. This sense of comfort seems to resemble that of a sustaining arm. This sustaining power is found to be effective in various ways. It induces a feeling of personal helplessness in the individual whom it sustains, and at the same time increases his desire for helpfulness to

other individuals. And as these workings tend to promote the power of individuals to live happily with one another, a feeling of awe and reverence for the sustaining power arises, independently of any further judgments as to its nature.

I have given this bald description of what I believe are fairly commonly observed facts. I shall indicate later on the names which I think appropriate for the description of these events. At present, we must ask the question, is this religious experience? The answer must be that it is. For we defined religious experience as a state of consciousness wherein a sharp sense of humility and weakness in the presence of forces wholly or partly beyond our knowledge and control, is combined with a dependence upon and repose in a felt power which *prima facie* appears as wholly external to ourselves. All the elements of this definition are present in the above description. We must therefore conclude that religious experience in our sense can be reached in the way described. A further justification of our definition of religious experience will be attempted in the sequel.

We have now to consider what difference, if any, must or could be made to this course of events in any individual's consciousness, and to his trust therein, by his state of doubt concerning God, freedom, and immortality. Let us take the three doubts in that order.

In the first place, it will be said that Jesus himself, and the Gospels generally, throughout presuppose the existence of a personal, supreme, and good God. That Jesus believed from the first that he was the specially sent Messiah of God is not absolutely clear. But that he believed in the Fatherhood of God is beyond question. And on this belief, it is said, he based his doctrine of the brotherhood of man, as well as much else. Now the doctrine of the

brotherhood of man is the fundamental principle of Jesus' ethics, with which we suppose our doubting enquirer to be in agreement. How can our enquirer retain both his rational doubt about God and his sincere acceptance of the ethical teaching of Jesus?

Now, it is true that Jesus believed in God the Father, and taught that we are God's children. But I think it is false that he taught that we are to love one another exclusively or even mainly *because* we are all children of that Father. I do not see that there is any warrant for this view in the utterances of Jesus. And I do not see that the duty of love, so based, could ever have had the wide appeal that it historically has had. That I should love my brother because of what he is or may become, I recognize as a fine ideal. That I should love him because of a relation in which we both stand to a third person seems to over-intellectualize the conception of love and to provide no sort of potent motive. Certainly a belief that God tenderly loved all his children would be a motive for our loving them too. But God, as represented by Jesus, exhibits tenderness also for sparrows and foxes. And it does not appear that the brotherhood of all God's creatures was therefore taught by Jesus. That we should be humane and kind to the lower animals is doubtless implied; but the love we are to bear to our fellow-men is surely of a different order, and therefore must have different grounds. Consequently, on all these accounts, we must conclude that the Fatherhood of God is not integrally bound up with the doctrine of the brotherhood of man, or in other words with the gospel of love, but that this latter was meant to be our ideal independently of it.

Next it will be said that, since an intimate belief and trust in God was such an important feature of Jesus' mind and character, it will be impossible for anyone not sharing this belief and trust to have a sincere sympathy with

his teaching or a heartfelt devotion to his person. The protasis here is true: such belief was an important feature of Jesus' mind. But the apodosis is not true. There are persons in plenty who, without sharing this belief, do nevertheless earnestly accept his moral teaching and feel a devotion to his person. Nor are such persons guilty of any inconsistency. The great majority of Jesus' moral precepts bear no explicit reference to God. They, so to speak, carry their own authority with them, by instantly appealing to the moral consciousness; and their unique soundness is afterwards found in practice. And why a sincere estimate of Jesus as the greatest of all moral teachers should not inspire a heartfelt devotion to his person, I cannot at all see. Such devotion is quite compatible with a recognition that Jesus may have been mistaken about the existence of God. After all, at least once in his career, Jesus felt that God had forsaken him. And anyway, we cannot take Jesus as omniscient, for at least once in his recorded speeches he was demonstrably in error. In Mark 13:24-30, if the passage (which is not unique here) be taken as genuine and as meaning what it says, Jesus was wrong. For whatever reason, he made a mistake there; and not in a trivial matter either. He prophesied portents as certainly to be observed before the then living generation had passed away. We may be quite sure that no such events occurred. Accordingly, the possibility of Jesus being mistaken in any matter must always be allowed. And we have in any case to discount the legendary element which, in uncritical times, would infallibly grow around such a personality.

Further, it must be remembered that we are dealing at present with the situation of one who doubts, not of one who denies, the existence of God. And the sort of God in question is a personal, supreme, and good Being, Father of us his children. I introduce these reminders at this point, because the Fourth Gospel raises the question of

another sort of God. The language of the Fourth Gospel and of the First Epistle of John, though sublime, is of course emotional and far from clear. But when Saint John says "the Word *was* God," and "God *is* love"; when in Saint John's Gospel (14:11) Jesus is reported as saying, "believe me that I am in the Father, and the Father in me"; and when in the First Epistle of John (4:16) we read, "he that abideth in love abideth in God, and God abideth in him"; it is just possible that the Johannine conception of God is impersonal, or verges upon being so; since persons cannot be in one another. And it is important to remember that Saint John was the disciple who was nearest to Jesus' heart. Accordingly, an enquirer who doubts the existence of a personal God may find here a clue to a God that he can accept, especially if he is an adherent of any system of metaphysics which introduces an impersonal being with the name God. Still, he should be warned against this use of the name God. The word has been fairly appropriated for a personal Being, so that confusion is caused by any other use. Violence was done to the word God by Spinoza and by Hegel, with unfortunate results for both philosophy and religion. This warning must therefore be issued to our enquirer. But he will not require to be warned against identifying that *felt sustaining power*, of which we before spoke, with God. For, all that he certainly knows of this power is that it *prima facie appears* to be a power wholly external to himself. He has no evidence that it really is so external. It is for him as yet only a class of events in his consciousness. And he is not likely to be tempted to do such violence to the historical use of the word God as to apply it to a class of events in consciousness. Nor will he be easily led, without further evidence, to decide that this class of events is due to the *Spirit of God*. In fact, I do not see that it is even necessary for him to exclude the possibility that it is

due to involuntary auto-suggestion. We saw that he has no evidence that it is external. Yet it both occurs, and is of great and beneficent importance for the practical life of himself and others. We are not entitled to say that this could not happen if it were due to auto-suggestion. Whether of external or internal origin, it would still be within the universe; and that fact and its manifested effects are all that concern us. But of this more later.

Finally it may be objected, that if the existence of God be doubted, there is no guarantee of moral or any other order in the universe, and the motives for moral conduct are disorganized. But the obligation to moral conduct, which we feel, is unconditional. It would make no difference to our duty to do our best if we knew that, in spite of our efforts, utter chaos would surround us from that moment on. And besides, God is not the only guarantee of order in the universe. It might be just an ultimate fact, or a condition of anything existing at all, that everything should be ordered. That God is necessary to guarantee that virtue shall be rewarded, may be true. But it is not part of Jesus' teaching that virtue cannot be practised except for a reward.

We have now concluded that one who doubts the existence of God may still have a sincere sympathy with the teaching of Jesus, feel a staunch devotion to his person, and derive a deep religious comfort from the meditation of these things. Can we go further, and say the same of one who denies the existence of God? Assuredly. For we have already admitted that the existence of God is not vital to Christian ethical theory or practice, that Jesus may have been mistaken about God, that such error need not preclude devotion to his character, and that our solemn experience of a felt sustaining power does not oblige us to infer that this power is God or the Spirit of God. The only difference will be that if our enquirer is one who, from

general beliefs about the nature of the universe, denies the existence of God, then the possibility, previously open, of God being the source of the felt sustaining power is now excluded.

This concludes the question of God. Passing now to the doubt about free-will, we have an easier task. We can give an almost immediate negative to the suggestion that a doubt concerning human freedom must necessarily interfere with a warm appreciation and adoption of Christian precept and with a sensitiveness to the personality and power of Jesus, and what follows therefrom. For a number of professed Christians have not only doubted genuine freedom, but denied it. Some denominations, I believe, have made such denial a point of doctrine. But let us consider the matter briefly for ourselves. If I have come to a reasoned conclusion that all my actions are determined, will this prevent my accepting an invitation to dinner, in the confident expectation of being able to go at the appointed time? Or will it prevent my buying a railway ticket to my destination, in the confident expectation of being able to get into the train when it stops at the platform? Or will it prevent my feeling a moral obligation not to travel on the railway without a ticket? Or will it prevent my telling the truth, if I am asked whether I am married? It is obvious that it will do none of these things. And it should be equally obvious that it will not interfere with more important resolves and performances. No doubt the demands of Christian ethics are sometimes difficult, and in the line of most resistance. But this is quite irrelevant. We cannot in any matter, important or trivial, avoid acting *as if* we were free. And the fact that we cannot avoid acting as if we were free will not be changed by a belief that in point of fact we are not free. Suppose that I listen to a rousing sermon. It might happen that I would in consequence, with painful effort, strive to do what the preacher urged.

I should then certainly feel as if I were freely making the painful effort. But I might at the same time hold that it was the words of the preacher, in conjunction with my character, which causally determined my effort; and my character would be determined by the characteristics provided for me at birth, moulded and modified by all the events that have happened to me since. It is quite possibly true that we could not feel in any given case that we were acting virtuously or sinfully, unless we *appeared* to ourselves to have made a free choice between alternatives. But it is not true that we could not act virtuously or sinfully unless we had *really* made a free choice. It is enough that we should be obliged, as we are, to act *as if* we were making a free choice.

I chose the instance of the sermon advisedly. For it incidentally disposes of the argument sometimes heard, that if determinism were true, it would be useless to urge people to take any course of action. It would be nothing of the kind. The exhortation of a preacher might very well be just the factor which would determine in his hearers the course of action which he desired them to take. A similar argument is often used with regard to punishment. Where is the use or propriety, it is asked, of punishing a man for doing wrong, when he could not help doing what he did then, and cannot help doing what he will do in the future? This is, of course, an equally shocking argument. For the punishment may very well be just the factor which will determine the offender to follow a better course of action in future. Again, it will be objected that if determinism were true, repentance would lose all meaning. But, on the contrary, repentance would mean a lament that our character was such that it had determined us to bad actions, this lament being itself a factor determining us to strive to follow a better course in future. And this is in practice indistinguishable from what repentance means on any

other view. It is true that on a deterministic view, responsibility could hardly find a place. But Jesus does not ask us to assign responsibility in the case of other people. On the contrary, he said "judge not." And is it not clear that we shall be *more* disposed to be tolerant and to refrain from judging any agent, if responsibility does not lie in the agent, than if it does? Surely this is probable. And if it be urged that the sense of responsibility for our own past bad deeds, or the sense of sin, is of great practical moral importance, we must point to an admission already made. We saw above that on a deterministic view we may still have a sorrow for the past so strong as to be itself a motive for improvement in the future. This taken in connection with everything else that has here been said, seems to be sufficient to make a sense of sin.

We have now concluded that not merely a doubt, but even a denial of the freedom of the will, need have no adverse effect in the matter before us. It remains to consider how, if at all, a doubt about immortality will affect it. Here the objections urged and the answers to them will be somewhat similar to those in the case of God. It will be said that a belief in the immortality of the human soul was so fundamental a part of Jesus' teaching, and also of his mind and character, that it will be impossible for anyone not sharing this belief to have a sincere sympathy with Jesus' teaching and a heartfelt devotion to his person. But what exactly was Jesus' belief about the destiny of the human soul after bodily death? He never made it plain what his belief was. The dead Lazarus, brother of Martha and Mary, is said to be asleep. Lazarus the beggar is in Abraham's bosom, comforted. A certain rich man is in Hades, in torments. The crucified thief was to be in Paradise on the day of his death, with Jesus. But it was not till the third day that Jesus rose from "the dead." Whoever says "thou fool" is in danger of the Gehenna of fire.

Workers of iniquity shall be cast into the furnace of fire. The kingdom of God is within you. Many shall sit down with Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, in the kingdom of heaven. The kingdom of heaven belongs to the poor in spirit. The kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and men of violence take it by force (Matt. 11:12 R. V.). The kingdom of heaven is like unto leaven. What harmony can be extracted from these sayings? None that does not rest at least partly upon guess-work. Some of this language is figurative, but which? Jesus seems to have used current Jewish phraseology without realizing that he was clouding his meaning. But although it is true that there is much disharmony here, and that the mind of Jesus moving on different levels expressed itself so very differently at different times on this matter, one thing emerges quite plainly. Jesus believed in some sort of life to come, and taught that whoso believed on him should never die.

Is this doctrine vital to his moral teaching, or not? It is an extraordinarily difficult matter to decide. Evidently he sometimes cast his teaching into the form "if you act so, you will have eternal life." If he meant that the hope of eternal life was to be our motive for doing what he said, then one who cannot but doubt immortality cannot hope to be in sympathy with what Jesus said. Of course, he might still accord all honor to the moral precepts themselves. But his living interest in Jesus would surely be fatally damaged by a belief that Jesus had given the wrong motive for following them. "I am the Resurrection and the Life" must mean "there is supernatural worth in my teaching," whatever else it also means. But it does not by itself mean that there is no other worth in the teaching, or that what other worth there is, is dependent upon this worth. Consider what would be implied by the admission that Jesus meant that the hope of eternal life was to be our sole motive for adopting his teaching. It would imply that

either he was blind to the intrinsic moral beauty of his own teaching and to its paramount importance for our conduct in this life, or he thought these things of no account as motives. And consider what would be implied by the admission that Jesus meant that the hope of eternal life was to be the principal, though not the only, motive for adopting his teaching. It would imply that a safe-guarding of our own interest was to be preferred to all else, and that all virtue was subsidiary to prudence. Self-sacrifice would not be real self-sacrifice, but only a subtle form of self-interest. The eye would infallibly be fixed upon the reward. Now if any one can satisfy himself that either of these positions is consonant with the major part of what we know about the life, the character, and the teaching of Jesus, it is hard to see how he can be refuted. But the majority of reflective readers in modern times do not get this impression from the Gospel story. They believe that what primarily commended the gospel of love to Jesus as to them, was its intrinsic moral beauty, and its vital importance for the enabling of human beings in this world to live happily with one another. They would admit that private prudence may be a part of virtue, but the suggestion that it is the whole or the principal part of virtue seems to them in complete discord with the whole spirit of the historical Jesus. And when it is urged that altruism would come in in the duty laid upon us to go forth and save other souls for eternal life, they would perceive that, on the present view, this duty too would itself be enjoined only as a means to personal salvation, and so would not be genuine altruism; and they would further see that this, the only hope for altruism (on the present view), would in time extinguish itself, so soon as all souls had been Christianized. Consequently they do not think that the hope of eternal life is the only or the principal motive for Christian conduct. And they are confirmed in this view by noticing

that in the Sermon on the Mount (in the first Gospel), which is Jesus' most important deliverance, there is no explicit reference to eternal life.

That the doctrine of eternal life is prominent in Jesus' teaching it is of course impossible to deny. That it was present to his mind as a subordinate motive for Christian virtue is also possible. That it really means a life not subject to cessation, and does not mean a terminable life spent in the knowledge of eternal truth or something of that sort, is almost certain. But that it is a vital part of Christian ethics is a view that we have now rejected. Accordingly, an enquirer who does not feel able to reach a judgment about the reality of immortality, need not be hindered thereby from a hearty acceptance of Jesus' moral teaching. Jesus' references to this subject he will be obliged to treat as possible errors; but we saw before that an admission of Jesus' fallibility need not be fatal to a devotion to his person.

Another objection, however, is sometimes raised. There must be a life to come, it is said, to redress the wrongs in this life: no virtue, and therefore no Christian virtue, could flourish in a world where virtue is so often crushed and sin so often triumphant as in this world, if this life were all. This argument assumes (1) that all wrongs must be redressed, (2) that some wrongs are not redressed in this life. Is there anything in the teaching of Jesus that involves these assumptions, and are they otherwise justified? In regard to the first assumption, that all wrongs must be redressed, we concluded before that if Jesus had taught that no sin went unpunished and no virtue unrewarded (a doctrine which might be considered incompatible with his promised forgiveness of sins), this would have been tantamount to a reduction of morality to a policy of private prudence. And we did not feel that this could have been intended. Certainly in particular cases he spoke of recom-

pense and (in a bad sense) of reward as sure to follow. But he nowhere lays it down that there is in this matter any law of universal application. Nor have we any certain ground to believe that there is. To the second assumption, that some wrongs are not redressed in this life, some support is afforded by the parable of Lazarus and the rich man. Thus the assumption may be Christian. But we have not independent grounds for believing it to be true. Indeed the contradictory (that all wrongs are redressed in this life) can be maintained without absurdity. It certainly appears that the laws of human nature, acting alone, tend within the limits of this life to punish sin with a tendency to more sin, and to reward virtue with a tendency to more virtue; that is to say, to visit sinners with impoverishment and finally disintegration of personality, and to visit saints with enrichment and glorification of personality. Some such doctrine of Compensation within the limits of this life, and in accordance with general laws, seems to have been the burden of Emerson's remarkable Address to the Divinity School. And it would be difficult to disprove the view. Thus of the two assumptions on which this argument about immortality rests, the first is non-Christian and unproved, the second may be Christian and is unproved. The position therefore cannot be regarded as essential to a Christian view.

We thus conclude that a doubt or a denial of immortality need not preclude an acceptance of Christian principle, nor impede the course of religious experience through devotion to Jesus, nor interfere with a trust in such experience as something other than hopeless illusion. The same has now been said of the three doubts concerning God, freedom, and immortality.

## III

We must now face, with the same purview, the question of Faith and the allied questions of mystery and miracle. Taking them in the reverse order, we must first note that the certified historical truth of all the recorded Christian miracles would not by itself prove anything except that here were events whose causes we do not understand. We should not be able to put them down as due to divine power unless we already knew from some other source that there was a divine power for them to be due to. And no one needs to be reminded that there are plenty of events whose causes we do not understand, and plenty of unknown laws operating in the universe. Nor does any one need to be reminded that we are, in this universe, in the presence of many mysteries. We do not require to take a step to be introduced to them. They are here on every hand. The arrogance of the scientific intellect has had its day. But it is sometimes said that sheer insoluble mystery has a salutary effect on our minds, and religious dogmas are sometimes recommended on this ground. Here, however, every trained mind will agree with the pronouncement of Dean Rashdall in a recent Trinity Sunday sermon (I quote from memory), that "a doctrine which cannot be expressed in intelligible terms can have no importance for our moral or intellectual life." Mere mystery, as such, and apart from attempts to give an account of it, can have no other effect than to inhibit both action and thought.

But the problem of faith is rather a different matter. Faith is a much more formidable claimant to be an essential factor in religious belief than either mystery or miracle is. Faith does not necessarily involve mystery. It may be

defined as the will to believe that which we are without rational grounds for believing. Let us consider the position of faith firstly from the intellectual view-point. It involves an admission of the inadequacy of reason. It implies that in the account we render to ourselves of things, we reach a point where reason must be abandoned and a fresh faculty called in. Now can the abandonment of reason ever be justified by reason? Evidently not. For if we hope to justify anything by reason, we must believe absolutely in the trustworthiness of reason. And it is no good trying to show that the trustworthiness of reason is only partial, by a method which involves the absolute trustworthiness of reason. If we admit that there is any matter wherein reason *cannot* be of any avail, then we must never allow that reason can give us assurance of anything. For there will be no possible means of fixing the point up to which reason is valid, and beyond which it is useless and pernicious. And this result will be the same whether the propositions for which faith is called in are contradicted or merely not decided by reason. It is the act of putting reason out of court which is not rationally justifiable. As a mode of reaching truth, then, faith cannot defend itself at the bar of the intellect.

But it is seldom that any one attempts to defend faith on purely rational grounds. It is usually defended on quite other grounds. The following quotations are taken from one of those articles on religious topics "from a correspondent" which appear on Saturdays on a particular page of the English *Times*. "Unless it (faith) is exercised with deliberation and purpose, men will rob themselves of their highest powers and experience." "The mind of man cannot come to its fullest activity, his moral powers must be stunted, his affections thwarted, the highest motives of service to others beggared if he ignores the claims of faith." And in general it is often urged that to insist upon

the self-sufficiency of the intellect tends to weaken our spiritual powers, and that, in order to realize the best that is in us, we must not be too critical and analytical, but must become as little children. Now here we are dealing with questions, not of truth, but of morals and of happiness. Of course, it is said that the important practical results of faith will convince each believer, on trial, of the truth of that in which he has faith. But this conviction will never amount to proof, since proof is rational demonstration capable of being imparted to others in intelligible terms, and this conviction is only open to each believer on a trial of the effects of faith made by and for himself. But so long as this defence of faith admittedly confines itself to questions of morals and happiness, it will always have to be treated with respect. For the witness of the character of certain exemplars of faith must not be ignored. Certain of the saints have acquired a power over themselves and others, exerted wholly for good and making for universal happiness, which was truly remarkable. Consequently it is urged (as recently for example in a sermon by Dean Inge) that, as in the case of music we attend to what the accredited great composers have written, and endeavor thereby to improve our natural appreciation of musical beauty, so we should put before us as models the great religious geniuses, and strive by faith and devotional practices to attain their spiritual eminence. There are two objections to this recommendation so far as it concerns faith. The first is that if such a course as this be recommended to such a scientific or philosophic enquirer as we earlier had in view, he will infallibly be repelled by the suggestion. He will feel that this course might be nothing more than a prolonged process of self-deception, and the mere possibility of its being so is enough to make the whole thing repugnant to his moral sense. We saw before, it will be remembered, that an admission of certain observed

effects as possibly due to involuntary auto-suggestion need not interfere with their supreme value for an individual's life. But here we are faced with a case where an initial act of judgment must be made in order that certain effects may thereafter be observed. This wears the air of deliberate self-deception, and is a very different thing from an involuntary auto-suggestion surmised after the observance of certain effects.

The second objection to the above recommendation is more important. It takes the form of a question whether the great qualities of heart and spirit sometimes shown by religious geniuses really are due in any important degree to faith. I do not see how it could be proved that they were or were not due to this or that factor, except by very close psychological observations which have not been made. But I venture to think that the said great qualities could perfectly well be due, not to faith at all, but to humility and prayer—terms of which I shall give definitions in a moment. This brings us to the last question which we proposed to discuss, namely, whether religious experience in the sense of our definition, religious experience unaccompanied by faith or otherwise grounded belief in God, freedom, or immortality, must or need not necessarily fall short of a complete satisfaction of what is called man's spiritual nature.

#### IV

We gave, earlier, an account of a course of events which is a not uncommon consequence of a sympathetic response to the moral teaching of Jesus. We spoke of meditation on the way of life recommended and followed by Jesus, accompanied by sincerity of purpose and withdrawal into

quietness of spirit; and we said that it was an observed fact that this was often followed by a deep sense comfort and an experience of a felt sustaining power. We have now seen that when this experience occurs, as it sometimes does, to individuals who feel unable to acknowledge any kind of belief in God, freedom, or immortality, such individuals need not reject the experience as radically illusory or as formally inconsistent with anything that follows from their rationalistic position. Nor need a recognition of the observed fact of this experience and its valuable effects involve any modification in their rationalistic position or in the unfettered use of reason. And we agreed to call the said experience religious. It remains to be said further that this experience, described as that of a certain class of events in consciousness felt as a sustaining power, is reached, not always but most commonly, by a number of persons in company, united in the act sometimes described as "worship." In these circumstances the felt power habitually appears to take the form of a presence over and above that of the individual consciousnesses of the persons present. By what name should this apparent presence be called? I think that an appropriate name would be the Holy Ghost. It is a non-committal name; that is to say, it carries very little connotation with it, but merely denotes its object, like a proper name. Yet it does not prejudge the question of its connection with any Person. Of course, the name "Holy Ghost" has historically been used for a person of the Trinity, and we are not here embracing the doctrine of the Trinity. But the fact for which this name was first found is manifestly the same fact of religious experience, the same "presence," which we have in view here. Thus although the name "Holy Ghost" has historically been bound up with particular views about God and his nature, it still seems a suitable name to use although those views be not accepted, because it would still denote

the object that it always has denoted. "Holy Ghost" is better than "Holy Spirit," for it is less likely than the latter to prejudge the question of God: God is sometimes spoken of as a Spirit, but never as a Ghost. Some may protest that it is most improper to apply the name Holy Ghost to a set of events which are not indubitably from a source outside ourselves, but which we have admitted may be due to involuntary auto-suggestion. But it must be remembered that we did not decide that they were due to auto-suggestion. They might quite as well be put down as due to a "general will" or a "group mind," by any one who believes in such things. Or they might equally be due to some genuinely external power. The point is that, to whatever source it is due, this class of events presents itself to us as of supreme importance and value for our practice and our happy life with one another, and as deserving in consequence of all veneration. If an idealist metaphysician believes that the true nature of an egg is spiritual, not material, the egg will not therefore refuse to nourish the idealist in order to pay him out for his view of its nature. The present case is exactly similar. Whatever view we may take of its nature, the Holy Ghost, if it comes into our experience at all, will be a solemn and spiritually nourishing Holy Ghost, from which we cannot withhold reverence even if we would. Consequently there can be no reason, on the ground of our doubt about its ultimate nature, to refuse the name Holy Ghost to the set of events indicated. Let us then at length assume that we are agreed to call this set of events the Holy Ghost.

We can now proceed to define humility and prayer. Humility I should define as the sense, in any individual's consciousness, of the insignificance of his own natural powers in comparison with that which is from time to time poured into him by the Holy Ghost. Prayer I should define as the act of putting the mind into the sense of communion

with and dependence upon the Holy Ghost. The protest will here be made that in practice prayer will be meaningless unless addressed to a personal Being who knows our hearts and is able to answer our desires. To this we may reply that it is exactly when explicitly addressed to a personal Being that prayer tends to lose its distinctive character. For it then tends almost inevitably to become *petition* for particular mercies, and so to lose some of its power to bring general strength and help. But having stated what we intend to mean by prayer, we must pass on.

Is it then possible that the great qualities of heart and spirit shown by some religious geniuses are due, not mainly if at all to faith, but rather to humility and prayer? It is impossible to give demonstration of this. But let any one impartially consider some religious genius, such as Saint Francis or George Fox or whomsoever he chooses, and ask himself whether the phenomena of such careers could not be due wholly to the power of the Holy Ghost fostered by humility and prayer. The superiority to all the ordinary littlenesses of human nature, coupled with a freedom from pride, the courage, the magnanimity, the combined strength and tenderness, the power of affection, the earnest testimony to an inner light and a life-giving fount, the flame-like zeal, the unbounded energy, the marvellous force—all these qualities of the saintly character surely point more to the workings of the Holy Ghost than to anything else. And if this be so, we shall have no need to call upon faith to account for these phenomena. For the Holy Ghost will account for them; and in the Holy Ghost itself we do not require to have faith, since it is an experience, a fact that is known, and whose traceable effects can be observed, and it does not confine its operations to those who have faith.

If, then, it be admitted that these manifestations proceed by natural laws from that class of events in consciousness, felt as a sustaining power and sometimes experienced

as a presence in the midst, which we have called the Holy Ghost; then there will be no need to discuss further the question whether religious experience, as we defined it, need fall short of a complete satisfaction of man's spiritual nature. For religious experience, as we defined it, is nothing but the experience of the Holy Ghost; and these manifestations, due to the Holy Ghost, represent the summit of the experiences that are as yet known to be accessible to men. Thus religious experience, in the sense of our definition, is capable of conducting men to the summit of their possible spiritual experience.

## V

We have seen that there is no impossibility in combining into a logically coherent whole a proper account of religious experience and an admission of a state of philosophic doubt on certain major problems of existence. It may only now perhaps be urged that the general psychological effect of the philosophic or scientific temper upon the chances of religious experience will be bad. But this temper is not always characterized by the intolerance and self-sufficiency which marked it during the nineteenth century. Spinoza combined full measure of both philosophic temper and sensitiveness to religious experience. So did Plato. So did Plotinus. The path of really profound learning and, as it might be thought, utter sophistication, often emerges at the end into a pleasant field of pure intellectual innocence. It is only half-measures that really sophisticate. The prince of scientists is Isaac Newton. At the close of his life of search and discovery, what was his state of mind? "I do not know what I may appear to the world, but, to myself, I seem to have been only like a boy

playing on the sea-shore, and directing myself in now and then finding a smoother pebble or a prettier shell than ordinary, whilst the great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before me." Such are his words. They are evidence that we need not fear that a hardening of the heart is a necessary incident of the fearless search for truth.

It has not been the purpose of this article to argue in favor of a sceptical position concerning God, freedom, immortality, and faith. Nothing has been said to indicate that any one ought to take up such a position. The purpose merely was to state a coherent case for those who feel themselves drawn towards two positions which superficially appear to be logically and psychologically incongruous. The attempt has been to do this by showing that these positions are not incongruous. It seemed worth while to make the attempt for the following reason. The honest rationalist, of whatsoever kind he be, is often led to confuse religion with the less honorable phenomena presented by the religious organizations. Witnessing the hopeless rigidity of Roman Catholic doctrine, the curious instability of Protestant doctrine (so much in evidence just now), the want of candour often displayed by ecclesiastical folk, the obstructiveness sometimes shown by them to the advance of science, and their tendency (perhaps in the long run inevitable) to substitute a scheme of observances for Jesus' "inward" conception of morality—the morality of the state of the heart and disposition of the will;—witnessing all this, he usually has not a high opinion of the religious organizations. Accordingly, even if he has himself a secret admiration for Jesus and a foretaste of what genuine religious experience is, he may, thinking of the forms the adoption and perpetuation of these things have historically taken, put it all away together as belonging to the powers of darkness. Now if the teaching and spirit of Jesus were to be finally pushed out of the main current of the world's

intellectual life, it would be a calamity. A rich storehouse would be lost to the spirit of man. The cause of social and international concord would be terribly weakened. But it would equally be a calamity if science and philosophy were not to be free to face every issue with absolute detachment and undaunted candour. This loss, equally with the other, would be a truncation of our human nature. Therefore it seems necessary to do something towards making it clear that religious experience is too oft-recurring and too fundamental a part of our spirit to be inextricably associated with any particular world-view. It is also important to make it clear that the moral teaching of Jesus is so profoundly fitted to educe the best qualities that are in us, that it is in no danger of withering away when theological doctrines are cut off from it. It is the root and trunk, and theological doctrines are the leaves that periodically perish and fall; not the other way round. Significant of this is the determination of some, in spite of their repudiation of formal Christian theology, to be, in practice, to the limit of their power, Christians; and not Christians merely, but uncompromising Christians who will stand four-square for what they believe to be their teacher's central meaning. But ultimately, of course, all Christians will stand or fall by the touch-stone of the Master: "by their fruits ye shall know them."

L. G. STRUTHERS.

SANDWICH, KENT, ENGLAND.

## A GENERALIZED BASIS OF FAITH

"It makes us repose on the unknown with confidence. Prayer is the recognition of Laws, the soul's . . . thread of conjunction with them." George Meredith "Beauchamp's Career," *The Epistle of Dr. Shrapnel*.

THE considerations here advanced do not present one more vain effort to formulate a single "world religion" for the rich diversity of the human spirit. They are rather a very diffident attempt to seek the background common to every religion, to find what is the philosophical or mental need that is met by every religious faith, what indeed we mean by religion.

Is it possible to consider religion apart from any body of religious belief? Can we generalize the function of religion in human life and human society? Perhaps an initial difficulty will be the distinction between personal and social religion. But after all, either of these may be regarded as including the other. So let us assume for the moment that religion in its social aspect is merely one expression of personal religion.

What then is the function of religion? "The Soul's Peace." Yes, but the same may be said of every absorbing occupation. Should religion claim to give a point of view, literally, to place the human being on a vantage point from which all events will be viewed in relation to one another and to a whole? If we allow this we still need not claim that Religion, still less that any one religion will bestow the power of perfect perspective, that the *due*

relationship will be apprehended of every event observed or experienced. But religion will give a sure sense that such relationship exists, though its complexity transcends human vision. Religion will bring the sure conviction that every event, however purposeless it may appear in itself, yet has its appointed function in a Universal Order. But does not Philosophy also claim to provide such a key to the Universe? Religion applies to this task both intellect and emotion; Philosophy, save by an extension of the word which makes it indistinguishable from Religion, must reject all means but that of the Intellect. Religion invokes "heart, soul and might," the primal synthesis of every human faculty.

It may be said, of course, that Philosophy may also be touched with Emotion, that there is, indeed, a point at which every human activity must meet so that each may be regarded as a different facet of one great whole. We fully admit this grand and inspiring truth. Every human activity indeed may be pursued for its own sake, and yet be a conscious contribution to the great scheme of things. Wherever is self-sacrifice, wherever is a sanction for any form of human activity as a contribution to the whole, independent of personal benefit or happiness, direct or indirect, there we have religion as here defined. Religion (as distinguished from any one religion) may thus be regarded not as a body of thought but rather as a point of view, affording a sanction, a stimulus which may be applied to every form of human activity including certain movements often regarded, even by their followers, as definitely anti-religious. In the group of those who accept religion as here defined, a group indeed almost coincident with the human race, all are characterized by a conception of the Universe as a Whole and by an overmastering sense of their obligation to make their life subservient to that Whole.

Now, would we affirm that the activity thus stimulated is always beneficial. Alas, when can human frailty, however exalted its inspiration, be assured of infallibility throughout its course? The manifestation that we call religious fanaticism is a refutation of any such claim. There are those, too, of whom the martyred Pallissy is a type, who may be regarded as no less fanatic, who sacrifice self and all dear to them to their pure and unselfish zeal in the cause of science or of art.

Indeed, it is remarkable how ingrained is the human tendency to sink individuality for the sake of a Cause. One contributory factor may be the inertia of the mind, which, having fastened on an Idea as adequate to illumine and justify all further action in the life course, feels then excused from further speculation or even reflection, and can go on blindly in the path appointed. "Young, all lay in dispute. We shall know, being old" expresses no doubt a popular philosophy. Another factor in the pleasure of enlistment for a Cause is undoubtedly the desire of the individual to seek for something nobler and greater than himself, in which he may lose the sense of his own littleness—a tendency observable in the nobler manifestations of the Group-instinct as well as in Hero-worship. But as persistent as either of these is a third factor, the human impulse to kindness and to self-sacrifice. The impulse is indeed found even among the animals, but by human beings it will be exercised not merely towards offspring or even towards benefactors or chiefs—the spirit of kindness will spread forth towards the stranger and even to species of beings other than our own. Always contending against that lowlier instinct of aversion to the strange or unknown is the impulse of kindness to our fellows reinforced by that other impulse of curiosity attracted by the "new and strange," which is one of the forces leading towards sympathetic exploration of other minds.

But action based on such instinctive kindliness equally with more selfish efforts, is liable to the blasting experience of Failure. Here, again, the great support will surely be a sense of Dedication as a part of the great Whole, the religious view. Even the least philosophic realizes how small is the power of one individual, how slight the cosmic reaction even to the largest aggregation of individuals. Empires pass. Yes, indeed, but with the fuller absorption of the conception of evolution and with the contributions to our understanding of the complex of peoples yielded by the advance of knowledge, we begin to get some faint notion of how, though none is indomitable or supreme, each has yet some part in the making of the great Whole. Every people, every individual, yes, every stone "makes a difference." No ancient culture is so lowly but that its influence may be traced "making a difference" in the most complex modern civilizations. The consciousness of this is very early felt and since man's first and dominant need is for a "key" we find the earliest formulations of cosmogonies.

There is much food for thought in the old confusion between religion and science. Religion among primitive peoples has always given rise to cosmogonies. Nor is this characteristic only of primitive peoples. The process is well nigh continuous. It can be traced through the religious system of antiquity, through the mystical tendencies which followed their spread, on to the speculations of modern science. In the nineteenth century Europe awoke with a start to discover that her religious faith was intertwined with the cosmological stories in the early chapters of Genesis, and that both these sets of belief were the subject of grave disturbance. And since Religion (whether in its individual or its social aspect) is concerned with giving the individual a relationship to the Universe it is clearly not a simple matter for religious faith to survive a change in cosmological conceptions. Yet such changes of con-

ception must be perpetually experienced so long as the human race perseveres in its age-long task of learning more and ever more of the qualities and conditions of the external world.

The sense of a Universal Order, in which we may fit our own activities and aspirations, is the constant need of the human race; but the expression of that need will perpetually change with the changes in experience. For every experience must not only fit in with the general cosmic conception of the place of the individual in the Universe, it must also reinforce that conception. New experience will often lead up to, as well as receive stimulus and nutriment from speedy or violent development in conceptions of science or philosophy, where adjustment of outlook, though by no means without friction, is nevertheless usually smoother and easier than in the realm of religious expression.

We have suggested that the supreme gift of religion is that it gives every individual and every event a place in an ordered cosmos. Unfortunately religion has never been content with merely postulating an ordered cosmos. Every great religion finds itself inextricably interwoven with some definite view of how the universe works. This confusion between the realms of religion and of science surely arises from our intellectual inadequacy. It is a fault not in our religious sense, but in our intellectual powers. Man, dimly conscious of an ever-expanding destiny, yet experiencing every moment his own feebleness, seeks peace in the conviction that he is linked in harmony with the whole vast, ordered universe. Can he maintain faith in the existence of that great Order and yet admit that his more definite cosmological conceptions are but working hypotheses, susceptible like all other scientific belief to an endless process of modification and evolution?

The failure effectively to reach and maintain this view permeates the thought of every class of human society. The uneducated are indeed the most liable to mingle superstition with their religion. Yet, after all, what is called superstition is often nought but discarded science. What was astrology, for instance, and the whole doctrine of microcosm and macrocosm, but an attempt to establish universal cosmic solidarity? And on a lower level many so-called superstitions are but the scattered fragments of ancient systems.

Those whose minds are most cultivated and whose knowledge is greatest will of course be those for whom religious belief must be most completely divorced from *discarded* science. But how tempting it seems even to the educated to reinforce religious faith with current cosmology. Religious Faith assures us that the parts of the universe *are* inter-related. The science of our own day shows us how in actual fact an inter-relationship exists in the physical world. What more tempting for Religion than to adopt and attempt to crystallize any definite Theory of the World that conveniently reinforces her thesis? What thinker, what great body of religious or philosophic thought has escaped the temptation to prove too much?<sup>1</sup>

There are indeed religions, such as Buddhism, that claim to be entirely divorced from interest in this world, so that it would seem no speculation on such matters could have crept into their creed. Yet, after all, a very definite cosmology informs not merely the belief in the transmigration of souls, but the very doctrine of Nirvana. The book of Genesis supplied the Christian and Jewish religions with a rude cosmogony to which the Apocalyptic literature brought rich and strange accretions. The great

<sup>1</sup> As these lines are being typed comes the announcement of a forthcoming lecture at Cambridge on "The Theological Implications of the Einstein Theory."

thinkers of Classical antiquity separated to a great extent their philosophic speculation from association with the beliefs and worship of the gods and goddesses. Yet Aristotle's *De anima* shows us soul as inseparable from body, while he criticizes a different physiological and cosmological view in the *Timaeus*. Even the Stoics based their system on the Democritan Atoms. The work of Lucretius, who was called by Bacon "an Atheist," is a passionate attempt to find the true place and aim of Man in a vast ordered Universe.<sup>2</sup>

The difficulties of the relation between religious and cosmological conceptions are not only on one side. While new views of Nature may disturb our religious conceptions, so also may new religious experience disturb our scientific faith. It is within the memory of all how the quickened sense of the Unseen, gained under the stress of emotion experienced during the late War, led curiously to the rejection of scientific experience. So much of the world's achievement must be accepted second hand by every individual that there is always danger of one part of our heritage passing into oblivion when another is greatly stressed. This danger is intensified by the artificial antitheses that tend to grow up in our minds. Why should our experience of the material world and of the spiritual world be regarded as antipathetic?

Religious faith is indeed inevitably in intimate relationship with scientific conceptions. How may this relationship be adjusted to leave room for growth and development in both our sets of ideas? Again, it seems that the solution lies in the increase of our powers of abstract conception.

Will not religion holding fast to belief in the *existence* of correlated harmony throughout the Universe, yet learn

<sup>2</sup> A very interesting discussion by Mr. C. Bailey on "The Religion of Lucretius," appeared in the *Proceedings of the Classical Association*, Vol. XIX, p. 9, London, 1922.

to keep this conception entirely distinct from any hypothesis as to the details or method of expression of such harmony? Admittedly we cannot fully apprehend these while our knowledge retains its human limitations—and with the constant growth of human knowledge new hypotheses must in succession emerge. Let religion be content to affirm that there exists an inter-relationship and that its completer understanding is the noblest human goal, though each individual can contribute but one facet to the crystal. Yet how enormous is the significance of certainty of merely the existence of such relationship.

“All that is at all,  
Lasts ever, past recall.  
Earth changes, but thy soul and God stand sure.”<sup>8</sup>

There should be our support “midst this dance of changing circumstance.”

How this harmonious whole is built, the plain of any one part in the Great Order, to these questions we must resolutely resist asking for a solution from Religion. Religion can but give us Faith that an answer exists—and will thus stimulate and encourage us in our course, in our investigation into the laws of Nature, of Man’s Body and Mind, of the social organisms, in our effort to live in harmony with the discovered laws of the Universe and to interpret them to our fellow men.

“The beauty of nature and the beauty of the moral law,” said Kant, were the basis of his faith in the existence of God. To him, enjoying the beautiful and the noble, a specific religious belief brought a conception of a creative spirit transcending these twin manifestations, and bringing them into perspective as parts of the whole, related to one another through their mutual relations to the Creator of each.

<sup>8</sup> R. Browning, *Rabbi ben Ezra*.

Science indeed shares with philosophy in providing material to be absorbed by Religion and so to lead her to quicken with emotion the apprehension of One Universe transcending our mundane sense, and to provide the sanction of Dedication of human life in harmony with those great universal laws, which, whether apprehended as Science, Philosophy, or Religion, we call Principles. It is that sense of cosmic fellowship that we have called religion that leads us to recognize the universal application of Principles and that saves us from imagining that any lower or sectional interest can be truly served by contravention of the fundamental universal laws. It helps us to a fruitful adjustment to any environment for "he who hath the fountain of prayer in him will not complain of hazards." That sense of having "the universal for succor of the truth in it" <sup>4</sup> both increases the power of endurance and stimulates to action, or rather to any manner of life.

Thus all our powers of emotion, intellect, and action, "heart, soul and might," to quote the verse that has for centuries formed the central watchword of Israel,<sup>5</sup> are quickened to find and observe what some will prefer to call the Laws of the Kingdom of God, while others engaged, as we have seen, on the same Quest, will describe as the Laws of the Infinite Universe. It may seem that spiritual endeavor is far from some lives, yet further consideration and truer insight will lead us to recognize that all are in their degree groping towards that vantage point, where they may feel themselves in harmonious relationship with the great Whole. It would indeed be no less absurd than ungrateful to deny that some are more intimately touched with the Spirit, more able to guide their own and others' course in conformity with its lead. Yet spiritual experience is surely absent in no single life-course. Sometimes

<sup>4</sup> *Epistle of Dr. Shrapnel.*

<sup>5</sup> Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might. *Deuteronomy VI*, verse 5.

such experience may be called excitement, sometimes love or triumph, but probably no single human being has gone through life without at some time taking a vivid interest in some matter that in no way affects his bodily welfare. There is indeed no so-called materialist who is really impervious to non-material considerations. Often the "materialist" is peculiarly sensitive to the appeal of affection, and may even deserve the name of sentimental. It is only when for "non-material" we substitute the term "spiritual" or still worse "religious" that we evoke at once his vigorous denial of any sympathy or understanding.

Is not this confusion of terms typical of the inevitable confusions and misunderstandings that must arise when we, who in this world can only apprehend the spiritual through the material, endeavor to communicate or share spiritual experience? Every artist, every thinker, can work only through a medium—his very brain depends for its manifestation on certain physical fabrics. Thus does thought, including of course religious thought, always undergo change and development in transmission. How great then is the responsibility of those who, while passing on the torch, must by this fundamental law of the Universe inevitably modify the character of the flame, if one may so put it, by the nature of the fuel they contribute.

It is so fatally easy for our ideas to be confused in our own minds as in those of others. Take, for example, the great problems of Personality, and of the Immortality of the Human Soul. Since in this world we have experienced Spirit only in some relationship to Matter we must accept an extreme vagueness and indefiniteness as to the true meaning and implication of belief in the Immortality of the human spirit. We may feel a strong conviction of Spirit as indeed the most "real" element in existence. Our experience of Spirit may appear to us the most vivid and significant of our life. Indeed, we may feel convinced that

in every experience the spiritual, that is the element of consciousness and of memory, are all that remains with us, all that convey meaning to us, yet we must admit that the attempt to formulate such experience either to ourselves or to others involves the introduction of the non-spiritual.

Influence is a most impressive manifestation of the spirit, and one that will be recognized by every impartial observer. Independent of distance in time or space, the human spirit that has once established its claim on our love or our reverence will continue its potent hold on our thoughts and action. In the exercise of influence we have indeed spirit functioning with the least aid of matter—though it will be conceded that even here the physical and physiological aspects of Memory must play their part. Yet this manifestation of Influence may help us to apprehend Spirit, to give some meaning to the term.

Yet again, when we consider the spiritual changes involved in Development, we can see that Immortality itself is a strangely subtle conception whose true implications it is hard for us to apprehend. The helpless babe, the vigorous school child, adolescence, maturity, advancing age, what qualities of the spirit do not each of these phrases call up to our mind? Qualities that will overlay and modify every individual personality, and that yet will be subtly controlled and modified in every individual by the personality that will color every stage of the individual life-course.

We are tempted to regard the individual personality as mainly a potentiality, as something dynamic, with infinite possibilities. This gives us courage to expect infinite change and development beyond this world, rather than loss of that wonderful and beautiful manifestation that we call human personality—perchance its transfiguration to a state yet more wonderful, more exquisite. Yet here

again, let us remember our human limitations, let us beware of any crude attempt to define the Unknowable in terms of our little finite minds. At every stage of its earthly course the manifestation of human spirit will be conditioned by Matter, by the bodily frame and by the material environment. Does not this suggest that if we try to separate too sharply consideration of the spiritual and of the material we are putting ourselves against the very fabric of our world? To some generations who have felt Spirit as the only reality, the line of struggle has always appeared the elimination of the material. In revolt against this thought we have the contention "Nor the soul helps flesh more now than flesh helps soul." May not the trend of our aspiration rather be to *inform* Matter with Spirit, to awake our consciousness to Spirit and so to ensure that Spirit never abdicates its rule, nor relinquishes its moral, nor renounces its appeal.

For in all the world around us there lurks Spirit waiting only that we may open our hearts and our minds to it, that we may saturate ourselves therewith to our infinite joy. The exquisite beauty of living form, the wondrous laws of growth and movement, even these do not exhaust the stimulus given in a bountiful world to our spiritual nature. "Our little brothers the birds" of St. Francis, "The wonders of nature and of the moral law" of Kant, the exquisite symmetry of sound awaiting us in all music imagined or yet undiscovered, those marvellous and exquisite relationships that we call mathematics, love, knowledge, all such Beauty is around us, informing our Physical World ready for our entrancement when we can but open our eyes and see and know. By some that joy and entrancement may be called the Love of God. Others name it the gift of the human spirit. Yet what matter these names? The urgency is that this precious gift may be seen and recognized by all, that all may share in it, that all may

recognize the common heritage. Let creeds multiply. Since we are created with infinitely diverse minds, why should we not give to them diverse expression? Only let us remember sometimes to give expression to the thoughts shared in common by all. Agnostic, Theist, Jew, Christian, Positivist, Buddhist, Moslem, Confucian, we all seek to feel ourselves in relationship with our fellowmen and with the Universe around us. And a master key there is—prone to break in our hands under too careful examination and analysis—yet which grows ever stronger with careful use—we mean the key of common action, common service in the upward trend of the human race to fulfill ever more completely its part in the Universal Whole.

DOROTHEA WALEY SINGER.

HIGHGATE, ENGLAND.

## CRITICISMS AND DISCUSSIONS

### WHAT IS AN ANTINOMY?

WHEN MEN begun to study numbers they had an expanding sense of power. Results came clearly and these results could be proven to be correct. Pythagoras saw vast metaphysical discoveries within his grasp. Things went well until the effort was made to divide numbers. Five could not be divided by three. Why not? Men assembled in secret conference. The difficulty was vital. One of the conference was the original news-man. He scented a good story. He gave out the information that the intellectuals were in trouble. Their foundations were crumbling. Then he took a boat for a row on the sea and was promptly drowned. By the Gods said the intellectuals for his tattling. Two will not divide by seven. We get 285714,285714, as long as we care to proceed. There is a mystery here. The process of division is not destroyed. Nor is it exhausted. Let it continue forever, there would still be something beyond the reach of the process. It will not yield to the process.

It is a beyond, a transcendent. All we know of it is that it is infinite. This is the point where knowledge and the infinite come into relation. Division reveals the contact of knowledge with the infinite. But the infinite is not knowledge. Its one mark is that it is beyond the utmost reach of the process of knowledge. This discovery has made trouble for the intellectuals until this day. If the process of knowledge has limits, it breaks down. The process of knowledge does not break down, therefore anything beyond knowledge is superstition. Thus the battle has gone until now. Some denying that knowledge gives contact with infinity. This comes in the process of faith.

If the infinite is beyond the reach of knowledge; if the process of knowledge is valid; then we are in the presence of an ultimate dualism. This danger brought forth the Eleatic School. Reality is one. All variety, any change, any difference is excluded. The one

appeared to change, but it did not. If the one does not change, why should it appear to change? This was the paradox and not to be explained. That is, the Eleatic doctrine was not illustrated on the level of appearance. Therefore appearance is not real. Thus is discovered a metaphysic for conservatism. Then Aristotle elevated the Eleatic doctrine of the one into the canon of contradiction. That is, if reality is one, unity, any contradiction of the one is false. "Of two contradictories, one is false." Thus comes the dualism of the true and the false, the orthodox and the heretical. For fifteen centuries this canon of Aristotle pursued its career in Europe. Any change was abolished from the world. Any intelligence that advocated any revolution was sent to hell. This vast movement in European life looks to be due to the power of an idea. When Copernicus harked back and suggested that things change, so revolutionary a man as Martin Luther said, Copernicus is a mad man. I think we must sympathize with Galileo. Standing in the presence of the High Court, remembering the fate of Huss, looking at the fire hot to receive him, he said, "The doctrine that things move is a heresy and I will not teach it." But once out of the reach of the Inquisitors General, things began to move again. Today upon the spot where Bruno was burned for teaching the doctrine of motion, there stands one of the great monuments of Europe, erected by the scholars of the world. Nothing was done when Galileo was tried and Bruno was burned. Problems of thought do not come under the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts. The European mind went rapidly to the extreme of utter motion. It was a question whether there was any fixedness at all. The Church, the State, truth, God were put upon the defensive. It was this metaphysical condition that awoke the giant, Kant, and gave to the world the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. And the antinomy is one of the master revelations of this great book. What is an antinomy?

Kant's analysis goes to show the validity of the mental process as mental, and that the door into this mental process is the senses. Taking Locke's doctrine that all knowledge, as to content, has its source in sensation, can we have knowledge of anything other than objects? Our knowledge as to content is limited to that which the sensation gives. The Verstand works the content of sensation into knowledge, using the categories. The Vernunft attempts to apply these categories to the content not given in sensation. The category thus used is an idea. The idea is effort to reach the transcendental sphere and secure knowledge. The knowledge of the sphere

beyond experience and sensation is necessary to the world of sensation and experience. But it contradicts the knowledge of sensation and experience. This contradiction is an antinomy.

According to Aristotle, a contradiction means the presence of error. Therefore, the Kritik reaches the conclusion that the mental process issues into error. Various movements issued out of this result of the Kritik. Kant attempted to restore confidence by resorting to the practical sphere. The moral law shows the supreme presence of the truth in man's life. The fact of the antinomy must be accepted. But does Kant's interpretation of it stand? Does the presence of the antinomy mean the absence of truth? Once more, what is an antinomy? Kant points out that time as in the origin of the world is both infinite and finite. That anything should be finite and infinite is an antinomy. Let us consider. The infinite is that which has no limits external to itself. We speak of infinite space or infinite time. The only difference between finite space and infinite space is limits. An inch in so far as it is cannot be distinguished from infinite space. That is, if I show an inch, you are unable to tell whether I took the inch out of a foot, a mile, or infinite space. Space has no quality other than its quantity. Infinity is of quantity, not of quality. There is no infinite quality. When quality becomes infinite it has passed into quantity. Quantity is that which has its Sein in its form. Limits do not change the quantity. The last foot is exactly the same kind of foot that is the first or the hundredth in a line. Hence, continuity is quantity with the limits removed. The limits making no alteration in the quantity, the quantity maintains its identity through and beyond the limits. The limit is not something new, but the particularizing of the quantity. One hour does not differ as quantity from eternity. It is discreet, particularized time. There is nothing in discreet time but time except the discreet. The discreet is the Dasein, the form of time. But quantity is form. Therefore, quantity is the unity of the *an-sich-sein* and the *für-sich-sein*. The *für-sich-sein* is for itself. That is, quantity has no relation outside itself.  $2/7$  will give 285714,285714, as long as we divide. The series has its Sein in the  $2/7$  and the  $2/7$  has expression in the series. The series is a process that exhibits continuity and discreetness. The  $2/7$  fixes the process and the process does not go beyond the  $2/7$ . The process is the unity of the *an-sich-sein* and the *für-sich-sein*, the  $2/7$  and the six terms continued without end. That is, this quantity  $2/7$  is discreet and continuous, finite and infinite. Both lie in the structure of the process. So Kant is correct when he

says the antinomy is fundamental. It is far more than a bit of sophistry. But his conclusion, we do not reach the infinite is reversed. The infinite is the only attainable. We reach nothing but the infinite. 2/7 in so far as it is anything is infinite. The antinomy instead of being the bar to truth is the door to truth. It is the dialectic process. The grain of wheat negates itself as form, not as wheat, in order that it may sprout and increase into twenty grains. The negation is not death, not destruction, but life. The form reappears as identical with itself and in twenty other forms. The antinomy appears to be the death of the contestants. But it is not so. It is absorbed in the dialectic process. It is the process of life. And in the Begriff not even form disappears. The thought process creates its forms, negates these forms, passes into other forms, but does not lose the negated forms. History is the negated forms of thought. When a form of thought is negated, it is not committed to the earth, but to history. And history is not the sphere of the dead. It is living. History is an illustration of man's power to live, to live without limits, life conscious of itself as without limits, beyond the beginning and reaching across the end. Kant, like Columbus, made a discovery. Also like Columbus, he failed to give an account of his discovery.

H. H. WILLIAMS.

#### MR. W. J. PERRY ON "PUGNACITY"

**I** WELCOME Mr. Perry's refreshingly pugnacious article on pugnacity, because in it he shows, unlike too many sociologists, a keen interest in psychology and a sense of its importance for the social sciences. He goes, perhaps, even further than I can follow him in that direction, when he says that "in the last analysis the problems of social psychology are reducible to those of the individual." We are agreed that social institutions, however powerfully they may mould individual development, cannot be understood or explained without reference to the psychology of the men who have formed and maintained them. But Mr. Perry's article is clearly an attack upon views put forward by me; and when, at the invitation of the editor, I attempt to reply to it, I find my task very difficult

because I cannot discover what exactly it is that he wishes to refute.

He takes pains to show that certain rather speculative generalizations about the social rôle of the instinct of pugnacity (made in my "Social Psychology") are not illustrated in a perfectly consistent manner by my description of "The Pagan Tribes of Borneo." It would be easy to explain away the exceptions to the rules which he points out, by showing that some are apparent only, and that others are to be explained by special circumstances. But that would be a tedious and otiose task. No sensible sociologist, however strong his psychological leanings, would expect to be able to deduce all the institutions and customs of any people from their constitutional peculiarities, even if these were known by him in detail. Mr. Perry's notions of the applicability of individual psychology to the explanation of social customs are too naïve. A single illustration of this must suffice. He points out that I have described certain villagers as "sociable and kindly to one another" within each community, yet very pugnacious towards other communities. And his argument seems to be—such collective or group pugnacity cannot be in any sense the expression of an instinctive pugnacity, for if these people possessed any instinctive pugnacity individuals within each community would be perpetually quarrelling with one another. He might have pointed with equal relevancy to another similar discrepancy in refutation of the view that these people possess a sexual instinct; namely, I have stated that they are somewhat lax in sexual relations before marriage, but that after marriage sexual irregularities are rare. Does Mr. Perry not understand that social customs and institutions may and do control and modify profoundly the expression of our instinctive tendencies?

**But I gather from the general tone of Mr. Perry's article that he aims to do more than point out certain difficulties in the application of the conception of instinctive pugnacity to the explanation of social phenomena in detail.** Is he, then, one of those who are for "giving up instincts in psychology"? Apparently not, for he seems to accept the sexual and other instincts as constituent factors of human nature. Is it, then, Mr. Perry's contention that though human nature does comprise certain instinctive tendencies, the pugnacious tendency is not one of them? If so, then I would ask him how he proposes to account for the liability to anger which is certainly present in a very large proportion of the human species. Or does he contend that, though this tendency is present in all men, it plays no part in determining the social practices and institutions in

which the sociologist is primarily interested? Or is his contention merely that the pugnacious tendency is equally strong in all men and in all races, and that therefore it is illegitimate to postulate differences of degree in this respect in order to account for differences of custom and institution? If so, I would ask him what is the ground of this opinion, and I would insist again on the proposition (made and defended in my *Group Mind* and in my *National Welfare and National Decay*) that the racial peculiarities of any enduring community find their clearest expression in its customs and institutions. If Mr. Perry will clearly propound any one of these theses, or any other incompatible with what I have written, I will do my best to defend or, if necessary, modify my views. But pending that, I can only infer that Mr. Perry has read somewhere the foolish statement that warfare can never be made obsolete because it is the expression of an ineradicable instinct of pugnacity; that he feels obscurely though illogically that what I have written of pugnacity seems to give color to this statement; and that his naturally strong pugnacity is aroused by it. Perhaps he is one of our pugnacious pacifists who would establish the reign of peace on earth by slaughtering their fellowmen on a large scale. In any case it seems that "the instinct of pugnacity" is to Mr. Perry, as the proverbial red rag to a bull; but, though he has charged valiantly against it, I cannot see that, in spite of all the dust, he has damaged it appreciably. If his charges are to produce any result they must be directed towards some definite goal.

W. McDougall.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

## BOOK REVIEWS

COMMON-SENSE ETHICS. By C. E. M. Joad. London: Methuen, 1921. Pp. XVI + 207. Price, 6s. net.

MORAL THEORY. By G. C. Field. London: Methuen, 1921. Pp. x + 214. Price, 6s. net.

Mr. Joad's trilogy<sup>1</sup> suggests that while Common-sense forms an excellent basis for speculation, it is still possible to have too much of a good thing; and that since even the Scottish school could do little with it in philosophy, it is not very hopeful to repeat the attempt. Few of us would rely mainly on Common-Sense to supply hats to put on our heads; it is even more doubtful therefore that it can furnish a philosophy to put into them. Mr. Joad, however,

is firmly convinced that all earlier thought on ethical problems has been fruitless, simply because it has had no "relation to the business of living." It is difficult to realize that this is asserted, with any seriousness, of Aristotle and Kant, of Sidgwick, Green and Mill; but it represents the author's general attitude to the classical moralists. His criticism is exceptionally severe. Ethics has failed "to apply to the actual problems of life," because it has pursued "the methods of *a priori* reasoning"; and again we are driven to ask if this is really intended to apply to the utilitarians, or to the Critical systems of Kant and Hegel.<sup>2</sup>

Now criticism is an indispensable prolegomenon to any philosophic system; but it is equally necessary for it to rest on a firm basis. The foundation of Mr. Joad's critical standpoint, however, is so extremely questionable that it is frankly surprising to find so able a writer succumbing to the impulse to sacrifice ordinary accuracy for the sake of aphoristic brilliance. We find *e. g.* that "Descartes . . . deduced by means of the laws of logic the whole structure and nature of the Universe. Leibnitz constructed a mathematical universe on the basis of a number of homogeneous units . . . called monads" (p. 91); whereas the monads, consistently with the principle of the Identity of indiscernibles, were essentially heterogeneous, and (so far as number can be considered at all) were infinite. Mr. Joad, in short, appears to have confused the monads of Leibnitz with those of Bruno.

But (to use his own words) "the most striking example of this tendency" to misrepresent those whom he criticizes is found in his presentation of Hegelianism (p. 92). "There is only one thing in the Universe which is absolutely real: this thing is the Absolute. . . . There is no distinction between mind and its objects, just as there is no distinction between any two physical objects. . . . The ultimate reality is mental in structure, and matter is a delusion." It would be difficult to compress more errors within so small a space; it is not a summary; it is a travesty. There are only two conceivable explanations—either ignorance of Hegel's own position, or carelessness in expounding it. Referring to Hegel's own works, we find it explicitly stated that "the principle of the One is ideal, but not in the sense of being in thought or in the head alone."<sup>3</sup> Again, "I relate myself to an object. The object is independent. I have not made it, it did not wait for me in order to exist, and it remains although I go away from it. I and the object are therefore two independent things."<sup>4</sup>

Why cannot modern critics give Hegel credit for meaning just what he says here? For these passages are not isolated statements; they can be paralleled repeatedly, and constitute the very foundation of his entire system of thought.

So much, then, for Mr. Joad's criticism of his predecessors. His constructive treatment consists in the psychological analysis of Impulse as a factor in all conscious activity, based largely on current psycho-analysis and behaviorism, together with Mr. Russell's fallacious distinction between "creative" and

<sup>1</sup> *Common-Sense Philosophy, Common-Sense Ethics, Common-Sense Theology*.

<sup>2</sup> Contrast, *e. g.*, Prof. Kemp Smith, *Commentary*, pp. xxxv, xxxvi.

<sup>3</sup> *History of Philosophy*, Vol. I., p. 303.

<sup>4</sup> *The Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. I., p. 107. Cf. Dr. Bosanquet's recent *Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 5.

"possessive" impulses. But it is surely obvious that this distinction has but the slightest foundation in actual experience. The two are most intimately connected; the "impulse" to possess both stimulates and controls the "impulse" to create. It is equally manifest that both alike require unceasing regulation; the only problem is as to where the basis for this is to be found. To fall back once more upon impulse is to appeal from Philip drunk to Philip insane. Our sole refuge lies in the appeal to Philip sober; or in other words to Reason. And this, surprisingly enough, is precisely Mr. Joad's final solution when he attempts a "metaphysical basis for the Theory of Impulse as the expression of the Life Force" (p. 176). The "Life Force," it appears, belongs to Mr. Shaw; and like its famous creator, "it is constantly thrusting, and pulsing, and throbbing, and abhors the static" (p. 199). Mr. Joad's metaphysical method is of equal interest. For, abandoning his initial contention that classical Ethics has no "relation to the business of living," he concludes that it is after all not necessarily untrue to life" (pp. xii, 176). Philosophy, then, "following its peculiar method of *a priori* reasoning on the presuppositions of our experience, increases the scope of our speculations" (p. 177); and thus Common-Sense finally discovers its true affinity in an undiluted Kantianism.

Mr. Field's book is of a totally different character. He, too, is essentially critical; but his criticism is allied with appreciation. Himself an acute and lucid thinker, he recognizes the labor which thought has demanded from earlier thinkers in the sphere of Ethics. None of them, it is true, has achieved finality; but this is the result not so much of faulty methods and mistaken standpoints as of the extreme complexity and difficulty of the subject matter. There is but one remedy for the deficiencies of classic ethical systems; and that lies in a keener analysis and a profounder logic. Mr. Field modestly describes his volume as an "Introduction" rather than a text-book. So far as form and method of treatment go, this is certainly an accurate description; but in spite of that his work is by far the clearest survey of the general principles and problems of modern ethics that has appeared for some considerable time. The author's own conclusions are not merely presented to the reader; they are carefully argued out, equally without superfluous detail as without the omission of anything really vital. Above all, the student is from the outset made acquainted with the real subject matter of his enquiry—with those indubitable facts of experience which ethics seeks to analyze and codify, as distinct from the metaphysical basis or background with which, even while it maintains a constant and intimate relation, it is the province of philosophy to deal. This, as all teachers will at once recognize, is an outstanding merit; for nowhere, except perhaps in dealing with religion, is the boundary more confused than it is between philosophy, as such, and ethics.

Mr. Field employs a powerful dialectic; but it is at the same time so supple that the various questions are presented in their manifold aspects with deceptive ease. Kant, at first sight, would not appear an attractive author with whom to begin the analysis of moral experience. Kant's treatment is certainly fundamental; but his own expression of his thought is bafflingly obscure. The author however, has selected Kant's system as one typical attempt to rationalize conduct, and his treatment here, at once expository and critical, is a masterpiece of lucidity. The mastery of Kant constitutes one-half of all philosophy; the other half lies in discovering where Kant was wrong.

From the German ethicist the author passes on to the typical moralist of the ancient world—Aristotle, here likewise supplementing his analysis of Aristotelian morality with an elucidation of the outlook of our own day. Nothing is omitted which is essential to the initial consideration of the entire situation; and it is extremely interesting to notice that while Mr. Field is altogether too modern to be a rigid Kantian he finds much to sympathize with in Aristotelianism; a tribute, possibly, to the eternal youth of Greek thought. He concludes with a "constructive theory" which itself fully merits what he has accorded to his predecessors—keen yet sympathetic and appreciative criticism.

J. E. TURNER